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SUMMARY 
Infrastructure is presenting significant national and global challenges.  Whilst often 
seen as performing well, infrastructure tends to do so against only limited terms of 
reference and short-term objectives.  Given that the world is facing a new 
infrastructure bill of some £40T, improving the benefits delivered by existing 
infrastructure is vitally important (USD$57T; Dobbs et al., 2013).   
This thesis investigates strategic intent and the management of infrastructure 
systems; how factors such as organisational structure and business practice affect 
outcomes and the ways in which those systems — not projects — are managed.  
To date, performance has largely been approached from the perspective of project 
investment and/or delivery, or the assessment of latent failures arising from specific 
shocks or disruptive events (e.g. natural disaster, infrastructure failures, climate 
change).  By contrast, the delivery of system-level services and outcomes across 
the infrastructure system has been rarely examined.  This is where infrastructure 
forms an enduring system of services, assets, projects, and networks each at 
different stages of their lifecycle, and affecting one another as they develop, then 
age.  Yet system performance, which also includes societal, organisational, 
administrative and technical factors, is arguably the level relevant to, and the reality 
of, day-to-day public infrastructure management.   
This research firstly investigated industry perceptions in order to test and confirm 
the problem: the nub of which was the inability to fully deliver appropriate and 
relevant infrastructure outcomes over the long term.  Three detailed studies then 
explored the reasons for this problem through different lenses; thereby providing an 
evidence-base for a range of issues that are shared by the wider infrastructure 
industry.  The results: 
 provide a range of novel insights that are applicable to industry at several 
levels; 
 highlight a range of complex, interrelated features of the management of 
infrastructure systems, which do not fulfil, or align with strategic intent; and  
 point to a range of implications for long-term outcomes. 
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In confirming its hypothesis that “the strategic intent and the day-to-day 
management of infrastructure systems are often misaligned, with negative 
consequences for achieving the desired long-term infrastructure system outcomes”, 
this research has increased our understanding of the ways in which that 
misalignment occurs, and the consequences that result.  It found those 
consequences were material, and frequently not visible within the sub-system 
accountable for the delivery of those outcomes. 
That public infrastructure exists, not in its own right, but to be of benefit to society, 
is a central theme drawn from the definition of infrastructure itself.  This research 
shows that it is not enough to be focused on technical outcomes.  Infrastructure 
needs to move beyond how society interacts with an asset, to the outcomes that 
reflect the needs, beliefs, and choices of society as well as its ability to respond to 
change (aptitude).   
Although the research has confirmed its hypothesis and three supporting 
propositions, the research does not purport to offer ‘the solution’.  Single solutions 
do not exist to address the challenges facing a complex adaptive system such as 
infrastructure.  But the research does offer several system-oriented sense-making 
models at both the detailed and system-level.  This includes the probing 
methodology by way of a diagnostic roadmap.  These models aim to assist 
practitioners in managing the transition of projects, assets, and services into a 
wider infrastructure system, their potential, and in (re)orienting the organisation to 
the dynamic nature of the system and its societal imperative.  
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GLOSSARY 
AMETI Auckland-Manukau Eastern Transport Initiative. 
AMP Asset Management Plan. 
AT Auckland Transport.   
BCR Benefit–cost ratio. 
BT Business technology. 
CAPEX Capital expenditure or the costs of building new 
infrastructure.  Audit New Zealand (2010, p. 76) uses the 
following definition from the Royal Institution of Chartered 
Surveyors “one-off expenditure on major items which have a 
life of longer than one year (e.g. land and property) [...] with 
current expenditure implications”.   
CAPEX can include rebuilding older infrastructure if the cost 
of the ‘renewal’ exceeds budgetary thresholds (defined by 
context). 
Consequential 
OPEX (cOPEX) 
New maintenance and operational expenditure (OPEX) 
arising from capital development. 
EU European Union. 
IPENZ Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand. 
IRI International roughness index. 
IT Information technology 
ITP Integrated Transport Programme. 
KPI Key performance indicator. 
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Latent factors Latent failures derive from factors which may not in 
themselves result in failure, which may take time to become 
apparent, or which may lie dormant until combining with other 
factors or circumstances (Reason, 1990).   
LGA Local Government Act, 2002. 
LGA(AC) Local Government (Auckland Council) Act, 2009. 
LoS Level(s) of service. 
LTMA Land Transport Management Act, 2003. 
MoW New Zealand Ministry of Works and Development. 
NAMS National Asset Management Support. 
NZ New Zealand. 
NZTA New Zealand Transport Agency.   
O&M Operations and maintenance. 
OPEX Operational expenditure or operating costs.  Audit New 
Zealand (2010, p. 78) advises that OPEX is revenue 
spending, and uses the definition within the International 
Infrastructure Management Manual, which states that OPEX 
“include[s] costs for operations personnel, materials, fuel, 
chemicals and energy consumption etc.”  
RLTP Regional Land Transport Programme. 
RMA Resource Management Act, 1991. 
RPTP Regional Public Transport Plan. 
SOI Statement of Intent  
STE Smooth travel exposure. 
System A system is a network of interdependent components that 
work together to try and accomplish the aim of the system. 
(Deming in Holmgren, 2005, p. 17).   
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TDM Travel demand management. 
UK United Kingdom. 
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LOCALITY GUIDE 
A guide to the New Zealand regions (black) and cities (red) referred to within this 
research: 
 
Source:  Modified from Statistics New Zealand (2014) 
  
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
xxii   CMB150717_E 
 
 
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
CMB150717_E   xxiii 
FOREWORD 
I have spent 25 years integrating the principles of sustainability into a diverse range 
of infrastructure projects and strategies in New Zealand, Australia, and the Pacific.  
Over that time, I observed that, even where the projects involved innovative 
solutions to address whole-of-life matters, it was often difficult, subsequently, to 
sustain — or even deliver — all the intended outcomes once the project was 
handed over for routine operation. At first, I treated these problems simply as 
challenges to be overcome.  However, it became clear to me that not only were 
there issues with the integration of project assets and services into the wider 
physical system, operational practices often did not align with, and support, some 
outcomes.  This was particularly evident where infrastructure: 
 served several functions:  For example, a constructed wetland delivering 
stormwater treatment, and cultural, amenity, and ecological benefits; and/or 
 could not be managed using existing asset management tools:  For example 
the inability of conventional (linear) road asset management systems to capture 
non-linear assets (e.g. public transport facilities), or non-standard 
materials/solutions (e.g. constructed wetlands).  Issues were exacerbated 
where there was a reliance on, and/or assumption that those same systems had 
captured all ongoing operational requirements.  
These were not the only examples, and issues that had the potential to erode long-
term outcomes — or had already done so — were encountered at all stages 
(strategic, project, operational).   
These problems are not unique to my experience.  For example: 
 M. Brown, Clarkson, Barton, and Joshi (2013) describe ‘follow-through’ issues 
with ecological compensation practice.  New Zealand infrastructure 
development is often subject to conditions, which may require ecological 
compensation.  Aside from being a matter of non-compliance, failure to follow-
through on conditions can erode the outcome(s) upon which that infrastructure 
was predicated. 
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 IPENZ (2010) identified issues in areas of infrastructure performance reporting, 
and questioned whether society was actually getting the levels of service being 
reported.   
As will be seen, industry interviews completed as part of this research provided yet 
more examples of eroded outcomes: of water treatment plants becoming ineffectual 
because investment and design decisions are not well understood; of perverse 
outcomes arising from coupling with personal and/or project or organisational 
performance measures, and of infrastructure being managed around technical 
performance rather than customer need.   
Such problems do not relate to whether project-level initiatives were being 
delivered across project stages.  Project-level matters, such as the follow-through 
of actions arising from environmental effects assessments, have already been the 
subject of other investigations (e.g. Arts, Caldwell, & Morrison-Saunders, 2001), 
and is an area that I worked on some time ago (e.g. Blom, 1997, 2000).  Rather, 
the point is that even if questions of project delivery are fully addressed across all 
project stages prior to handover, there remains a wider systemic problem.  This 
relates to the operational ability to deliver intended outcomes, not just of the 
project, but of the underpinning systemic strategic intent that firstly defined that 
project.  What is required is Systems Thinking for systems, not projects. 
Whilst this is not solely an engineering, operational, or performance issue, this is, 
nonetheless, a problem for engineers.  This is because engineers are 
predominantly responsible for the delivery, management, and operation of public 
infrastructure and the control of the wider organisational framework.  So, while 
infrastructure rarely fails catastrophically, and may perform well in the short term or 
from a certain perspective, engineers need to address these problems of outcome 
delivery, which are insidious, complex, not widely articulated, and furthermore, less 
researched.  Without systemic research we cannot be sure of whether the 
problems are material, and are left with unconnected anecdotes that are of limited 
value in improving the delivery of infrastructure outcomes. 
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Before going further, two fundamental matters are brought to the reader’s attention.   
Both are discussed again within the thesis, and both shape how the research has 
been, and needs to be, approached: 
 The first is a reminder that infrastructure is "the basic physical and 
organisational structures and facilities (e.g. buildings, roads, power supplies) 
needed for the operation of a society or enterprise" ("Oxford English 
Dictionary (online version)," 2014; emphasis added).  Notably, assets in 
themselves are not sufficient for the delivery of outcomes, and so underline the 
importance of the service(s) delivered by built infrastructure. 
 The second is that when considered in its context, infrastructure exists both as 
a system itself, and within a wider system (Hall, Henriques, Hickford, & Nicholls, 
2013).  Here, it comprises all the services, assets, projects, and networks with 
which it co-exists and interacts — all at different stages of their lifecycles — 
dynamically affecting one another as they develop, then age.   
In short, conventional, linear thinking is inadequate to deliver intended long-term 
infrastructure outcomes and a new paradigm is required; one that is both outwardly 
focused and system oriented.  We need a different ‘mental model’ from the project- 
and asset-based conventions that dominate infrastructure practice at this time (e.g. 
Edkins & Zerjav, 2014; Lenfle & Loch, 2015), and must address the question as to 
whether current infrastructure practice is capable of supporting system-level 
strategic intent.  
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1 BACKGROUND 
This thesis investigates the relationship between the strategic intent and the 
management of infrastructure systems.  Much has been written from a 
management perspective about the challenges in implementing strategy and 
aligning day-to-day management with strategic intent.1  Attention has also been 
given to the matter of project selection and the factors that promulgate poor project 
outcomes.2  Yet infrastructure operational matters have received relatively little 
attention.  Whilst operational infrastructure does not often fail catastrophically 
during its design life, it also does not appear to be performing as well as it could 
be.3  It is this less obvious underperformance that is the problem that interests this 
research. 
For infrastructure associated with the public sector (the focus here), under-
performance has been highlighted by the metric-driven approach of ‘New Public 
Management’ (Hartley, Donaldson, Skelcher, & Wallace, 2008).  Performance has 
otherwise been addressed: 
 in relation to the latent failures arising from specific disruptive events (e.g. 
natural disaster, infrastructure failures, climate change); or  
 from a project- or artefact-oriented perspective (e.g. through network modelling, 
asset management, or project management and delivery frameworks).   
However, a distinct ‘project’ exists for only a relatively short period before being 
embedded within the wider system and dispersed across operational functions and 
                                              
1
 e.g. Ford and Schellenberg (1982), Kaplan and Norton (2001, 2008); Kim and Mauborgne 
(2005); Loch and Tapper (2002); Prahalad and Gary Hamel (2003), to name but a few. 
2
 e.g. the corpus of work by Flyvbjerg, the OMEGA Centre, amongst many others. 
3
 e.g. Dobbs et al. (2013); IPENZ (2010). 
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processes.  Instead, infrastructure is an enduring system that comprises multiple 
interacting services, assets, projects, and networks — all at different stages of their 
lifecycles — dynamically affecting one another as they develop, then age.   
The challenge, then, is integrating individual projects, assets, and service 
initiatives, into the existing system.  This is so that their impacts, benefits, and 
contribution to the whole system can be recognised, understood, and managed.  In 
other words, Systems Thinking for systems, not projects.  Whilst this should 
arguably be the reality of day-to-day public infrastructure management, this has 
rarely been examined from the perspective of delivering services across the 
system.   
This research, therefore, firstly investigates the literature and the views of 
infrastructure practitioners.  This is to ascertain whether there is a (perceived) 
misalignment between the strategic intent (intended outcomes) and the way in 
which infrastructure systems are managed, the outcomes that result, and how this 
is recognised, and described.  After this broad inquiry, three different cases are 
studied to explore the emergent issues in depth and from three different 
perspectives, in order to gain qualitative insights into effective infrastructure 
practice.   
This is novel given the likes of Hartley et al. (2008); Jackson (2009a); Jowitt and 
Milke (2013), are of the view that whole-of-systems working is still emergent in 
operational research and is even less advanced in the areas of public service and 
thence public infrastructure administration.  The research also offers several 
system-oriented sense-making models at both the detailed and system level.  The 
aim is to assist practitioners in managing the transition of projects, assets, and 
services into a wider, dynamic, infrastructure system that is focused on externally 
oriented service outcomes.  
The case/field focus on understanding is preferable for new theory development in 
operations management […] because eventually, the explanation of quantitative 
findings and the construction of theory based on those findings will ultimately have to be 
based on qualitative understanding.   
Meredith (1998, p. 453) 
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1.1 Infrastructure context and literature 
What is infrastructure? 
Infrastructure is critical to many aspects of society and the quality of life in our 
communities (e.g. Armitt, 2013; Dobbs et al., 2013; New Zealand Government, 
2011b; OECD, 2012).  Often simply described by its fixed, physical assets or 
networks, these are typically long-lived structures, individual assets such as bridges 
or buildings, often having a design life of 50-100 years.4   
However, the value of these assets lies not in the structures per se, but in their 
societal outcomes, as infrastructure is, by its very definition ("Oxford English 
Dictionary (online version)," 2014; emphasis added): 
The basic physical and organizational structures and facilities (e.g. 
buildings, roads, power supplies) needed for the operation of a 
society or enterprise. 
Public infrastructure is that used by or within the public realm, and in New Zealand 
(the focus of the later detailed studies), this is generally in some form of public 
ownership (New Zealand Government, 2011b).  It is acknowledged that, elsewhere, 
this might not always be the case (e.g. parts of the United Kingdom (UK) water 
sector).  However, the focus here is upon the underlying infrastructure (engineering 
management) practice.  This distinguishes between the business acumen expected 
within New Public Management (discussed next) and infrastructure organisations 
that exist as a commercial enterprise. 
                                              
4
 As a network or a system, infrastructure can endure for centuries (the proverbial ‘grandfather’s 
axe’ or ‘Theseus’s ship’).  Roman roads, which often describe modern transport routes across 
Europe, are an example of this (Carreras & De Soto, 2013).  Infrastructure is therefore an 
‘evolutionary system’ (Atkinson & Moffat, 2005; de Wit & Meyer, 2010; Green, 1994; Star, 1999; 
van der Lei, Herder, & Wijnia, 2012), complete with the added complexity that comes with 
social, functional, and individual perspective and perception. 
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What are some of the key challenges facing infrastructure administration? 
It is both the critical nature of infrastructure and its interdependencies that underline 
the significance of the global challenges now being presented.  These include the 
following issues:5 
 much ‘new world’ or post-war infrastructure is simultaneously approaching the 
end of its design life; 
 infrastructure is often poorly performing, or inadequate for current and future 
needs; and 
 natural disasters have underlined the importance of infrastructure resilience.  
Yet the catastrophic failure of infrastructure is relatively rare, and indeed 
infrastructure may be perceived or reported as performing relatively well in many 
areas (e.g. New Zealand Government, 2011b).  However, this may only be the 
case when considered against a limited set of performance measures and 
frequently short-term considerations (M. Brown et al., 2013; Controller and Auditor-
General, 2014b; Fenner & Ainger, 2014).  Furthermore, and irrespective of any 
reported good performance, there is also an identified need for ongoing 
improvement (Controller and Auditor-General, 2014b; New Zealand Government, 
2011b).   
Unsurprisingly, there is a growing focus on the outcomes being delivered, 
particularly by existing infrastructure.  This follows the development of ‘New Public 
Management’ in the public sector, which emphasises business-like performance 
management and stakeholder collaboration (Asquith, 2016; Dunleavy & Hood, 
1994; Hendriks & Tops, 1999, 2003; Hood, 1991; Lowndes, 1997).  However, 
infrastructure-related literature in this area appears to be sparse.  Almklov and 
Antonsen (2014, p. 1) provide one of the few examples to consider the implications 
of New Public Management upon infrastructure practice.  Significantly, they found 
that it “renders essential aspects of operational work invisible — including practices 
that are known to be of importance for reliability”, particularly operational co-
                                              
5
 Dobbs et al. (2013); Fenner and Ainger (2014); Guthrie and Konaris (2012); Hall et al. (2013); 
OECD (2012); and OMEGA Centre (2012). 
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ordination and the retention of operational history.  In this regard, Almklov and 
Antonsen (2014, p. 1) observe that operational work has no clear beginning or end, 
and that this may be “hard to prescribe, describe, and control”.  They argue that this 
is at odds with the New Public Management model, and that  there is very little 
research into the effects of New Public Management upon the practice of operating 
critical infrastructure. 
How has infrastructure research approached these challenges? 
Attention has been given to improving outcomes through ex ante project selection 
or investment processes (e.g. Flyvbjerg, 2009; Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & 
Rothengatter, 2003).  However, whilst of vital importance, overall performance 
requires more than the delivery of a programme of works.  Crucially: 
 infrastructure governance systems have typically remained unchanged despite 
their ability to effect positive change (Dobbs et al., 2013); and 
 feedback within infrastructure management practice is poor (Busby, 1998), and 
any differences between planned and actual project performance are frequently 
“explained away as an isolated instance of unfortunate circumstance” 
(Flyvbjerg, Skamris Holm, & Buhl, 2003, p. 72). 
In this context, Edkins and Zerjav (2014, pp. 2-3) argue that the asset- and service-
-based typologies need to be broadened to construct “a novel concept of 
infrastructure and the management of its interdependencies that moves beyond the 
domain of engineering artefacts and includes interactions between actors, 
organizations and institutions”.   
Research on latent failures6 can provide one form of engineering and infrastructure 
feedback.  The effect of latent failure has been researched in the area of natural 
disasters (Desouza & Flanery, 2013), catastrophic failure of infrastructure (e.g. 
Matthew Bolton, Bass, & Siminiceanu, 2008; Reason, 1990), or emergent events 
such as climate change (Crabbé & Robin, 2006).  Whilst arguably germane to 
infrastructure operations, latent failure analysis is seeking either specific root 
                                              
6
 e.g. Reason (1990). 
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
8 Background CMB150717_E 
causes or outcomes relative to a specific event (e.g. Goodman & Ramanujam, 
2012; Reason, 1995).7   
However, there are few published studies that explore the shortcomings of 
‘business-as-usual’ operations within the public infrastructure space, and more 
particularly addressing such issues at a system level.  This includes research both 
into failure of the system as well as the positive flip side to this, system ‘fitness’ (to 
extrapolate Flyvbjerg (2009)).  Work by the World Bank describe “big holes in the 
big picture” (Estache & Fay, 2010, p. 3).  As Schön (1991, p. 9) has observed: 
A series of announced national crises — the deteriorating cities, 
poverty, the pollution of the environment, the shortage of energy, 
seemed to have roots in the very practices of science, technology, and 
public policy that were being called upon to alleviate them.   
Of the research that does exist in this area, most examines the problem from within 
Classical Optimisation Theory (e.g. Durango-Cohen, 2007).  The nearest relevant 
research is that from the healthcare sector where the research is starting to explore 
whole-of-system working (see Section 1.2.2).   
Is there a public infrastructure research need? 
Much of the current literature about built infrastructure examines issues through a 
project-centric lens rather than that of the system.  This presupposes a 
conventional asset lifecycle of: plan–build–maintain–dispose (Figure 1.1), and 
examines the issues with the implicit presumption of delivering more projects, then 
optimising the maintenance and renewal of the hard assets.8  Accordingly, much of 
the existing literature is essentially focused on optimising each of the tasks or 
stages within the lifecycle, with a particular emphasis on project delivery and asset 
management.   
                                              
7
 The limitations of this approach being identified as a problem for the public service sector 
(Hartley et al., 2008). 
8
 Similar linear ‘systems models’ may be found in manufacturing and management, such as that 
promulgated by Deeming (in Seddon, 2008). 
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Figure 1.1:  Conventional infrastructure lifecycle 
Source:  Synthesised from Guthrie and Konaris (2012); Lenferink, Tillema, and Arts (2008); van 
der Lei et al. (2012)
9
 
This raises three points: 
 Project delivery is a bounded system that is generally subject to controlled or 
managed changes in parameters within its boundaries.  Whilst project- and 
system-level matters are not mutually exclusive, they should not be assumed to 
be one and the same. 
 Whilst infrastructure systems are dynamic, for those infrastructure types with 
the ongoing delivery of assets/projects/programmes, that state of flux and 
change is exacerbated.  This is because, excluding most renewals, capital 
works or projects are ultimately designed to develop and change both the 
assets and function of the system.  
 The lifecycle (and its key stages of strategy/planning, capital works, and 
operations/maintenance) is more than just a theoretical model, it can also 
reflect/dictate organisational structures, silos, and processes.  It is notable that 
many organisations within the physical/built infrastructure sectors (i.e. roads, 
rail, energy, waters) are implicitly arranged to reflect this lifecycle.10,11   
                                              
9
 Whilst often shown in circular form, the ‘lifecycle’ remains ultimately project-oriented, and 
linear.  Note the simplification of the operational phase and in particular the absence of any 
renewal and/or repurposing processes. 
10
 P. Higgs, (New Zealand President, Institute of Public Works Engineering Australasia), pers. 
comm., 22 August 2016.  Also see Chapter 3. 
11
 This particularly differentiates built infrastructure sectors from other public infrastructure such 
as health services and policing (e.g. Seddon, 2008). 
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So, whilst there is an extensive body of literature aimed at improving (optimising) 
aspects of infrastructure management (e.g. project12 and asset management, 
strategy development, network function, benefit management, risk management), 
the reality is that this is not addressing system-level issues.  This reality is reflected 
in a number of frustrated comments within the literature, for example: 
 We often have quite messy, poorly structured situations where objectives are 
not clear, where different constituencies have conflicting aims and where the 
way forward requires vision and leadership as well as hard analysis and design. 
(Morris, in Winter, Smith, Morris, & Cicmil, 2006, p. 645) 
 Whilst the traditional engineering research methods are valuable to study the 
physical artefacts of infrastructure, such methods clearly have limitations in 
addressing the complexities that arise from social, financial, power, and other 
kinds of relations between different human actors and organizations that enact 
the web of infrastructure phenomena. (Edkins & Zerjav, 2014, p. 13) 
 Such problems can no longer be solved by the application of still more 
'engineering fixes' nor are they amenable to the conventional remedies of 
human factors specialists [...] These [...] depend upon acquiring a better 
understanding of the breakdown of complex socio-technical systems, and the 
development of new techniques of risk assessment. (Reason, 1990, p. 28) 
There is, then, a need to understand if, where, and how a breakdown in the 
business-as-usual management of infrastructure is occurring at the system level, 
and how this might then affect strategic decision-making or infrastructure 
governance. 
1.2 Wider literature  
Public service failure and turnaround are issues of pressing practical concern in most 
nations, yet theoretical and empirical research in this field is sparse.  
Boyne in Hartley et al. (2008, p. 249) 
                                              
12
 Including literature that canvasses the ability to deliver project undertakings and 
requirements, such those relating to environmental management and compliance (e.g. Arts et 
al., 2001; M. Brown et al., 2013). 
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It transpires that the wider academic literature says relatively little directly or 
specifically about the relationship between the strategic intent and the management 
of infrastructure systems beyond that already touched upon.   To echo a sentiment 
expressed by Loasby (1976, p. 9), who considers decision-making practice in the 
field of economics, "much of the content [of the existing literature] consists of a 
variety of devices by which the trick may be done".   
As this research is concerned with understanding the system and the issues it 
generates (evidence), and how to approach it (sense-making) — rather than the 
‘how to’ of public infrastructure administration (i.e. Loasby’s ‘trick’) — an oblique 
approach was required.  This Section, therefore, summarises literature from across 
a range of different disciplines with the aim of providing further context and 
background.  Additional literature is overviewed separately throughout the 
document, including that which relates to the specifics of the detailed studies.   
1.2.1 Operational context 
Organisations do not, of course, exist in isolation.13  Nor is the ‘environment’ static, 
or able to be controlled as a matter of convenience (Gallopin in Gunderson & 
Holling, 2002; Harris, 2007; Larsen-Freeman, 2013; Snowden, 2005).  
Nonetheless, De Geus (2002) observes that many organisations try to deal with the 
future by predicting it rather than asking how they might respond and adapt.  This is 
a particular issue for built infrastructure, which has a convention of ‘predict and 
provide’ (Owens, 1995), is dominated by physical assets, but which needs to 
continually adapt and evolve.  As Yorke, Walker, Holling, Gunderson, Folke, 
Carpenter, and Brock (in Gunderson & Holling, 2002, p. 436) opine: 
Most of our popular and scientific ideas are based on a static view of the 
world and the place of humans in it [...] In contrast, the evolutionary 
                                              
13
 The external context and accountability is particularly critical to the administration of public 
infrastructure.  Indeed, this is arguably one of the key reasons business and management 
literature only goes so far in addressing matters of public administration (Hartley and Skeltcher 
in Hartley et al., 2008). 
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basis of our biological insight stresses adaptation and response to 
changing conditions. 
Complexity Theory has emerged as a response to this environmental complexity 
and uncertainty (Straub, 2013; Uhl-Bien & Marion, 2008).  Although the theory 
endures, there appears to be a resistance to/an inability to grasp or implement the 
principles in real terms (Ackoff, 2006; Jowitt, 2013; Jowitt & Milke, 2013; Straub, 
2013).  This is, at least in part, an artefact of the principles attributable to a complex 
system, which are distinguished from simple and complicated systems by both 
features and behaviours:14 
 Self-organising, adaptive, evolutionary, learning behaviour. 
 Involving the observer (playing the game, changes the game). 
 The system’s history is irreversible. 
 Cause and effect may be spatially and/or temporally remote. 
 Contradictions are treated as paradoxes rather than error. 
 The level of complexity relates to the nature of system relationships rather than 
the number or type of component parts.   
 Whilst components may be knowable, they exist as integral part of a wider, ever 
changing system that includes non-linear feedback-loops.  A functional complex 
system is therefore not fully decomposable.15 
 Component parts may be nested or hierarchic, and diverse in nature. 
 Behaviour and outcomes are therefore dynamic and may not be predictable and 
may display (as a system or part thereof): 
- a dynamic stability (ordinary complex systems — able to respond/adapt to 
perturbation); 
- ‘antifragile’ behaviour (ability to thrive in disruptive conditions); 
                                              
14
 Synthesised from (amongst others) Ackoff (1971); Folke et al. (2002); Gaziulusoy (2010); 
Gunderson and Holling (2002); Harris (2007); Holling (2001); Kauffman (1993); Simon (1969); 
Snowden (2003); Taleb (2012); Uhl-Bien, Marion, and McKelvey (2007). 
15
 Simon (1969) suggests otherwise, as Loasby (1976, p. 33) explains “decomposability matters 
above all because it facilitates adaptation.  A completely decomposable system, as defined by 
Simon, would be fully adaptable to any change in its environment.  The assumption of complete 
decomposability is an assumption of complete adaptability." 
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- emergent behaviour (emergent complex systems — continually evolving, 
novel systems). 
Ackoff (1971) argues that a systems-approach is particularly apt for an organisation 
as a particular kind of system.  Infrastructure, too, is at once a system and part of a 
system (Hall et al., 2013).  In this regard, and crucially, infrastructure is also 
‘chaordic’, as infrastructure is continually interrelated with its environment (Olmedo, 
2010, p. 77).  Therefore “since hindsight no longer leads to foresight after a shift in 
context, a corresponding change in management style may be called for” 
(Snowden & Boone, 2007, p. 2). 
In line with De Geus (2002), the focus moves to how a system will respond over 
time; the ability of the system to adapt and respond to its environment or fitness 
landscape (Kauffman & Johnsen, 1991), rather than to predict it.16  This in turn 
introduces the concepts of long-term sustainability and resilience (Bollinger & 
Dijkema, 2012; Folke et al., 2002).   
Because complex systems also exhibit dynamic, goal seeking behaviour (Ackoff, 
1971), objectives must arguably shift from outcomes to aptitudes.17  Consequently, 
storytelling and metaphor are oft used means of communicating complex concepts 
and act as organisational memes (Boal & Schultz, 2007; Murray, 1998; Snowden, 
2003).  These can be difficult to integrate within conventional infrastructure 
management processes, systems, and tools.  More particularly, pinning down 
exactly how and when the principles have been adopted can be difficult, as there is 
no one solution to a complex problem or problem within a complex system.  
Whether this is actually problematic may have more to do with a perceived need to 
quantify and control outcomes, than necessarily being detrimental.  This also 
relates to the organisation’s ability to retain information and knowledge, and to 
learn. 
                                              
16
 Infrastructure, for example, has a tradition of ‘predict and provide’ (Hall et al., 2013; Owens, 
1995). 
17
 Defined in Section 2.3. 
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Information and knowledge are vital to all organisations, and underpin the very 
meaning of a bureaucracy, which quixotically “ensures permanence by the keeping 
of files and records, i.e. the 'know how' remains in the organisation and does not 
pass out with individuals who leave” (Lupton, 1969, p. 9). 
For example, in New Zealand, the Public Records Act (2005) requires local 
government to keep certain records (s17), and to lodge these with National 
Archives after 25 years (s21).18  And yet, as will be seen in Chapter 5, information 
retention is a significant problem.  Information and knowledge may also be affected 
by organisational boundary effects (Aldrich & Herker, 1977; Schein, 2010), or may 
otherwise become institutionalised or ‘canonical’ (Pidd in Hartley et al., 2008).  
These thereby limit an organisation’s capacity to absorb new information and to 
learn over time (Howlett & Morgan, 2011; Lowndes, 1997). 
Another aspect to learning is the preparedness to make and learn from mistakes.  
This touches on a range of organisational aspects from organisational culture 
through to goal setting, and the implications of ‘getting it wrong’ (Harford, 2011).  
Ackoff (2006) identifies this as one of the key reasons organisations do not actively 
adopt or apply the principles of Complexity Theory.   
1.2.2 Operational functioning 
Systems Thinking is another area that is closely aligned with the complexity 
discourse.  In the 1980s, social science research engaged with ‘large technical 
systems’ such as transportation, in which the system enables “a multitude of 
specific activities to take place" (Mayntz in Joerges & für Sozialforschung, 1998).  
Whilst noting that social science had tended to focus on the development and 
diffusion of technology and its consequences, Mayntz and Hughes (1988) observed 
a shift in interest to the role the systems played in society, and how such systems 
had developed.   
                                              
18
 The interface of the archive date with the asset life of physical infrastructure, the nature of the 
records deemed worthy of archiving, and whether the records have been kept are all of potential 
interest here. 
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More recently, Geels (2007) investigated the transformation of the Dutch highway 
system in response to a stated lack of literature on the matter.  Geels found that 
multiple levels (niche, regime, and landscape), together with the insider-outsider 
dynamics ascribed to Van de Poel (Ibid.), could describe the historical 
transformations of the study system.  However, whilst touching on the nature of 
infrastructure as a complex system, Geels’ research was ultimately concerned with 
past practice. 
By contrast, Jackson (2009a) usefully contemplates Systems Thinking in relation to 
management and its place in contemporaneous operational research (terming this 
“applied systems thinking”).  Whilst three strands to this are identified by Jackson, 
and highlight the evolution of applied system thinking, of particular relevance to this 
research is the commentary on a fourth tranche: described as ‘recent 
developments’.  In this, Jackson identifies two systems approaches that have been 
“little discussed in the academic world but are having a considerable impact on 
practice” (emphasis added; Ibid., p.30): 
'Whole Systems Working' has been influential in the field of health and 
social care.  It is described by Hudson (2006) as the process of 
involving all stakeholders of a domain in a discussion about service 
change—all parties are encouraged to think about the way the whole 
service delivery system works, rather than focusing only upon their own 
service. 
Vanguard's system thinking combines aspects of systems thinking, lean 
thinking and intervention theory to deliver, it claims (Seddon, 2003):  
A method for [...] achieving the ideals many managers aspire to: a 
learning, improving, innovative, adaptive and energized 
organization.  It provides the means to develop a customer-driven 
adaptive organization. 
This approach is getting significant take-up in the public sector, 
where it offers a damning critique of existing ways of doing things 
as well as numerous examples of a better way (Seddon, 2008). 
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Both approaches provide an object lesson in how relatively simple 
(though not simplistic) combinations of systems ideas can have a huge 
impact on improving managerial practice and the efficiency and 
effectiveness of organizations (Jackson et al, 2008).  
Hudson’s work, which usefully synthesises a number of key Complexity Theory and 
Systems Thinking concepts, describes an approach for integrated working at the 
system level (Hudson, 2006).  However, the aspiration of Hudson’s definition 
should not be construed as prerequisite criteria or a given method for approaching 
complex systems (i.e. it does not automatically stand that anything less than the 
involvement of all stakeholders cannot be classified as a whole system approach).  
Indeed, Hudson (Ibid., p.21) concludes that “a whole system approach does not 
offer a single technique or a new big answer”.  Supporting this, Hudson (2006) 
identifies four case studies,19 each of which uses a different method.  Vanguard 
offers yet another that targets ‘command and control’ regimes and seeks to 
optimise the administration services of local authorities with particular attention 
given to ‘failure demand’ (in Jackson, 2009a; see also Seddon, 2008; Seddon & 
Brand, 2008; Seddon & Caulkin, 2007).   
When faced with the scale, complexity, and goal-seeking (i.e. dynamic) nature of 
systems such as these, Ackoff (1994) and Snowden and Boone (2007) share the 
view that a probing approach is required.  Not only does this ‘sample’ the system 
(recalling that there is no single solution to a complex problem or problem within a 
complex system), it can also assist in identifying and/or assessing ‘points of 
leverage’.  These are points at which a small intervention can result in a 
disproportionate change or system-level outcome (e.g. Bosch, Nguyen, Maeno, & 
Yasui, 2013; Hudson, 2006). 
                                              
19
 All four were in the health and social services and paid “more than a passing conceptual nod 
to what a whole system approach is really about” (Hudson, 2006, p. 18).  Hudson (Ibid.) also 
notes that attempts to implement a whole system approach were “few and far between”.  
Notwithstanding the anecdotes provided by Seddon (2008), this somewhat challenges 
Jackson’s assertion that the approach has been influential in practice. 
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As Jackson (2009a) observes, this is an emerging field and it is clear that this 
includes not only the opportunity to contribute to the development of theory, but 
also methods and application.  For completeness, it is noted that the call for further 
systems thinking/system-level research has not been curtailed or precluded by the 
presence of identified issues or studies within related sectors at the task, project, or 
change initiative level. 
1.2.3 Strategy and operational alignment 
Whilst Osterwalder (2004), Kaplan and Norton (1996, 2001, 2004, 2008), and 
McKinsey (in R. Grant, Butler, Hung, & Orr, 2011) have developed tools to assist 
strategy development and implementation, the gap between ‘knowing and doing’ 
remains an issue (e.g. Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Ghobadian et al., 2007; G. 
Grant, McKnight, Uruthirapathy, & Brown, 2007).  For example, Johnston and 
Pongatichat (2008, p. 18) have observed: 
Distinct and definable practices (strategies and tactics) which 
demonstrated that, in practice [...] managers and staff went out of their 
way to avoid aligning measures with strategy, even though they had the 
authority and ability to change their measures and they were well aware 
of the strategic intentions of the organisation. 
Concluding that further work was warranted in the actual practice of strategy and 
management alignment, they observed several ‘coping mechanisms’ which were 
deployed by managers when faced with changing their practices to align with 
strategy: 
 short-term success strategies; 
 target adjustment tactics; 
 blaming tactics; and  
 deflecting tactics. 
Should these mechanisms exist within the infrastructure industry, then this is at 
odds with the notion of what constitutes both infrastructure and ‘civil service’.   
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Commenting directly on the public sector, Boyne (in Hartley et al., 2008, p. 237) 
observes that the emergent emphasis on performance indicators arising from the 
advent of New Public Management now means “it is easier to assess whether a 
service provider is failing in an absolute sense”.  Boyne goes on to identify two 
types of public sector failure, and notes that the type of failure has a direct bearing 
on turnaround strategy: 
 delivery of poor results (low scores on given performance indicators); and 
 low legitimacy (results do not conform to stakeholder expectations). 
Boyne (Ibid.) suggests the balance between the two failure modes can be linked to 
the strength of the institutional norms that constrain an organisation and therefore 
set stakeholder expectations.  However, Boyne notes there is still considerable 
scope for further research as the focus to date has largely been upon turnaround 
success arising from strategies such as retrenchment, repositioning, and 
reorganisation. 
As a subset of wider public sector practice, the ability to deliver public infrastructure 
that meets its strategic intent is also a prevalent theme (e.g. Controller and Auditor-
General, 2010, 2014b; Dobbs et al., 2013; IPENZ, 2010).  However, few studies 
reflect on system-level practice beyond departures from standards.   
Pahl-Wostl (2002, 2007, 2009) provides many of the available examples having 
investigated strategic alignment as it relates to the management of natural and 
water resources.  That work, through its exploration of collaborative learning 
environments and in particular the notions of single-, double-, and triple-loop 
learning in that context, highlights an inherent assumption of the existence of 
feedback-loops within the theoretical literature (Figure 1.2).20  In so doing, it 
underlines the importance of both feedback, and the lack thereof, within the reality 
of the infrastructure lifecycle (see also Chapter 3).  Of particular relevance to this 
research, Newig, Günther, and Pahl-Wostl (2010) further highlight a need to 
consider governance learning at the network (i.e. system) rather than actor level. 
                                              
20
 It also fails to recognise that the feedback inherently results in change (i.e. that the system is 
therefore chaordic; Olmedo (2010)). 
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Figure 1.2:  Feedback as a sequence of learning cycles 
Source:  Pahl-Wostl (2009) 
The interrelationship and alignment of strategic intent and the operational reality of 
infrastructure outcomes would appear then, from the available literature, to warrant 
further research.   
1.2.4 Decision-making  
Decision-making within the public sector 
Denhardt, Denhardt, and Blanc (2013) have identified the pluralistic nature of 
decision-making within the public sector as a consequence of access to democratic 
decision-making processes.  Accordingly, they argue it can be difficult to identify 
decision centres.  However, there are two facets to this: political, democratic 
processes; and community collaboration as promulgated through New Public 
Management approaches. 
At the political level, Wilson (1887), argued that public administration is separate 
from, but informs democratic political processes.  This in itself requires a clear 
distinction, as Wilson points out, between constitutional governance and 
administrative questions.  Similar issues were discussed within the New Zealand 
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local government context by the Office of the Auditor-General (Controller and 
Auditor-General, 2002).  
In the New Zealand context, many infrastructure organisations and Council 
Controlled Organisations now have boards, some members of which may be 
political appointees.  The term ‘governance’ is therefore not singular.  This thesis 
therefore refers to the governance provided by a board of directors, and the 
management within the body of the organisation.  Of direct relevance, one of the 
study organisations, Auckland Transport, has outlined its approach to governance, 
the political interface, and cultural responsiveness within its Statement of Intent 
(Auckland Transport, 2014d).  This is helpful in further delineating the scope of this 
research. 
Engineering decision-making 
Decision-making is fundamental to engineering (Jowitt, 2013), and consequently 
there is an extensive body of literature that addresses this both implicitly and 
explicitly.  However, much of the literature on engineering decision-making appears 
to have either a functional or a support focus, and although there are examples 
from the literature that explicitly consider the nature of engineering organisations 
(e.g. Busby, 1998; Dias, Subrahmanian, & Monarch, 2003), these tend to be 
sparse.   
Bergh and Lim (2008) briefly consider engineering at the system level in their 
assessment of the evolution of the city.  They suggest there has been a shift in 
focus from hardware (e.g. infrastructure), through software (e.g. quality of life, 
safety), to ‘orgware’ (organising capacity or the ability to deal with the hardware and 
the software).  What still tends to be missing from the engineering literature is 
research into engineering decisions made at the systems level within the strategic 
and governance processes of public administration systems.  This was also 
observed in the sustainability area, in which Hacking and Guthrie (2008, p. 75) 
identified the need for more than just comprehensiveness, and that “strategicness” 
and “integratedness” were also required.  
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Whilst commenting on literature relating to decision-making in engineering design, 
Simon (1972, p. 172) suggests that the paucity of material is because Classical 
Decision Theory concerns itself with choice among given alternatives.  By contrast, 
he argues engineering design is about “the discovery and elaboration of 
alternatives”.  Similarly, binary strategic decisions are also rarely appropriate, 
particularly in light of uncertainty or complexity (Courtney, Kirkland, & Viguerie, 
1997).  In essence, engineering decision-making includes an element of judgement 
applied to both problems and activities (Engineers Australia, 2012). 
At a strategic or organisational level, outcomes (being the result of decision-making 
processes) are commonly measured against key result areas or performance 
indicators.  Much has been written about this within management, public service, 
and engineering literature, including criticism of the use of such measures.21  
However, the attributes of good or sound decision-making with the merits of an 
outcome should not be conflated.  This aligns with Higgins (2000, pp. 1217-1218), 
who observes: “a decision is perceived as good when its expected value or utility of 
outcomes is judged to be more beneficial than the alternatives”. 
Higgins (2000, p. 1226) also postulates that decisions may be good because they 
are morally suitable or ‘fit’, concluding that “value from fit contributes to a decision 
being good independent of value from worth”.  Furthermore, for complex systems 
this is less about the ‘what’ of the outcome, and more about the system’s aptitude: 
its adaptive capability and capacity, resilience, and perhaps fitness.  
1.3 Research relationship with the literature 
Whilst there is a body of literature addressing system-level theory and practice 
ideals (e.g. in the form of management guidance), that same literature also tells us 
that there are very few actual studies that examine system diagnosis and the 
implementation of System Theory within Public Administration (noted by Hartley et 
al., 2008; Hudson, 2006; Jackson, 2009a (amongst others)).  The few studies that 
                                              
21
 e.g. Layard and Glaister (2003); NAMS (2007); Propper and Wilson (2003); Walshe, Harvey, 
and Jas (2010). 
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are available focus on the delivery of services and therefore do not penetrate the 
technical realm of engineering for and within Public Administration.  One of the 
inhibiting factors for any Public Administration research appears to be the very 
complexity of the systems in question, and how to meaningfully engage with this; 
despite fifty years of operational research, Jackson (2009a), concludes this is still 
an emergent area.  Further applied research can therefore contribute to theory 
development in these areas, including methods of assessment and diagnosis. 
There is also an emergence of work which considers civil infrastructure as a system 
(or interchangeably as a system of systems).  However, like the wider Public 
Administration research, this appears to be relatively sparse in regard to business-
as-usual engineering practice as an open system in an evolving environment.  
Moreover, the focus remains on project-related matters and so there is a need to 
further explore the interface between project and system, as well as at the system 
level itself (and to do more than simply audit departures from normative procedure).   
To recap, infrastructure systems are a ‘wickedly’ complex space in which there is 
sparse literature.  This research can therefore contribute to specific challenges 
facing infrastructure at this time, as well as to the wider corpus on System Thinking 
within public infrastructure administration — not at the project level, but the 
application of Systems Thinking to the system — to whole-of-system working.   
The term ‘systems-level approach' has entered the language of the discourse [on 
large scale infrastructure].  What remains to be done is to figure out what that 
actually means and then to implement it.  That the major infrastructure projects of 
the present day are almost always controversial is not surprising, but the problems 
appear to be exacerbated because the basis of the decisions is unclear and the 
systems boundaries surrounding them are ill-defined (or not defined at all).   
Jowitt (2013, p. 291) 
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2 RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
This thesis charts research that seeks to explore infrastructure practice from the 
perspective of the infrastructure system.  As such, this is contemporaneous 
research from a ‘client’ perspective; the client being the infrastructure organisation 
as a proxy for society.  The focus is, therefore, on business-as-usual operations 
and the context that this creates for infrastructure administration and long-term 
infrastructure outcomes.  In particular, this research investigates the strategic intent 
and the management of infrastructure systems, and the implications (if any) for 
long-term infrastructure outcomes.  
This Chapter sets out the research purpose and high-level approach, as well as key 
terms and other matters that help to define the research scope (‘the system’).  
Research methods are addressed later within the document. 
2.1 Purpose 
My central hypothesis22 is that:  
The strategic intent and the day-to-day management of infrastructure 
systems are often misaligned, with negative consequences for achieving 
the desired long-term infrastructure system outcomes.   
This hypothesis is augmented by three underpinning propositions: 
1. Individual infrastructure projects automatically, by their nature, become part of, 
are embedded in, and change, a complex infrastructural system (e.g. 
interactions, feedback, emergent properties). 
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 Developed inductively from industry experience, literature, and the preliminary research. 
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2. The governance and management of such systems will not be effective if 
focused on outputs at the level of projects, assets, or even subsystems.  
Governance and management needs to address the desired/intended strategic, 
externally-oriented outcomes and aptitude of the whole system.  They also 
need to address the contributions of individual projects and of the day-to-day 
operations to that system. 
3. No matter how well individual projects are designed and delivered, or strategic 
outcomes are initially defined, systems are dynamic.  Accordingly, infrastructure 
administration needs to both accommodate and continually respond to this time 
dimension.   
The challenge and level of uncertainty faced here means that the hypothesis may 
be considered broad.  However, this is the reality for those who are charged with 
addressing this in practice (e.g. Bazerman, 1994; Brugnach, Dewulf, Pahl-Wostl, & 
Taillieu, 2008; Snowden, 2005). 
2.2 Approach 
Given the current levels of research in this area, it was important to firstly 
understand what is actually believed or actually known within the infrastructure 
industry, for it does not automatically stand that:  
 there is a systemic problem and that this is recognised (i.e. there is a problem 
that exists or is recognised beyond individual examples and stories);  
 there is substantive evidence of the problem;  
 the problem is material or its nature is understood; and  
 anything is being done about it.   
This is an approach supported by Davis (1971, p. 310), who identifies a number of 
‘interesting non-propositions’ to research:23 
                                              
23
 Davis (1971) explores what constitutes ‘interesting’ research, or that which has a contribution 
to make.  In making the point that “non-interesting theories are those which affirm certain 
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(1) Findings’ which confirm or disconfirm hypotheses, (2) ‘Clues’ which 
indicate the way a problem can be solved, (3) ‘Aesthetic Descriptions’24 
which refine perception, (4) ‘Analogies’ which render the unfamiliar in 
terms of the familiar, and (5) ‘Models’ which simplify the integration of 
complex relationships. 
From a practice perspective, Yankelovich (1991)25 has usefully identified a three 
step approach within the policy arena that is aimed at moving communities from 
opinion to judgement when “confronting system-level implications” (Yankelovich in 
Constanza, 2000):26   
 consciousness-raising or awareness;  
 developing an understanding or “working through” the issues; and  
 resolution or action. 
Although notionally applicable to policy development, this is not policy research per 
se.  Nevertheless, given the broader contextual parallels, the approach is 
considered to be applicable and relevant here. 
Research structure 
Yankelovich’s three steps provide a simple structure for this research that can be 
aligned with Davis’s ‘interesting non-propositions’, and so meld academic and 
practical objectives (Table 2.1).  Moreover, the combined approach aligns with the 
                                                                                                                                    
assumptions of their audience”, Davis (1971, p. 310), excludes “non-propositions that are also 
capable of evoking interest”.  It is these ‘interesting non-propositions’ that are of relevance here. 
24
 Davis (1971) does not define this term, but from Keenan (2016), it is taken to mean the 
experiences and stories — in this instance, of practitioners — that might describe industry 
perceptions around a particular issue.  This is supported by Parker (2016), who argues there is 
the need to provide ‘expert intelligence’ and evidence to assist the development of policy and 
practice. 
25
 See also Yankelovich and Friedman (2010). 
26
 The prerequisite to which is given as a bridging of the gap between the “culture of technical 
control” and the public (Yankelovich in Constanza, 2000, p. 2).  This has obvious parallels with 
the stated need to re-orient infrastructure practice to its societal imperative (Section 1.1). 
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views of Snowden and Boone (2007), who tell us that a probing approach is 
particularly appropriate to questions of complexity. 
Table 2.1:  Research structure  
Research structure Research aspects 
Confronting system 
level implications 
(Yankelovich, 1991) 
Interesting research 
(Davis (1971)) 
Part I:  Context 
Is there misalignment, and how is this 
recognised as a problem within the wider 
infrastructure industry?  What are the 
stories? 
Awareness Aesthetic description  
Part II:  Detailed studies 
How is the misalignment being generated 
(what are the reasons for the misalignment)? 
Developing 
understanding 
Clues/Analogies  
Part III:  Synthesis 
What characterises this misalignment or 
‘gap’?  Given this, what are the implications, 
if any, for infrastructure administration and 
long-term infrastructure outcomes? 
Resolution Models/Findings 
This structure aims to take the ‘proof of thesis’ beyond reliance on anecdote, 
thereby providing an evidence-base for both further research and action.  
Therefore, the structure of this research responds to both the complexity of the 
problem and that of the system being investigated.27   
Document structure 
This document reflects the research structure just outlined, and so is divided into 
three parts.  The nested nature of this research is such that it does not lend itself to 
a simple, linear presentation of the material.  This is not assisted by the very 
                                              
27
 See also Chapter 4 and Figure 4.1. 
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
CMB150717_E Research Overview 27 
different detailed studies which, whilst presenting their own results and meriting 
discussion in their own right, are also at once the evidence and inputs to the wider, 
system-level case.  Accordingly, much of the material from the detailed studies has 
been appended, and the document structured according to the framework 
described within Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2:  Document structure  
Research 
structure 
Document 
chapter 
Focus Appendices 
Part I:  
Context 
1 Introduction, background, and 
literature review. 
 
2 Research overview. I.  New Zealand context. 
3 Preliminary research into 
industry awareness, and 
aesthetic description of the 
problem. 
II.  Summary of interviews and 
workshops.
28
 
III.  Research management.
28
 
IV.  Lifecycle interface factors. 
Part II:  
Detailed 
studies  
4 Research need, strategy and 
methodology. 
 
5-7 Detailed studies 1-3.  Whilst 
these are self-contained studies, 
with their own introduction, 
methods, results, and 
discussion, these provide the 
input evidence, data, and 
themes which contribute to the 
overarching cross-case analysis. 
V.  AMETI overview. 
VI.  Detailed study 1 analysis. 
VII.  Detailed study 2 analysis. 
VIII.  Detailed study 3 analysis. 
IX.   Detailed study 3 
questionnaire. 
8 Summary of the detailed 
studies. 
 
 
 
   
                                              
28
 Also applicable to the detailed studies within Part II. 
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Research 
structure 
Document 
chapter 
Focus Appendices 
Part III:  
Synthesis  
9 Cross-case analysis.  The 
results and discussion for the 
overarching research. 
 
10 Research reflection, 
contribution, summary of the 
results and conclusions. 
 
2.3 Scope and limitations 
2.3.1 Scope 
Before moving on, there are several terms that require definition as they inform the 
scope of the research: 
 Strategic intent:  Horwath (2009, p. 26) is of the opinion that “the “what” you’re 
trying to achieve, whether it be a goal, an objective, or a long term vision, 
should never be confused with “how” you will achieve it, which is strategy.”  This 
thesis concerns itself, not with the “how”, but rather the strategic aspirations and 
outcomes subsequently being sought through the tactical operation of 
infrastructure systems.   
Such aspirations may be expressed through visions, inspiration statements, or 
more formal stated goals and objectives, which provide the “emotional and 
intellectual energy for the journey” (Hamel & Prahalad, 2013, p. 141).  These 
have been collectively referred to as the “strategic intent”.  This emphasises 
the focus on outcomes and benefits rather than artefacts and features.  But it 
does not contemplate the merits of that intent, other than adopting the position 
that the public administration of public infrastructure is by definition, oriented to 
societal outcomes.   
It is also noted that although agency will be a factor in organisations (e.g. 
Johnston & Pongatichat, 2008), this research does not in any way offer a view 
on the personal intentions of those involved in implementing strategy. 
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 Infrastructure system:  A complex system of artefacts, networks, services, 
organisations (each at different stages of their lifecycle, and affecting one 
another as they develop, then age), inclusive of their social/environmental 
context and outcomes.  A system of systems.  Something greater than a 
project.   
The focus here is on the day-to-day (i.e. tactical) infrastructure operations.  
Whilst the interface between the project and the system it transforms is of 
interest, the process of project investment and delivery — including whether the 
project delivers its intended outcomes — is excluded.  As noted, project 
investment and delivery has been the focus of much research.  Any issues 
experienced at the project level would only exacerbate those at the system level 
and it is important not to confuse the two, or to assume that they are one and 
the same. 
 System aptitude:  As distinct from an output or outcome.  Aptitude (here) 
refers to the attributes of the organisational and physical system (e.g. resilience, 
fitness), combined with the individual/organisational/industry mind-set (culture) 
and orientation.  These characteristics collectively define or contribute to the 
inherent or acquired ability and inclination of a system to respond and adapt to 
its evolving context.  This, therefore, does not presuppose or comment on the 
merit of the outcome being sought, but references its goal-seeking behaviours 
(see Ackoff (1971); see also Section 1.2). 
 Infrastructure governance:  This thesis refers to the governance provided by 
a board of directors.  Project Boards are considered in this context to be a 
management function.  Whilst political matters will be germane, they are outside 
the scope of this research; as one interviewee observed “We can still have good 
governance if you’ve got bad politics” [PR58].   
 Management of infrastructure systems:  This refers to a hybrid of 
management, engineering, and other practice areas that exist within a public 
infrastructure organisation.  It does not mean, but may include, management 
systems such as quality procedures or information management.  
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 Infrastructure administration:  The integrated governance and management 
of infrastructure.  Whilst this is a subset of Public Administration/Service, this 
does not refer to Public Administration/Service from a political or policy stand-
point.  Unlike a private sector organisation, infrastructure administration is 
externally oriented with the aim of producing ‘public value’ (Hartley et al., 
2008).29 
2.3.2 Limitations 
This research does not consider the need for any given project, or enter into an 
argument on the merit of any given infrastructure solution.  However, it does 
consider the processes that might initiate a project, and consider how system and 
project objectives are established and framed.  Similarly, the research does not 
offer an opinion on how an organisation should be structured, as that is another 
matter. 
Exogenous factors that could be subject to change have also been set aside if and 
where this is possible.  These included matters of political influence, constitutional 
amendments, step changes in technology, system shocks (e.g. climate 
change/natural disaster),30 and changing economic conditions (including the 
willingness/ability to fund).  This does not mean that a static approach was taken, 
but rather that these would have unduly complicated matters in an already complex 
research space.   
2.4 Sector focus and selection 
As noted, what limited system-level research there is within public infrastructure 
has been focused on health and social services.  The asset-as-service arena of the 
                                              
29
 Hartley et al. (2008) define public value as that which is “added to the public sphere”.  They 
note that it may include social, economic, political, or environmental factors, or be “more broadly 
about the quality of life”.   
30
 Although, matters of preparedness, resilience, and adaptation within business-as-usual 
practice were considered. 
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physical or built infrastructure sectors, therefore, offers the opportunity to 
investigate a less researched area and to: 
 penetrate the technical areas that underpin the broader service delivery of those 
systems; and 
 explore the capacity of such systems to respond to the constant state of flux 
created by project delivery and system transformation, and how those systems 
sustain the benefits intended from that change. 
The New Zealand infrastructure environment has been selected to research this 
because: 
 public infrastructure remains largely in public ownership, so avoided 
complications arising from commercial operating models; 
 there is a separation of (or at least an awareness of the need to separate) 
political involvement from technical and organisational governance (Asquith, 
2016; Auckland Transport, 2014d; Controller and Auditor-General, 2002); and 
 there was ready access to the industry. 
In their call for more evidence-based theory in the realm of public service 
improvement, Hartley and Skeltcher (in Hartley et al., 2008, pp. 10-11) argue “the 
degree of improvement cannot be assessed simply by the achievements of an 
individual organization or service unit, but rather is better assessed through the 
achievements of the whole institutional field”. 
This is a considerable challenge for any systems research,31 and, whilst 
conceivably this research has broader application, it was decided to use the land 
transportation field within New Zealand as the focus for the overarching research 
programme and ‘unit of analysis’ (Yin, 2003).  The choice of this sector was in part 
                                              
31 The ability to meet this challenge is also addressed through the research design and methods 
(Chapter 4). 
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influenced by personal experience and knowledge of the processes across the 
lifecycle of projects and systems in this area.32   
More materially, land transport was identified as a potential sentinel in the 
understanding of decision-making for infrastructure.  This was primarily because 
land transport influences society through its interface with land use and economic 
development, and is frequently a conduit for other types of infrastructure (Carreras 
& De Soto, 2013; Martindale in Weber, 1958).  Indeed, Martindale observes “the 
street, represents first and last the greatest material problems of the city”, and 
quotes Henri Pirenne’s declaration that “the control of the streets means the control 
of the city” (in Weber, 1958, pp. 57-58). 
The land transport sector also provides an example of the transition rapidly 
developed infrastructure systems must now undergo to confront matters such as 
simultaneously ageing assets, the full realisation of maintenance costs, and 
ongoing growth.  Furthermore, there is an identified need for further development of 
long-term infrastructure system performance within this sector (e.g. Controller and 
Auditor-General, 2014b; IPENZ, 2010).  Additional information on the New Zealand 
context may be found within Appendix I. 
 
 
 
 
                                              
32
 On several occasions during the preliminary research (Chapter 3), interviewees urged for the 
water sector to also be included within this research.  Unlike land transport, the water sector in 
New Zealand is managed at the local government level, so was expected to have less 
consistency and central co-ordination.  This was considered too “messy” for the scope of a PhD, 
so remains a research opportunity. 
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3 INDUSTRY NEED AND 
FOCUS 
The conventional starting-point for empirical research is often theoretical 
knowledge taken from literature or earlier empirical findings.  This contrasts with 
Grounded Theory which gives preference to the data, whereby theory is discovered 
relative to the research topic (Flick, 2002).  Indeed, Flick (2002, p. 48) pointedly 
observes that “research questions do not come from nowhere”, and that their origin 
may lie in the researcher's personal biography, their practical interests, or 
contextual background.  Bryman and Bell (2011) and Robson (2002), concur, and 
Eisenhardt (1989, p. 536) notes that “a priori specification of constructs can also 
help to shape the initial design of theory building research”. 
Nonetheless, as this research stems from industry experience, it was important for 
potential bias to be recognised and tested (Thomas, 2004).  Consequently, 
preliminary research has purposefully been undertaken to mitigate any such risk 
(Loasby, 1976) by investigating and testing current industry perceptions and beliefs 
across infrastructure sectors.     
The preliminary research therefore provides pointers towards matters that would 
benefit from further research and where to focus the detailed studies.  It 
investigates whether there is misalignment between the strategic intent and the 
day-to-day management of infrastructure systems, and captures the stories that 
describe how this is recognised as a problem within the wider infrastructure 
industry (Table 2.1).  It is those same stories that are then used as part of the 
detailed studies to triangulate the results within the study and to reflect on the 
generalisability of the findings.   
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
34 Industry Need and Focus CMB150717_E 
3.1 Preliminary research methods 
Interview process 
The preliminary research was based wholly around a series of semi-structured 
interviews (Bryman & Bell, 2011), comprising two stages: 
 Stage 1:  The interviews were firstly across a range of infrastructure-related 
organisations and sectors, focused on determining whether there is a problem, 
and the broad nature of that problem.  A series of generalised questions probed 
views on infrastructure as both an artefact and a social enterprise.  Appreciative 
Enquiry33 was also used to identify areas that worked well (Fenner & Ainger, 
2014).   
Between December 2013 and June 2014, a total of 32 New Zealand interviews 
were conducted along with eight in the UK and Europe.  These 40 interviews 
covered a total of 33 different organisations.  Interviewees included 
chairpersons/board members, chief executive officers, directors, executive 
management, and senior specialists.   
 Stage 2:  This stage sought further detail on issues and opportunities meriting 
closer examination.  To do so, it targeted New Zealand’s transportation sector.  
Project delivery is already well served in the literature and conventional 
infrastructure lifecycles are disproportionately dominated by it.  For this reason 
an alternative system lifecycle (based on Figure 3.1) was used to focus matters 
towards day-to-day system-level operations. 
Between August and October 2014, a further 19 interviews were conducted 
within a large New Zealand municipal transportation organisation.  Interviews 
were conducted vertically from chairperson/board-level to team leader, 
disciplinary specialists, and across departmental functional areas.   
A summary of the stated expertise and experience covered by all 59 interviews is 
given within Appendix II. 
                                              
33
 Learning from “what is being done better already, rather than defining a 'problem' and solving 
it” (Fenner & Ainger, 2014, p. 241). 
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Figure 3.1:  Infrastructure system lifecycle model 
Source:  Adapted from Blom (2014)
34
 
Notes:  This is first and foremost a conceptual system lifecycle, which is aimed at re-orienting 
infrastructure practice towards outcomes and away from project-led thinking.  This is an 
evolutionary, sense-making model rather than an incremental improvement process (see Blom, 
2014). 
Project stages shown in Figure 1.1 have been merged for simplicity.  This model also replaces 
the convention of ‘Retirement and disposal’ to provide for repurposing (whether at the 
component, asset, service, sub-system level).  
Research management 
Appendix III overviews the management processes adopted for this research as a 
whole (including ethics and the source material referencing system used 
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 From work which precedes this research. 
Area of interest 
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throughout this document).  The preliminary research comprised semi-structured 
interviews structured around an underlying framework, as follows: 
 Stage 1:  shared understanding of meaning/issue identification: 
- sustainability (meaning, static/dynamic attributes); 
- infrastructure (meaning, lifecycle/staging, interface with organisational 
structure, effects on processes and outcomes, history and context); 
- value, resilience, robustness, and adaptive capacity (meaning and relevance 
to infrastructure/infrastructure organisations, meaning of value in different 
contexts, value loss/enhancement, relationship to sustainability and long-life 
infrastructure); 
- system-of-systems (revisit comments at system level, what works/doesn’t 
work and why, what is missing, what is the problem, attributes needed/key 
matter to be developed to address the problem); 
- for funders only (nature of involvement, criteria, industry influence, matters 
of interest); 
- other matters. 
 Stage 2:  Further clarification/transportation focus: 
- processes within ‘area of interest’ (Figure 3.1) important to the 
organisation’s long term infrastructure outcomes (which and why, 
effectiveness, what works/doesn’t work, examples, effects 
enabling/constraining decision-making); 
- other matters. 
The framework focused upon the infrastructure lifecycle.  This reflects the selection 
of a built infrastructure sector (transportation) both in terms of typical organisation 
structure and the phases through which the assets, services, and processes are 
managed.  As such, the lifecycle provides access to many more dimensions than 
might be immediately apparent.  Aside from excluding project delivery, there is 
otherwise no assumption of where or what the research should investigate in 
further detail.   
Many of those interviewed actively sought a more general discussion.  
Consequently, some of the interviews were at the less structured end of the 
continuum (Bryman & Bell, 2011), so did not always follow ‘the script’ exactly.  
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However, the interviews generally touched upon most of the topics within the 
framework.  It is noted that as the interviews were conducted early within the 
research process, the interviews did not explicitly ask the research questions as 
they are currently framed; those were subsequently deduced from the analysis of 
the responses as outlined within this Chapter. 
Interviews ranged between 30-90 minutes but were generally an hour in length, and 
were face-to-face where possible.  All interviews were transcribed before being 
loaded as a PDF file into qualitative research tool NVivo, which enables users to 
categorise or ‘code’ their source material (Bryman & Bell, 2011).  NVivo was 
selected on the basis of availability, capabilities, and guidance (Ibid.).  
Coding followed the Weber Protocol35 to reduce bias (in Bryman & Bell, 2011, p. 
290).  Coding was typically at the paragraph level, although individual sentences 
were coded where appropriate (e.g. where a reference to a specific location or 
piece of infrastructure had been used to illustrate a point).   
Both stages were processed together because views were frequently offered that 
transcended the focus of each stage.  Furthermore, interviewee experiences often 
spanned infrastructure sectors, so those with transportation experience could not 
be arbitrarily separated.  Nor could it be assumed that an answer was being given 
from the perspective of any one sector or organisation. 
Treatment of the content 
Interview material was ‘divided’ into manifest and latent content.  Manifest content 
is the “content of the item in question: what it is clearly about”, whereas latent 
content is the “meanings that lie beneath the superficial indicators of content” (Ibid., 
p.290).  To this end: 
 The manifest content was identified so data (via key words/topics) could be 
searched and managed for use in the subsequent detailed studies.  This 
enabled the themes emerging from the detailed studies to be compared (i.e. 
triangulated) with those from across sectors and industry experience (Yin, 2003; 
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 An eight step, iterative process to reduce ‘rater bias’ in coding. 
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
38 Industry Need and Focus CMB150717_E 
see also Chapter 4).  As such, the use of NVivo was simply a mechanism which 
assisted the sorting, categorising, and subsequent use of the material so that it 
could be readily accessed and collated into topics, or easily searched. 
Analysis of the manifest content was carried out at this point of the research so 
that the overarching ‘threads’ (i.e. chain of ideas/opinions) could be considered.  
Whilst this was of limited use at this stage of the research, as it ultimately 
reflects the interview questions and direction of the discussion, the primary 
cluster related to ‘business and technical processes’.  Notably, the thread 
comprised lifecycle management, performance monitoring and reporting, 
decision-making, and general business practice.  At a basic level, this provided 
a degree of triangulation with the latent content analysis.   
 The latent content was used to answer the three questions pertaining to this 
stage of the research (Table 2.1): 
- is there misalignment;  
- how is this recognised as a problem; and   
- what are the stories? 
Also of interest was where, or what in the lifecycle warranted further specific 
investigation (e.g. strategy, projects, operations and maintenance, feedback, 
disposal).  The assessment of the latent content was achieved by a detailed 
review and thematic analysis (recoding) of the primary data (see 'narrative 
analysis' for sense-making; Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
Predefined codes were not used.  Coding of the data for both manifest and latent 
content was therefore emergent or ‘open’ (Strauss and Corbin in Bryman & Bell, 
2011).  155 nodes emerged progressively.  The process was iterative and 
previously coded interviews were reviewed as new codes emerged.  The codes 
were then sorted into topics and themes (Ryan & Bernard, 2003).  Topics 
augmented the manifest content data for subsequent use in the detailed studies, 
whereas the themes (which are turned to next) related more directly to the research 
questions. 
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3.2 Is there a problem and what is the nature of that 
problem? 
Whilst the available literature suggests a research gap, this does not, of course, 
necessarily equate to a problem in reality (Section 2.2).  Indeed, some of those 
interviewed did feel that they (team/organisation/sector) were performing well, 
although acknowledging the need for ongoing improvement, for example: 
I would say that in the last five years, people are [...] understanding what 
outcomes truly are [...] Therefore we are getting better at articulating in 
strategic terms, the outcomes we are truly trying to deliver […which] are 
generally broader than they used to be […The] work still to be achieved 
is then to be able to connect [...] the individual works you do, to those 
outcomes.  To satisfy yourself that [you] truly are [...] strategy led. 
[PR33]36 
However, there was a general observation amongst those interviewed that good 
performance was patchy, whether between sectors, organisations, projects, or over 
time.37  So, even where areas of good practice were identified,38 other individuals 
would have a different perspective and could point to where these were incomplete, 
or could improve.  The interviews provided a good degree of triangulation in this 
regard. 
The interviews also unearthed a series of belief-systems in more than one 
organisation, whereby one part of an organisation believed something had been 
addressed by another (in contrast with the subject department’s own view that their 
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 This section contains quotes and references to interviews to provide examples to support the 
assessment.  This is not a proxy for the underlying assessment. 
37
 The exceptions being [PR14], [PR20], [PR38], [PR54], [PR59], [PR67-PR68] where no 
specific issues surfaced. 
38
 e.g. recent improvements in the rate of delivery of projects to the construction market, project 
procurement, and asset management. 
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practice was rudimentary or essentially non-existent).39  The Controller and Auditor-
General (2014b) has raised similar issues. 
From the perspective of those within the industry, there is a problem and the overall 
outcomes were suboptimal in some way.  Whilst there may be many reasons 
contributing to this, the crux of the problem (issue) is the inability to fully deliver 
appropriate and relevant infrastructure outcomes over the long term:   
I mean if you put a bunch of engineers in charge of a project, they’ll do a 
fantastic job of delivering you a project, but [...] that may not actually 
deliver what you want to see!  ‘Cos they’re focused on design and 
implementation and doing and all of that good stuff —mission critical —
but if you haven’t got your problem definition and solutions sorted out in 
the first place, you end up with the sorts of problems that [...] we’ve just 
had a long discussion on! [PR18] 
In describing the overarching problem, many interviewees40 also pointed to a 
misalignment between the intended strategic, or system-level, outcomes (or 
benefits) and the delivery, or management of those outcomes over the longer term.  
What was also clear was that there was no real understanding of the scale and 
scope of that misalignment, nor the significance of any implications, because 
system-level outcomes were not being given sufficient attention: 
There definitely [is a] loss of value there [in operations and maintenance 
(O&M)…].  I think that [things like community aspirations] probably gets 
lost quicker because of the relationships with [...] whoever the 
community or stakeholder is, tends to be quite strong in the design 
phase, but gets lost quite quickly in the O&M phase.  Even within the 
client they’re different people usually. [PR25] 
                                              
39
 e.g. [PR 16], [PR19], [PR21], [PR 25-PR26], [PR32-PR33], [PR37], [PR39], [PR44], [PR47], 
[PR53-PR54], [PR56]. 
40
 In addition to those quoted below, this surfaced in the following interviews: [PR13], [PR15-
PR16], [PR18-PR19], [PR21-PR22], [PR24], [PR26], [PR28-PR33], [PR35], [PR37], [PR39-
PR40], [PR42-PR44], [PR46-PR47], [PR70].    
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Well I think in [...] a long-term analysis point of view there’re some 
learnings you get [...] at the completion of the project.  So it’s the 
success of the project.  But when you have the longer-term [...] 
evaluation, it’s the success of the original intent or the intention that led 
to the project being one of the reasons why [...] the money was spent 
[...] And I think we don’t do that enough [...] We don’t look at whether the 
assumptions we made —and [...] it’s probably because the 
environment’s always changing and [...] well, one, I think we don’t think 
about it and two [...] if I think about it, we say ‘oh well, there’s so many 
variables, and there’s gonna be ups and downs and overall [...] 
somehow and somewhere [...] it would balance out’. [PR27] 
I don’t think we do well at going back to the [...] three years review and 
say ‘well, why didn’t that play out?’, and understand why [...] and [...] 
informing decisions going forward from that point [...] You just keep 
stacking more and more jobs on to the [...] schedule of work to be done, 
‘cos we want to develop more areas, and we don’t [...] actually draw 
value out of the decisions we’ve made in the past.  We [...] don’t go back 
and test the outcomes [...] that we thought we were going to do from [...] 
the first decision process [...] I can see nowhere where we can sit down 
and do a real benefit evaluation at the end of the process. [PR64] 
From the perspective of those being served by infrastructure, the problem is a 
significant one.  For example, New Zealand local government, where infrastructure-
related services are a vital part of council function, has recently surveyed 2,400 
residents and 594 businesses (Local Government New Zealand, 2015).  That 
survey found that whilst the results might generally be ‘good’ by being indirectly 
comparable to countries such as Australia and the UK, this was of “little comfort”.  
This was because respondents to the New Zealand survey only rated local 
government performance at 28 out of 100 (Ibid.).  IPENZ (2010) has reported 
similarly poor customer feedback in other infrastructure sectors. 
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So, whilst there is no suggestion of catastrophic failure, this points to a more 
insidious issue of omission and unrealised potential; of society working around its 
infrastructure.  As Hellström (2007, p. 417) observes: 
Disruption does not come about through expansion of a system, but rather 
because incremental change may embed design flaws gradually deeper into 
a system, where ad hoc solutions to improve workability hide problems 
under increasingly thick layers of technological ‘improvements', yet do not 
eliminate them. 
Ironically, whilst the primary issue might be simple to articulate, it is paradoxically 
complex.  In this vein, four key problem dimensions emerged from the interviews: 
 Needs:  What is delivered and how it is delivered. 
 Precepts:  What customers believe or expect to be delivered. 
 Choices:  Whether the choices are appropriate and purposeful, and that 
compromises have been understood. 
 Aptitudes:  Whether there is the ability to change both reactively and 
proactively. 
Much of the infrastructure literature currently focuses on ‘doing the right projects 
right’.  Yet the emergent dimensions show that there is more to the problem space 
than addressing ‘need’ in any simple sense.  Furthermore, whilst there was a 
shared awareness of the importance of improving long-term infrastructure 
outcomes at senior levels, the management of system-level benefits also seemed 
to be the ‘elephant in the room’.  Because a piece of infrastructure hasn’t fallen 
down and may ‘only’ be perceived as (i.e. not ‘actually’) a problem, does not mean 
that the problem is neither real nor significant as there are more dimensions to the 
issue than indicated by the hard infrastructure assets alone.  Infrastructure 
customers often have little or no choice in where they go for infrastructure services, 
and may not be heard over technical and funding considerations.  These are the 
matters of stakeholder salience and legitimacy41 developed by Mitchell et al. (1997).  
                                              
41
 “Who and to what managers actually pay attention” (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997); similarly, 
Ramsden and Spoonley (1993) ask who defines what is important. 
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
CMB150717_E Industry Need and Focus 43 
And yet, as the industry proverb goes, there is no point building good quality 
concrete life jackets.   
3.3 Generalisability 
Interviewees were asked whether the issues they raised related solely to a 
particular instance or context described (circumstances, organisation), and whether 
this was a country-specific issue.  Many of those interviewed had worked in more 
than one country within a variety of different contexts, and had experienced 
common themes across these.42  Interviewees were therefore well placed to affirm 
the generic nature of the examples and the issues raised.  Their feedback suggests 
that it is not ‘just’ poor organisational, sector, or country-specific practice, and that 
the issues are worthy of being explored further.  Comments particularly 
emphasised differences between theory and practice, and how the issues can stem 
from an expectation or perception that practice occurs ‘by the book’.    
Some interviewees suggested that the problems they described could be 
addressed within existing asset management practice.43  More often though,44 it 
was held that a different approach was required: 
It’s more than asset management […which] is quite simply what do you 
own, what condition is it in, and how much money do I need to spend 
[...] to keep it going?  This is about [...] looking at how [...] the benefits 
[in] the business case actually roll out and are affordable in terms of 
maintaining and renewing that new asset. [PR16] 
Feedback also pointed to the timeliness of this research.  Comments suggested 
that there was now an appetite to start exploring and addressing the complex 
problems being faced in infrastructure administration. 
                                              
42
 e.g. [PR15], [PR24], [PR26-PR27], [PR32], [PR35-PR37], [PR39], [PR48], [PR50-PR51], 
[PR53], [PR57-PR58], [PR62-PR63].  
43
 e.g. [PR22], [PR25], [PR37]. 
44
 e.g. [PR15-PR16], [PR18], [PR20-PR21], [PR24], [PR26-PR27], [PR29], [PR32], [PR34-
PR36], [PR39], [PR42], [PR47]. 
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3.4 Where to focus 
A great many reasons were identified for the issue with long-term infrastructure 
outcomes.  The key ones to emerge from the interviews were as follows:  
 Knowledge is not being retained within the system nor is it informing future 
decisions as best it might.   
 Infrastructure management is still heavily focused on capital works delivery, and 
processes tend to be asset-oriented.  System-level outcomes are rarely 
monitored. 
 Projects or organisational functions are often ring-fenced. 
 Projects are being delivered to ‘operations’, but the operational framework 
rarely adjusts to accommodate changes arising to the system; either to the hard 
system or within the organisation (such as specifications in the case of non-
standard assets).   
 Long-term thinking that integrates physical assets and organisations at the 
systems level was often seen as a missing necessity. 
The interviews also suggested45 a need to improve processes so that these are 
focused: 
 internally: to address organisational capability and capacity;  
 externally: to include infrastructure in its context.  Process scope needs to 
provide for societal, rather than just technical, outcomes; and 
 at the system level and on long-term function of the combined whole rather than 
individual assets.   
Given the importance of the infrastructure lifecycle and the relationship to 
organisational structures and processes (Section 1.1), the manifest content was 
analysed for lifecycle-related themes.  That analysis identified the interfaces 
between lifecycle stages, and therefore organisational divisions and processes, to 
be the area of greatest concern at this time (see also Edkins & Zerjav, 2014).46  A 
                                              
45
 i.e. deduced from the latent content generally. 
46
 Whilst other lifecycle interfaces were mentioned, the three listed in Table 3.1 were clearly 
dominant and considered more than sufficient scope for a PhD. 
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number of subordinate ‘factors’ that act on one or more of the interfaces also 
emerged and were able to be aligned with the differentiated lifecycle themes 
(Table 3.1; see also Appendix IV for examples from the interviews).   
Table 3.1:  Analysis of lifecycle factors 
Aspect  
(Lifecycle interface) 
Contributing factors 
Strategy/project 
interface 
 Articulating benefits. 
 Business case boundaries. 
 Lock-in/momentum/prioritisation. 
 Follow-through/reconciliation with system-level objectives (feed-
forward). 
Project/operational 
interface 
 Handover (feed-forward). 
 Transition from asset to system. 
 Whole-of-life performance. 
Operational/strategy 
interface 
 Performance (benefit) monitoring. 
 Follow-through/reconciliation with system-level objectives.  
Feedback to strategy (above). 
The interface between lifecycle stages is clearly not a vacuum; infrastructure does 
not simply leap from one state to the next across its lifecycle.  Rather, this is an 
area of organisation-spanning processes and transitional accountabilities.  The 
challenge that arises in turn is that, whilst much needed, applying a project 
management or business framework to individual parts of the process in isolation is 
unlikely to address issues arising from system complexity and interdependencies 
(Edkins & Zerjav, 2014).  Moreover, any approach needs to provide for the dynamic 
context and long timeframes over which this system operates.  Consequently, 
whilst the interviews show that there are many facets to this area, this is less a 
series of problems to be solved than an ecosystem to be understood.   
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3.5 Overview of industry need and focus 
The lack of attention being paid to understanding system-level benefits, their 
relationship to decision-making, and the associated implications of an absent 
feedback-loop has flow-on effects into areas such as the ability to manage change.  
The interviews suggest that this has only recently emerged within the general 
industry ‘consciousness’ and there is a real need, and appetite, to now address 
such matters.47 
Because of the range of possible disconnects within the system, as described, as 
well as the timeframes involved, any loss of system-level benefits may not be 
immediately apparent.  Interviewees talked of ‘legacies’ resulting from past 
infrastructure-related decisions and management choices.48  However, every 
example referred to large-scale infrastructure that was less than a century old and 
therefore notionally within its design life.  From the perspective of those managing 
the infrastructure, this might be viewed as a latent failure.  Whereas from a systems 
perspective, this is an active failure because the infrastructure is not achieving the 
outcomes intended.  But this cannot be known for sure when system-level benefits 
are not re-evaluated or tracked.  This in itself raises a challenge in the balance 
between looking back to feed forward within a dynamic environment.   
A key underlying theme to emerge was the inappropriateness of the dominant 
project-centric approach to infrastructure management.  Interviewees49 noted what 
Edkins and Zerjav (2014, p. 15) describe as an “‘execution-orientated’ mind-set” 
extending beyond project delivery; the linear pipeline of conventional asset 
lifecycles being ultimately unhelpful to managers immersed in a system of 
concurrent and overlapping processes and sub-systems.  A different mental model 
                                              
47
 e.g. [PR15-16], [PR22], [PR24-PR25], [PR27], [PR34-PR35], [PR37], [PR41-PR42], [PR44], 
[PR47], [PR50].   
48
 e.g. [PR13], [PR15-PR16], [PR18], [PR24], [PR28-PR29], [PR31], [PR33-PR35], [PR37], 
[PR41-PR44], [PR46-PR49], [PR51].  
49
 e.g. [PR15-PR16], [PR18-PR21], [PR24-PR28], [PR30], [PR32-PR33], [PR35], [PR37], 
[PR39], [PR42], [PR44], [PR46-PR47], [PR50-PR51]. 
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is therefore needed, at the least, for approaching this research space.  Whilst not 
initially tabled with this purpose, the systems lifecycle (Figure 3.1) offers an 
alternative starting point from which this problem space can be considered and the 
higher-level implications better understood. 
Bosch et al. (2013, p. 116) are of the view that “despite many efforts to deal with 
these complex issues facing our society, the solutions so far have seldom been 
long lasting, because ‘treating the symptoms' and ‘quick fixes', using traditional 
linear thinking, are the easiest way out, but do not deliver the solutions”.  There is, 
then, no one solution to a complex problem or problem within a complex system.  
Instead, it is a matter of identifying, “leverage points for systemic interventions”, or 
points where there is the opportunity for a disproportionate change to the system 
(Bosch et al., 2013, pp. 116, 134).  In this instance, these ‘leverage points’ (and 
therefore the focus for further research at this time), were identified as the 
processes that occur within or span the interface between infrastructure lifecycle 
stages.  As many infrastructure organisations are either structured, or their 
processes are configured around that lifecycle, these interfaces have many more 
dimensions than might first appear.  They themselves form a complex with 
organisational and process aspects, but present the most advantageous points at 
which to ‘deep dive’. 
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PART II:  DETAILED STUDIES 
 
Part II of this research uses three ‘deep dives’ (a practice borrowed from strategic-
level business practice), to look at the system-level issues through three different 
lenses.  Each lens investigated one of the primary lifecycle interfaces in more 
detail.  The methodological framework that ties the three studies together is 
therefore the first of the Chapters in this part of the document. 
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The detailed study analyses have been appended with the aim of improving the 
narrative of the central research programme.  Just as Appendix IV provided 
examples of interviewee quotes, the appendices associated with the detailed 
studies (and studies 1 and 2 in particular) provide selected examples from the 
source material (summarised for brevity).  The studies contain detail aimed at 
assisting practitioners in responding to this research, and have been written with 
that audience in mind.  That said, system thinking requires more than a focus on 
the big picture, as the systems themselves may be nested (Olmedo, 2010) and 
hierarchical (Gunderson & Holling, 2002) so a single perspective is unlikely to 
provide the necessary insights.  The detail of each study is therefore a crucial part 
of research as it assists in the development of understanding and the identification 
of clues as to the way forward for the system as a whole (Table 2.1). 
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4 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
Because many of the engineer’s chief problems have their origin in the management 
system, perhaps his philosophy should be applied to the management interface that 
couples engineering to the needs of society.  
Forrester (1964, p. 66) 
Here, the epistemological domains relevant to this research are considered, before 
positioning the research and setting out several of the matters that have informed 
the methodological rationale.  These draw on, and meld, approaches from several 
disciplinary domains (e.g. Complexity Theory, ecology, sustainability sciences, 
Public Administration, and the wider social sciences).  The methodological 
framework is then set out, which introduces the detailed studies. 
4.1 Summary of research need 
Part I of this thesis explored the relevant literature and industry perspectives to 
identify both a theoretical and practical need for research into the strategic intent 
and management of infrastructure systems.  A review of the literature has identified 
a number of relevant theories; however, none of these appear to have been directly 
investigated from this perspective, or using the approach adopted here.  Moreover, 
the wider literature laments the very few studies of such theories in practice. 
Although rarely failing catastrophically, the infrastructure we have is not performing 
as expected, nor as best it might, despite the development of innovative 
engineering, and tools to assist the efficient and effective management of assets.  
In short, industry interviews indicate that there is a misalignment between the 
strategic intent and the day-to-day management of infrastructure systems.  What is 
also clear is that whilst strategic planning, project management, and asset 
management are useful frameworks for their respective lifecycle stages, there are 
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
52 Research Strategy CMB150717_E 
still outstanding implementation issues.  Furthermore, infrastructure systems 
operate across all these stages simultaneously on a day-to-day basis.   
Industry feedback in the first phase identified that the interfaces between the 
various lifecycle stages should be the focus for further research.  As infrastructure 
organisations and practices often align with lifecycle stages, the interactions 
between them add to the complexity at those interfaces.  In addition, the issues 
raised in the preliminary research appear to be ubiquitous, so will be likely to 
exercise a cumulative effect on the wider system over time. 
The stories garnered from the interviews have provided an insight into how the 
wider infrastructure industry sees current issues and the factors that shape them.  
Not all of these have been discussed at this stage; however, they inform the 
subsequent detailed studies, where they have been used to triangulate results, and 
to reflect on the generalisability of the findings.  It is apparent from the responses 
that there is not yet a collective awareness that the current issues facing the 
industry extend beyond projects and programmes to systemic function and 
performance, but it is emerging.  This comes back to the point made by Jowitt 
(2013, p. 291) that, notwithstanding any emergent awareness, “what remains to be 
done is to figure out what that actually means and then to implement it”.   
4.2 Methodological underpinning 
Epistemological traditions 
Engineering and the physical and chemical sciences are often linked to a tradition 
of empirical, quantitative research (e.g. Holling, 1973; Schön, 1991).  Schön (1991) 
observes too that a positivist, ‘technical rationality’ has embedded itself in public 
service organisations (including engineering administration), and that this is the 
“positivist epistemology of practice” (Ibid., p.30).  However, he qualifies this by 
noting that a form of ‘professional pluralism’ has arisen from the ‘messy’ reality of 
high uncertainty and complexity (Ibid.).   
Whilst Forrester (1964) laments an apparent partitioning between engineering and 
management in practice, he nonetheless emphasises the common philosophical 
approach that underpins both.  Indeed, infrastructure and ‘town planning’ 
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policy/management are evident in the writings of Kautilya from as early as 300BCE 
(Eraly, 2002), which provides an interesting insight into how embedded the 
underlying technocratic practices and philosophies may be.  Whilst the 
epistemological traditions have ancient roots, recent engineering and management 
practice is sometimes seen as a product of the industrial age (e.g. Uhl-Bien et al., 
2007).   
However, a range of epistemologies exist, and notably there has been a decoupling 
of epistemology and methodological approach.  This reflects the importance of 
aligning methods with, and having relevance to, the context in question 
(Feyerabend, 2010; Dainty in Knight & Ruddock, 2008).  Accordingly, there is no 
single, ‘right’ approach.   
Research positioning 
This research is iterative and although the detailed studies target specific issues, 
the overarching research strategy is: 
 inductive, having been based on several a priori constructs and propositions 
emerging from prior industry experience, which were probed through 
preliminary research; 
 concerned with open, complex systems and therefore unlikely to lend itself to or 
be well served by reductionism; and 
 aimed at developing a sense-making theory or model (i.e. it does not expect to 
enable engineers or managers to “predict and control their environments” but 
rather to respond and adapt to these environments (P. Johnson & Duberley, 
2000, p. 40); see also Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld (2005)). 
These characteristics accord with Holling (1973, p. 1; emphasis added), who 
opines: 
If we are examining a particular device designed [...] to perform specific 
tasks under a rather narrow range of predictable external conditions, we 
are [...] more concerned with consistent nonvariable performance in 
which slight departures from the performance goal are immediately 
counteracted [...] But if we are dealing with a system profoundly 
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affected by changes external to it, and continually confronted by 
the unexpected, the constancy of its behavior becomes less 
important than the persistence of the relationships.  Attention 
shifts, therefore, to the qualitative and to questions of existence or 
not. 
Relevantly, the pluralistic nature of this research does align with that recommended 
for the investigation of complex systems (e.g. Ackoff, 1994; Dainty in Knight & 
Ruddock, 2008; Syntetos & Jackson, 2011). 
4.3 Approaching complex systems 
Science is developing concepts of complex adaptive systems […] but […] data gathering 
[…] is not keeping up with the conceptual revolution.  The emphasis here is on a more 
fluid and evolving epistemology built around becoming rather than being, on process 
rather than structure and on change rather than stasis.   
Harris (2007, p. 162) 
One of the many challenges with this research topic is the apparent paradox of 
both its perceived simplicity and inherent complexity (Section 3.2).  Ackoff (1994) 
notes that a complex system loses its integrity when reduced to its constituent parts 
and thus the parts must instead be considered relative to their function and role in 
the whole.50  He also asserts that “problems should be viewed from as many 
different perspectives as possible before a way of treating them is selected. The 
best way often involves collaboration of multiple points of view, a transdisciplinary 
point of view” (Ibid., p.187).  Snowden and Boone (2007) concur.  Their view is that 
a probing and iterative approach is appropriate in complex environments; inherently 
such environments cannot be the domain of any one, or even multiple, discernible, 
disciplines. 
                                              
50
 See also Hartley and Skeltcher in Hartley et al. (2008).  However, this does not constrain or 
diminish the need to understand the detail, which is vital to the ability to probe and effect 
change within the system (see Dobbs, Manyika, & Woetzel, 2015; Yu & Bower, 2009; see also 
Footnote 61).  In this context, then, the whole may not necessarily be greater than the sum of 
the parts as these different ‘levels’ should be inseparable and inextricably intertwined. 
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Two points arise from this and inform the research strategy: 
 The matter of trans-disciplinarity, which the likes of Carew and Wickson 
(2010), Kessel and Rosenfield (2008), Stock and Burton (2011), Stokols (2006) 
and others, tell us is more than simply considering multiple points of view.  This 
also includes a practitioner interface, and so is meshed with Action Research. 
 The need for a probing approach from multiple angles/perspectives.  This 
assists with establishing common themes and creates a form of system-level 
triangulation.   
4.3.1 Trans-disciplinarity 
Wickson, Carew, and Russell (2006) have synthesised what they consider to be the 
three distinguishing characteristics of trans-disciplinary research, which are used 
here to describe the research orientation:51 
 Problem focus.  Trans-disciplinary research has an explicit intent to solve 
complex, multi-dimensional problems of the real world with the intent of creating 
change (Ibid.).  This is very much the driver for this research (Foreword and 
Part I of this thesis). 
 Evolved/evolving methodology:  Trans-disciplinary research methods are 
often drawn from different epistemologies and disciplines (i.e. ‘evolved’), or may 
evolve over the course of the research (Ibid.).  The previous section addressed 
the pluralist epistemology that underpins this research.  Reference is also made 
to the iterative and emergent development of the research.  As will be seen, the 
methodological framework is more than a conventional mix of qualitative and 
quantitative research.  It melds ‘mixed methods’ with ‘deep dives’ (e.g. Bessant 
& Stamm, 2007), a practice borrowed from business. 
 Collaboration:  The literature often refers to trans-disciplinary research being 
under taken by collaborative groups of researchers, but also includes research 
undertaken by research groups or a lone researcher in collaboration with the 
                                              
51
 Whilst Stock and Burton (2011) identify other characteristics, those either relate to multi-
researcher processes, so are not applicable here, or may be grouped under the broad themes 
expressed by Wickson et al. (2006).  
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community (e.g. Stock & Burton, 2011; Wickson et al., 2006).  There are two 
points here: 
- The ability to draw upon qualifications and practice experience across a 
range of science disciplines and engineering, including the leadership of 
multi-, inter-, and trans-disciplinary teams.52  This research also spans 
academic and industry boundaries and, upon reflection, would have been 
unlikely to have been as effective if completed wholly in either domain.   
- In this instance, the community in question consists of industry practitioners.  
The concept of community collaboration therefore overlaps with that of 
Action Research (Stock & Burton, 2011). 
Stock and Burton (2011) describe trans-disciplinary research as a ‘holy grail’, citing 
others who express doubt over whether it can actually be achieved.  But they also 
acknowledge there are no clear boundaries between integrated research 
categories, or gatekeepers of those boundaries.  This may be so, but just as Huang 
(2010) observed in Action Research, trans-disciplinarity has a spectrum of practice 
and is a research approach, not a method (see also Wickson et al., 2006).  In other 
words, research may be trans-disciplinary without fulfilling a set of normative 
methodological criteria.  This is revisited in the following Section. 
4.3.2 Action research 
Action Research aligns with a defining characteristic of complex systems 
(Section 1.2.1) in which the observer is part of the system (playing the game, 
changes the game).53  Huang (2010, p. 93) defines Action Research as “an 
orientation to knowledge creation that arises in a context of practice and requires 
researchers to work with practitioners”.  Greenwood (in Coghlan (2011)) goes 
further by explicitly stating that Action Research is an approach rather than a 
                                              
52
 Multi-disciplinary:  Disciplines using their own methodological approaches.  Inter-disciplinary: 
Individual approaches within a common framework.  Trans-disciplinary:  Integration of different 
disciplinary methodologies.  From Wickson et al. (2006).   
53
 Referring here to the chaordic nature of the system (Olmedo, 2010), not the agency of the 
actors. 
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method or technique.  Both views are augmented by the earlier observation of 
Dickens and Watkins (1999, p. 127) that Action Research is “an umbrella term for a 
shower of activities intended to foster change on the group, organizational, and 
even societal levels [... …] Action researchers, then, generate context-bound, 
values-based knowledge and solutions from their public inquiries into system 
problems” (emphasis added).   
Returning to, and supporting the point made earlier with regard to trans-
disciplinarity, Boulus-Rødje (2014) observe that normative methods in action 
research have become de facto criteria (i.e. a default definition), concluding that “if 
the criteria of action research remain exclusively strict and narrow, a number of 
action research projects may go unnoticed, as they may not be labeled [sic] 
explicitly as ‘action research’” (p.98).   
So, whilst Lewin’s initial concept of Action Research included execution, evaluation 
and learning (Dickens & Watkins, 1999), and whilst change may be intended (Ibid.), 
the point is that Action Research need not necessarily effect that change.  Rather, 
that is a matter of scope, not a reflection of the classification or orientation of the 
research.  Indeed, Bryman and Bell (2011, p. 415) caution that Action Research 
“should not be confused with evaluation research [...] which usually denotes the [ex 
post] study of the impact of an intervention, such as a new social policy or a new 
innovation in organizations”.   
For this research, any proposed intervention — let alone any evaluation criteria for 
that intervention — is not yet known because the research firstly tests whether 
there is a problem, and then characterises reasons why this might be (Chapter 3).  
Whilst the detailed studies were chosen on the basis that a problem was likely, so 
they might well recommend a specific course of action or change, this does not 
automatically hold for the overarching system-level research.  This is because there 
is no single solution to a complex problem or problem in a complex system.  
Rather, the system-level research is concerned with the emergence and 
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persistence of relationships (preceding section; Holling, 1973), and what those 
relationships tell us about approaching the system in the future.54 
Prescriptive intervention 
Notwithstanding the preceding discussion, Action Research must still intend to 
effect change.  Therefore recommendation(s) for intervention must, logically, still 
arise.  In this regard, Bryman and Bell (2011), cites Gummesson’s observation that 
Action Research is closely aligned with management consultancy, but reiterates 
Lewin’s original point that Action Research is undertaken with practitioners.   
As ‘collaborative consultancy’, the implication is that the practitioners, as the 
research/consultancy ‘client’, will still be “looking for expert advice” (Appelbaum & 
Steed, 2005, p. 73).  So prescriptive statements, or those that define courses of 
action, are inherent to Action Research.  These imply a normative basis, 
particularly when exercising judgement.55  This aligns with the “theories of action” 
espoused by Argyris and Schön (in Bartunek (2008, p. 9)).  Moreover such 
statements do not come from nowhere, and are context specific (see also practical 
knowing and judgement in Coghlan, 2011; Pohl & Hirsch Hadorn, 2008).   
Collaborative consultancy 
Practitioners have been involved throughout this research, through the preliminary 
research (Chapter 3), the selection of the detailed studies, and within the studies 
themselves.56   This accords with Fielding and Fielding’s view (in Flick, 2002, p. 49) 
                                              
54
 This is the very point of this research (in particular, see proposition 3 (Section 2.1)).  Besides 
which, any intermediate change and its subsequent evaluation may take decades (see [PR60]; 
Appendix IV, and Syme in Stokols (2006)). It is therefore not within the scope of this research to 
assess the implications of any change. 
55
 Also see Pohl and Hirsch Hadorn (2008), who see trans-disciplinary research as developing 
“descriptive, normative and practice-oriented knowledge in order to help solve, mitigate or 
prevent life-world problems [sic].” 
56
 Discussed later, but for example in detailed study 2, rather than simply handing over the 
cOPEX schedule for pricing, and whilst Auckland Transport was responsible for how the 
schedule was ‘populated’, the process was interactive rather than transactional. 
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that the "structural aspects of a problem should be linked with reconstructing its 
meaning for the people involved”.  More materially (see Huang, 2010), the 
meaningfulness of that collaboration can be seen in the level of willing involvement 
and frankness of participants, the recognition by the study organisations of the 
need and opportunity for change, and an openness to constructive criticism.57  
4.3.3 Probing searches and multiple perspectives 
Responses to complexity can vary from building more sophisticated models 
through to slicing or probing the problem from multiple angles to learn from what 
this tells us (e.g. Astorino-Courtois et al., 2012).58,59  However, as March (1991, p. 
111) observes: 
Decisions in organizations involve an ecology of actors trying to act 
rationally with limited knowledge and preference coherence; trying to 
discover and execute proper behavior in ambiguous situations; and 
trying to discover, construct, and communicate interpretations of a 
confusing world.  
The complexity literature advises a probing approach to this challenge 
(Section 1.2).  To return to Yankelovich (Section 2.2), presenting complex issues in 
a relatively few number of “visions” that “lay bare the conflicts and inconsistencies 
                                              
57
 Negating one of the criticisms of Action Research (see Hinings and Greenwood in Bartunek 
(2008). 
58
 Ackoff (1979) attributed the apparent demise of operations research to the prevalence of 
mathematical models and algorithms, often arising from the principles of Game Theory. 
59
 For completeness, it is noted that Decision Theory (notably the corpus of Kahneman and 
Tversky) was explored as part of the development of this research.  Similarly Game Theory (e.g. 
Bernoulli (1738/1954); von Neumann and Morgenstern (2007); and Black (1969)) was 
considered as a possible research tool.  Decisions are an integral part of the contextual fabric 
(hence, its inclusion within the literature review).  But because the focus is upon system 
outcomes and the role of engineering practice in this, the current approach was favoured.  
Furthermore, Seddon (2008) is of the view that Game Theory promulgates the ‘command and 
control’ perspective, noting that this is at odds with the fundamentals of Systems Thinking and 
the issues being encountered within the public sector. 
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buried in the technical information”, can be an effective means of starting dialogue 
(Yankelovich in Constanza, 2000, p. 2).  Three deep dives60 fulfil that role within 
this research. 
Deep Dives 
Whittington (2006) cautions us that strategy is often seen as a property of 
organisations, and researched in a way that does not recognise the multi-level 
nature of strategy in practice.  By contrast, and in practice, the organisational ‘deep 
dive’ is a diagnostic tool used to gauge strategic performance and cut through 
organisational practice in detail (e.g. Bessant & Stamm, 2007; Horwath, 2009; Yu & 
Bower, 2009).    
Bessant and Stamm (2007, p. 9) describe the deep dive as a ‘search strategy’ that 
is particularly appropriate when faced with the “fog of uncertainty which 
characterises a situation of increasing complexity and unpredictability”.  They add 
that with techniques such as the ‘deep dive’ and “a mixture of judicious 
experimentation and a lot of fast adaptive feedback to emerging situations, firms 
can employ a ‘probe and learn’ approach”.   
Although Yu and Bower (2009, p. 6) describe the deep dive in terms of executive 
intervention, they observe that a deep dive “implies a heavy involvement [...] with 
fine-grained and technical specifics, well into the stage of actual implementation of 
those [...] initiatives”.  Crucially, they argue that (Ibid., p.8): 
A deep dive is an effective means to translate a strategic intent 
envisioned by top managers into organized actions that will be 
embraced by multiple levels of the organization. 
The corollary being the deep dive is an effective means of testing whether the 
strategic intent has been organised into actions that will have meaning at 
multiple levels.  This has relevance at both the industry/system level and at the 
organisational level of this research.   
                                              
60
 An emergent term. 
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A deep dive has the potential to provide direction and meaning by providing 
tangible examples and stories within context (Yankelovich’s “visions”) where 
conventional approaches have encountered resistance.  For example where Yu 
and Bower (2009) suggest that managers being asked to respond to a new 
strategic initiative can still feel bound by their existing context at the local level, a 
deep dive can help to close the ‘knowing-doing’ gap (Walshe et al., 2010).  By 
providing the link between the old system and the new state or direction being 
sought (Whittington, 2006), a deep dive must penetrate, and if necessary, 
challenge normative standards, principles and practice within the organisation, and 
create new behaviours (Yu & Bower, 2009).61  Accordingly, the process can help 
map a pathway and raise awareness and understanding of the issues.   
Relationship between deep dives and case study research 
There is little methodological discourse on deep dive practice as this is relatively 
novel as a research tool, and irrespective, is case specific.  In essence though, a 
deep dive is effectively a form of cross-sectional research in which multiple case 
studies enable the examination of patterns of association (Bryman & Bell, 2011).62  
A case study is a “detailed and intensive analysis […of…] the complexity and 
particular nature of the case in question” in which the focus is “on a bounded 
situation or system, and entity with a purpose and functioning parts” (Ibid., p.59-
60),63 and so is particularly appropriate to this research. So, whilst each ‘deep dive’ 
                                              
61
 See also Hartley et al. (2008), Yu and Bower (2009) on the drivers of strategic deep dives, 
and current calls for disruptive systems thinking (Dobbs et al., 2015), all of which call for re-
orienting from first principles.  Another aspect of this relates to the development of 
understanding (‘consciousness raising’) identified by Yankelovich (1991) and the need to 
address the “perceived applicability to self” and “concreteness and clarity” of an issue (pp.77-
79). 
62
 Again, guidance on how research could or ‘ought’ to be carried out should not be mistaken for 
its definition (e.g. Boulus-Rødje, 2014; Feyerabend, 2010). 
63
 The inclusion of bounded systems within this definition does not preclude the use of a case 
study to research unbounded systems.  The term merely attests to, and provides another 
example of, a definable ‘case’ that is context-specific (Dickens & Watkins, 1999). 
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is a case study in its own right,64 these in turn inform the overarching case study 
that is New Zealand’s land transport sector.   
So, in addition to the nesting of the case studies here, there is also the matter of 
the use of the deep dive within a form of ‘multi-case, mixed-method research’ that 
needs to be considered.  The question is whether multiple case studies, with 
different methodologies within each, can be used to cast light on a wider issue, 
and, in so doing, comprise a valid research design from an academic perspective.   
Yin (2003, p. 20) answers this by citing, as an example of a multi-case study, 
research that included nine social programmes as individual cases, all varying 
widely in focus.  Yin advises that the final chapter of that research then presented a 
cross-case analysis to “draw generalizable conclusions that could apply to many 
other programs”.65,66  As such, the use of multiple studies enables the relationships 
between the studies to be explored and triangulated relative to system-level 
matters.  Leonard-Barton (1990) and Tyre and Orlikowski (1994) provide other 
examples where multi-case research programmes have relied upon diverse studies 
with variable methods within each.  Jackson (2009b, p. 1298) observes that “only a 
combination of multi-methodology and multi-method practice can cope with the 
increasing diversity, complexity and change inherent in the problem situations 
managers encounter”.  In short, the multi-case, mixed-method approach, in 
conjunction with the epistemological positioning of this research, whilst perhaps 
novel in this particular context, is neither unsupported, nor academically 
unsupportable (Dainty in Knight & Ruddock, 2008, p. 8): 
Adopting the principles of methodological pluralism does not render the 
choice of method arbitrary, but emphasises the context-sensitivity 
inherent in research design.   
                                              
64
 ‘Detailed study’ has generally been used as ‘deep dive’ is not in common usage within 
academic literature and also avoids confusion with the overarching case. 
65
 See also Voss, Tsikriktsis, and Frohlich (2002).  
66
 Quantitative and/or qualitative multi-case design also need not involve replication (Yin, 2003). 
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4.4 Methodological framework 
The framework that follows is the result of an ongoing process of reviewing and 
reflecting upon the literature review, industry interaction, and the results of earlier 
research.  The framework aims to probe the workings of the New Zealand land 
transport system (the ‘system’ or unit of analysis), including both functional levels of 
the sector.  It does this by conducting deep dives through different 
organisations/processes that bridge each of the three primary infrastructure 
lifecycle interfaces: notably strategy–project, project–operations, and operations–
strategy.67   
The research framework, then, describes the same basic stages of other ‘multi-
case, mixed-method’ research comprising within-case analyses, followed by a final 
stage of cross-case analysis (e.g. Leonard-Barton, 1990; Tyre & Orlikowski, 1994; 
Yin, 2003).  The aim is that the framework enables common themes and stories to 
be established and considers the broader relationships within the system as a 
whole (see also Table 2.1).  This is the point made by Holling (1973), and quoted in 
Section 4.2, and so provides a means of reconciling the multiple perspectives of 
Action Research with the trans-disciplinary nature of — not only the research itself 
— the lifecycle interfaces, organisations, and indeed, the wider land transport 
sector.   
The framework also aligns with the learning theories of Argyris and Schön (in Pahl-
Wostl, Holtz, Kastens, & Knieper, 2010) and in particular steps beyond what is 
known as ‘single-loop learning’, defined as the “incremental improvement of 
prevailing action strategies without [the] questioning [of] underlying assumptions” 
(Ibid., p.574).  The research framework enables this through its structure (which, 
with its potential to transform, links back to Action Research): 
                                              
67
 Arguably system need and feedback should drive strategy, and therefore the operations–
strategy interface would appear first if the lifecycle were being viewed systemically (Figure 3.1).  
However, a conventional order has been adopted to assist readers. 
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 By returning to first principles, the individual detailed studies provide an 
opportunity for underlying assumptions to be revisited “within a value-normative 
framework” (‘double-loop learning’; Ibid., p.574; see also Dobbs et al. (2015)). 
 In turn, the detailed studies are intended to cast light on the ‘bigger picture’ to 
enable underlying values, belief-systems, and mental-models to be reviewed 
(‘triple-loop learning’).   
4.4.1 Detailed study selection 
Deep dives are often described as a means of transecting an organisation or a 
project (Yu & Bower, 2009).  Here, the three primary lifecycle interfaces, rather than 
the lifecycle stages themselves, or indeed, other matters, emerged as the 
dominant, or primary areas of interest at this time (Chapter 3).68  Because the 
lifecycle is synonymous with organisation structure and infrastructure practice,10 it 
affords insights into wider organisational issues and the New Zealand land 
transport sector more generally.  The challenge was to find lifecycle-spanning 
processes that were connected to both customer outcomes and technical practice.  
This excluded organisation-spanning, ‘in-house’ service functions such as finance 
and human resources.   
More particularly, the studies ideally needed to be aligned across several 
dimensions.  This is to enable cross-case themes and stories to be considered at 
the system level (Leonard-Barton, 1990; Tyre & Orlikowski, 1994) and to provide a 
link to the hypothesis and propositions (Yin, 2003).  So, in order to investigate how 
the misalignment between strategic intent and the management of infrastructure 
systems is being generated (and to enable reasons for the misalignment to be 
identified), processes were selected that: 
                                              
68
 Areas of interest are expected to change over time as the system and thinking of those within 
it evolves.  This does not negate the value of the deep dives in their own right, but at the same 
time, this emphasises the importance of the approach and methodology as a sense-making tool 
for infrastructure systems.  This reminds us that coming to ‘resolution’ (Table 2.1) should not be 
mistaken for a requirement to define a solution in the sense of the “culture of technical control” 
(Yankelovich, 1991, pp. 7-11). 
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1. Spanned one of the three primary infrastructure lifecycle stages in a way that 
included most of the interface-specific ‘contributing factors’ that had been 
identified by the preliminary research (Table 3.1). 
2. Represented a departmental/functional boundary-spanning process within the 
organisation, and would likely be found, if varying in detail, within the wider 
sector. 
3. Crossed multiple vertical levels in the organisation: from technical principles 
through to governance. 
4. Was of direct relevance to the outcomes experienced by the external customer 
— even if not currently delivered — and so related to the strategic intent (rather 
than only a technical objective).  
5. Related to wider normative industry practices (ideally that had been found 
wanting, but not yet resolved). 
In the event that there was no formal/singular process, there needed to be sufficient 
process components within the existing system to enable an equivalent ‘first 
principles’ assessment to be made.   
A range of possible detailed studies were identified over the course of the 
preliminary research.  For example, the Auckland Harbour Bridge and Northern 
Busway projects were often cited within the preliminary interviews as examples of, 
respectively, poor and good decision-making.  However, these were set aside as 
being ultimately project-focused, so therefore not suitable.  Other interface-
spanning processes such as funding, project prioritisation and programming, asset 
management, and compliance were also considered but either did not emerge 
strongly from industry interviews and organisational discussions, were too broad, 
involved processes worked on previously, and/or had evolved significantly since the 
start of this research.   
Accordingly, whilst there may be other processes that might meet the above-
mentioned research criteria, an opportunistic approach was adopted to ring-fence 
three studies before they were subsumed into ongoing improvement initiatives.  
This is a dynamic system, so organisations and the wider industry do not remain 
static whilst cases are identified or research is conducted (underlining the 
importance of involving practitioners). 
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Both benefit management and ‘consequential operating expenditure’ (cOPEX; 
defined in Chapter 6) were explicitly named on more than one occasion during the 
preliminary interviews (e.g. see Appendix IV).  In the end, these two processes — 
along with the well-ingrained industry performance measure of road smoothness — 
were deduced as being suitable for further research after the scope of each was 
refined in discussion with practitioners (Tables 4.1-4.3).   
Table 4.1:  Summary of detailed study 1 
System benefit management 
Aspect (lifecycle 
interface):   
Strategy/project interface. 
Brief description:   How strategic connectivity and benefit visibility at board level 
interrelates with projects. 
Organisation: Auckland Transport (local government organisation). 
Level:   Strategic. 
Scale:   Macro. 
Coverage of 
‘contributing factors’: 
 Articulating benefits.  
 Business case boundaries.  
 Lock-in/momentum/prioritisation.  
 Follow-through/reconciliation with system-level 
objectives (feed-forward). 
 
Methodology: Cross-sectional analysis through current practice, including analysis 
of: 
a) connectivity of current organisational strategies and 
directives/how strategic intent transitions into strategy; 
b) benefit visibility within board reporting/how strategic intent and 
benefits (outcomes) are reported and managed within the 
governance context; 
  
 
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
CMB150717_E Research Strategy 67 
System benefit management 
Methodology (Cont
d
): c) how benefits have been managed and transition within the 
project context. 
Plus a cross-analysis/synthesis of the implications for the strategy 
to project interface. 
Notes:  Links to strategic intent via strategic plans and project 
objectives.
 Auckland Transport has recently melded best practice from 
across 1 regional and 7 local councils. 
 No formal process in place (project-level benefit management 
under development).   
 Links to wider land transport funding and strategic objectives as 
local government must demonstrate ‘strategic fit’ as part of New 
Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA) funding applications (NZTA, 
2013a).   
 Benefit delivery is of shared concern in wider New Zealand land 
transport organisations and across other infrastructure sectors 
(Chapter 3).
 
Table 4.2:  Summary of detailed study 2 
Whole-of-life management 
Aspect (lifecycle 
interface):   
Project/operational interface. 
Brief description:   Post project delivery, operational estimating of the cOPEX arising 
from new projects and programmes. 
Organisation: Auckland Transport (local government organisation). 
Level:   Operational. 
Scale:   Meso. 
  
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Whole-of-life management 
Coverage of 
‘contributing factors’: 
 Handover (feed-forward).  
 Transition from asset to system.  
 Whole-of-life performance.  
Methodology: Cross-sectional analysis through current practice, including: 
a) analysis of project documentation to collate operational costs 
and trace how obligations have been managed and transition 
through the project development; 
b) first principle development of cOPEX schedule and comparison 
against other current estimates; 
c) cross-analysis of the implications for the project to operations 
interface. 
Notes:  Links to strategic intent via project objectives, operational 
budgets, and scope/levels of service.   
 Auckland Transport has recently melded best practice from 
across 1 regional and 7 local councils.   
 No formal process in place.  Auckland Transport has recently 
completed an asset-based estimate of the first stage of a 
significant programme, enabling comparison across estimating 
techniques and approaches.   
 Long-term costs are an identified issue for New Zealand local 
authorities in general (Controller and Auditor-General, 2014a).  
Whole-of-life costs were also identified as wider infrastructure 
issue (Chapter 3). 
 Links to wider land transport funding as local government must 
calculate whole-of-life costs as part of NZTA funding 
applications (NZTA, 2013a).  Wider deliverables must also 
demonstrate strategic fit with overarching objectives 
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Table 4.3:  Summary of detailed study 3 
Performance management 
Aspect (lifecycle 
interface):   
Operational/strategy interface. 
Brief description:   Road smoothness as an indicator of the strategic objective to 
improve customer comfort. 
Organisation: NZTA (central government organisation). 
Level:   Tactical. 
Scale:   Micro. 
Coverage of 
‘contributing factors’: 
 Performance (benefit) monitoring.  
 Follow-through/reconciliation with system-level 
objectives.  Feedback to strategy (see Table 4.1). 
 
Methodology: First principle reassessment of current practice, including: 
a) workshops with infrastructure customers to canvass issues and 
to focus/pilot more comprehensive assessment; 
b) national survey of customers; 
c) assessment of the implications for the operations to strategy 
interface. 
Notes:  Links to strategic intent as a performance indicator for a 
strategic objective.   
 Road smoothness is a widely used national and international 
indicator.  As well as being a measure of customer comfort by 
the NZTA (NZTA, 2011, 2014a, 2015a), it is a mandatory 
reporting measure for local government in New Zealand 
(Department of Internal Affairs, 2013).   
 Performance management identified as a wider issue for New 
Zealand land transport organisations and across other 
infrastructure sectors (Chapter 3). 
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To reiterate an earlier point:  the studies do not purport to cover everything, but 
rather aim to probe and diagnose the system by slicing the system/problem 
vertically.  In doing so, the studies intersect the hierarchic or nested layers of 
practice at the macro, meso, and micro level (Newell et al., 2005; Van de Ven, 
1976).69  This is notable, because, as Hitt, Beamish, Jackson, and Mathieu (2007, 
p. 1385) tell us that: 
Most management problems involve multilevel phenomena, yet most 
management research uses a single level of analysis.  A micro or a 
macro lens alone yields incomplete understanding at either level.  
Multilevel research addresses the levels of theory, measurement, and 
analysis required to fully examine research questions [...] To enrich the 
impact of future management research, we recommend (1) applying 
multilevel designs to existing models (2) considering bottom-up effects, 
(3) collaborating across disciplines on multidisciplinary topics, and (4) 
addressing major real-world problems via multilevel approaches. 
A summary of the overall methodological framework is given in Figure 4.1. 
One methodological point to emerge once the final detailed studies had been 
selected related to the relevance of the methodology to the infrastructure lifecycle 
as a whole.  The lengthy duration of the infrastructure lifecycle would generally 
preclude longitudinal studies except in retrospect as an historic review.  However, 
every piece of infrastructure will pass through the three lifecycle interfaces and the 
broad processes to be researched here.  Whilst the exact details of the process 
may differ and, for example, whilst the metric might not be road smoothness, there 
will be some form of performance monitoring.  So, even though the detailed studies 
are contemporaneous, the research framework offers a form of longitudinal study.  
This is not of a singular asset or network, but rather, of how the processes direct 
that infrastructure and its services (outcomes) to be managed.   
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 As such, this is different from reductionism. 
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Figure 4.1:  Methodological framework 
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4.4.2 Methods 
In addition to the matters covered within Section 4.2, guidance on case study 
research is provided by the likes of Easton (1992), Eisenhardt (1989), Farquhar 
(2012), Fiss (2009), Hartley (2004), Thomas (2004), and Yin (1981, 2003), and has 
been integrated into this framework.  Flyvbjerg (2006) also neatly identifies — and 
then dispels — five common misconceptions of case study research.  From this, it 
can be concluded that there is wide acceptance within the literature that studies of 
this type have a valid and useful place in research. 
Detailed study methods 
Each detailed study adopts a subject- and context-specific methodology 
(Tables 4.1-4.3), the methods for which are detailed within the relevant chapter.70  
The studies deploy a variety of tools to provide within-study triangulation, and this 
includes drawing upon the preliminary research material to provide a check on 
external validity and the wider applicability of the emerging stories and themes (Yin, 
2003). 
The studies are also approached from first principles to enable normative practice 
to be investigated.  As such, whilst the studies investigate the relationship between 
strategic intent and the management of those processes in detail, the studies are 
not an audit in the sense of a box-checking exercise against a given set of strategic 
objectives.  Rather, this is about sense-making and the detail is necessary transect 
and probe this space to uncover stories (aesthetic knowledge; Section 2.2) — and 
also evidence — such that it has meaning and relevance to practice as well as in 
theory (Sections 1.1, 4.2.3, and Footnote 61).  
Each of the studies generated a wealth of data, which were detailed within a series 
of standalone ‘reports’ to capture the analyses and results in a transparent manner, 
and assisting practitioner discussions.  The reports were then summarised into a 
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 Also see Appendix III: Research Management. 
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thesis chapter, and further summarised for publication,71 wider dissemination and 
uptake (see Table 2.1 and Section 4.3.2).72,73 
Only the material that relates directly to the main findings for each of the studies 
has been presented within this thesis for brevity.  For this reason, only selected 
evidence/examples/stories are included within the appendices.  There is therefore 
ample scope for other matters to be addressed at a later date. 
Cross-case analysis 
At the completion of the detailed studies, the findings from each were reviewed, 
and key themes identified and synthesised into groups for cross-case assessment 
by manual ‘cutting and sorting’ (Ryan & Bernard, 2003).  This involved reappraising 
the earlier material from a system- rather than study-specific perspective.  
‘Meaning’74 was therefore reviewed afresh and resulted in many of the themes 
being reworked and regrouped.  Accordingly: 
 the themes from each detailed study do not necessarily align with the system-
level cross-case analysis; and 
 reworking of the themes in this manner does not render the thematic 
assessment of the individual studies invalid, as the cross-case assessment was 
not looking within the deep dive but rather looking for system-level relationships 
and stories.  These are not mutually exclusive or contradictory. 
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 Blom, De Marco, and Guthrie (2015) and Blom and Guthrie (2015, 2017b, 2017c). 
72
 Other papers generated by this research include Blom and Guthrie (2016, 2017a, 2017d, 
2017e).   
73
 Except as noted, the papers stemming from this research do not include material that is not 
otherwise covered by this thesis. 
74
 From the source material but now in the context of the system (see Section 3.1). 
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5 DETAILED STUDY 1  
SYSTEM BENEFIT 
MANAGEMENT 
This first of the three detailed studies investigates the strategy to project interface of the 
infrastructure lifecycle.  It considers how the misalignment between the management of 
infrastructure systems and its strategic intent is being generated across the first of three 
processes to span key lifecycle interfaces or transitions (Tables 2.1 and 4.1).  As such it is 
aimed at providing clues or analogies to develop an understanding of the issues.  The material, 
in turn, provides the evidence-base and inputs for the subsequent cross-case analysis that is to 
follow within Part III. 
Brief description: How strategic connectivity
75
 and benefit visibility at board level interrelates 
with projects. 
Strategic intent:  This detailed study explores the delivery of strategic intent within the 
hierarchical organisational and plan structure of the Auckland region of New Zealand (see 
Appendix I).  In this context, Auckland Transport, as a Council Controlled Organisation, is 
charged with aligning with the wider plan objectives (strategic intent) of the Auckland Plan 
(Auckland Council, 2012a) and specifically the delivery of Auckland Council’s transport related 
objectives: 
 A well-connected Auckland (create better connections and accessibility within Auckland, 
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 Being the connectivity between directives within the higher order statements of strategic 
intent of Auckland Council and subordinate statements of strategic intent within the study 
organisation (Auckland Transport; as a Council Controlled Organisation). 
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across New Zealand and to the world). 
 Transformational shift:  Move to outstanding public transport within one network. 
Contributing factors investigated (see Table 3.1): 
 Articulating benefits. 
 Business case boundaries. 
 Lock-in/momentum/prioritisation. 
 Follow-through/reconciliation with system-level objectives (feed-forward). 
Organisation:  Auckland Transport (local government organisation). 
Much of the current attention given to benefit management targets project delivery.  
By contrast, this study considers system-level benefit management and the ability 
to sustain strategic intent once a given project or programme has been decided 
upon.  This is not an investigation/audit of project deliverables.  Rather, the focus is 
upon the underlying mechanisms and how system-level benefits are managed 
through the strategy–project interface.  The study investigates why the matter of 
benefits might be so problematic, and in what way this might affect the integration 
of projects into the extant system. 
5.1 Introduction to benefit management  
Although benefits are intrinsic to infrastructure and the public sector, benefit 
management still remains an area of concern to the wider infrastructure industry.  
For example, as part of the preliminary research (Chapter 3), benefit management 
was found to be a commonly shared issue, observing in the ensuing journal paper 
that (Blom & Guthrie, 2017e, p. 9): 
While the overarching issue relates to the long-term performance of 
infrastructure and thence the alignment of infrastructure governance and 
operations, this really amounts to how organisational structure and 
business practice define or shape engineering decision-making and 
infrastructure outcomes.  Benefit management [...] processes probe and 
transect this space and have been highlighted as areas for further 
investigation.  
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This Chapter advances that earlier research by investigating system-level benefit 
management in further detail.  It does so by using New Zealand’s publically owned 
land transport as the subject of the research, and focuses on Auckland Transport, 
the entity responsible for transportation management in New Zealand’s largest 
region (see Appendix I for further background).  Auckland Transport has planned a 
capital investment programme of NZ$60B76 over the next three decades (Auckland 
Transport, 2013a). 
This research assesses governance and strategic practice, together with how these 
interrelate with project-level benefit management.  However, this study does not 
purport to calculate the benefits of a project or of the system.  Rather, the approach 
provides a methodological tool for assessing the effectiveness and ‘fitness’ of 
processes that are being deployed to calculate, manage and deliver the benefits of 
transportation and other infrastructure systems.   
Benefit management and land transportation 
According to Breese (2012) and Tillmann, Tzortzopolous, Sapountzis, Formoso, 
and Kagioglou (2012), benefit realisation has relatively recently emerged as a 
mainstream management paradigm out of the technology sector.  A number of 
frameworks and tools have since been advanced to assist benefit management.  
Some are aimed specifically at the public sector, so have been integrated into 
project/programme management, policy, and practice (e.g. May, Sapountzis, Yates, 
Kagioglou, & Aouad, 2009).   
New Zealand has followed suit by adopting the UK’s Gateway review process 
(State Services Commission, 2010, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e).  Benefit 
management, as an identifiable discourse, with its associated milestone hold points 
should, therefore, be entering the language of the public sector.  Within New 
Zealand’s public transportation infrastructure providers, such as the local 
government entity studied here, this should — in theory at least — be less of a 
watershed because: 
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  At the time of writing, NZD$1 equalled approximately USD$0.73 or GBP£0.55. 
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 benefit Cost Ratios (BCRs) are a prevalent investment decision-making tool 
(e.g. NZTA, 2013a), and in New Zealand, transport investment now also 
includes assessment against strategic fit (NZTA, 2015a); and 
 projects are often required to demonstrate that “the work and designation are 
reasonably necessary for achieving the objectives of the requiring authority ” 
(Schedule 4, and s168A(3)(c); RMA, 1991).   
Notwithstanding the point here, that benefit ‘calculations’ are an embedded practice 
for the transportation sector, it is surprising that benefit realisation would, or could, 
ever be viewed as an emergent paradigm for any infrastructure sector at all.  Yet 
this would appear to be the case.  The definition of infrastructure (Section 1.1) 
inherently presupposes any outcome to be positive and, therefore, that projects 
deliver or renew benefits, and the operations division then service, maintain, or 
enhance those benefits over time.  An infrastructure benefit then, is simply that 
which is for the good of, improves, or helps forward that society or enterprise 
("Oxford English Dictionary (online version)," 2014).   
Of course none of this implies that benefit delivery has been, or currently is, 
exemplary.  Moreover, some of the project-oriented frameworks may be 
problematic because transportation infrastructure exists as a complex system 
(Section 2.3), and: 
 projects and programmes may inherently rely on the delivery of other projects or 
services (sometimes between different departments or entities) to enable 
benefits to be realised (Chapter 6);  
 projects and programmes are predominantly delivered to effect change to (i.e. 
benefit) an existing infrastructure system.  Once absorbed, benefits may no 
longer be able to be sufficiently differentiated or may be ‘explained away’ 
(Flyvbjerg, Skamris Holm, et al., 2003);  
 transportation systems exist as a long-term continuum that can extend far 
beyond the initial design life of the hard assets (Quinet, 2011); and therefore 
 strategy is formed incrementally through a non-linear and concurrent process of 
analysis, formulation and implementation (Thiry & Deguire, 2007). 
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This suggests that whilst benefits might be expressed as broad, societal (i.e. 
‘system-level’) objectives, there is a need to move beyond the current project-
oriented view that ultimately informs subsequent processes within project, 
programmes, and the wider organisation (Chapter 3).  However, changing focus 
can be challenging, especially when ongoing growth and economic prudence drives 
a demand for improved project management practices and rigour.  Furthermore, 
adherence to a project perspective is often unhelpful.  For example, Lenfle and 
Loch (2015, p. 7) contend that the stage-gate approach, which underpins current 
project management practice, is problematic because: 
This rational view of project management oversimplifies the processes 
at stake, particularly for innovative projects and megaprojects with their 
inbuilt unforeseeability (because of long time frames and stakeholder 
complexity).  Moreover, this leads [...] to misinterpretations of the 
success factors of these projects. 
Another emergent general management trend, the ‘project-based organisation’ 
(Hobday, 2000; Thiry & Deguire, 2007), arguably the status quo for many 
infrastructure organisations, will only serve to reinforce project-oriented practice.  If 
an organisation (and the infrastructure it manages) is, itself, viewed as a form of 
mega-project, then these problems might be similarly expected, even if expressed 
at different scales and timeframes. 
Study context 
Auckland Transport’s strategic context is largely defined by the requirements of the 
Local Government Act (LGA; 2002) and the Land Transport Management Act 
(LTMA; 2003).  The two statutes establish the high-level relationships with central 
government policy, and the local government aspirations and plans as articulated 
by Auckland Council.  Although the overarching statutory requirements are 
germane and taken into account, the key Auckland Transport strategic documents 
focus on giving effect to the Auckland Plan (Auckland Council, 2012a) in the first 
instance.  This establishes a document hierarchy in which ‘lower order’ plans must 
give effect to ‘higher order’ ones (see Appendix I).  Accordingly, there is an 
expectation that specific detail will be provided within tactical plans in response to, 
and in alignment with, the broader requirements of policies and directives. 
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The Integrated Transport Programme (Auckland Transport, 2013a), which sets the 
strategic direction within Auckland Transport and responds to the Auckland Plan, 
was issued after the initial release of the first generation of subordinate plans such 
as the Regional Land Transport Plan (Auckland Transport, 2012a).  Many of 
Auckland Transport’s plans require review on a three yearly basis and so are now 
in their second generation.   
This study also uses material from a significant capital works programme that was 
underway in Auckland at the time.  A brief overview of the Auckland-Manukau 
Eastern Transport Initiative (AMETI) may therefore be found within Appendix V.   
5.2 Detailed study 1 methods 
This study transects the organisation by completing a ‘deep dive’ through three 
levels of benefit management:   
 how benefits are framed in strategic documentation;77  
 how visible benefits are at board level (benefit visibility); and  
 what happens to benefits within projects (project-level benefit management).   
The final step was to investigate the extent of change likely to be required to 
respond to the research findings (influencing change). 
Strategic interrelationships 
The purpose of this step was to understand how Auckland Transport has structured 
its strategy, and how that interrelates with the Auckland Plan.  To do this, policies 
and directives were noted from key documents, along with how these cross-
referenced policies and directives within other documents.  The strategic 
documents considered were the: 
 Auckland Plan (Auckland Council, 2012a); 
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 Specifically, the interrelationship between the strategic intent of a higher order 
organisation/plan and the underpinning strategic intent and high-level strategy of a subordinate 
organisation and its key strategic documents. 
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 Integrated Transport Programme (ITP; Auckland Transport, 2013a); 
 Asset Management Plan (AMP; Auckland Transport, 2015b); 
 Regional Land Transport Plan (RLTP; Auckland Transport, 2015c); 
 Regional Public Transport Plan (RPTP; Auckland Transport, 2015f); and  
 Parking Strategy (Auckland Transport, 2015e).   
Social network tools (e.g. Gephi) are available to help map such relationships, 
connections, and even values (e.g. Allee & Schwabe, 2009), and have been used 
to this end later in this study.78  However, because disconnects between strategic 
documents are also of interest here (something that is not so apparent within a 
complex social network map), a different approach was required to assist the 
detailed analysis.   
The outputs were instead drawn in EDraw Max, a programme that has tools to 
enable the connections to be drawn to look like a subway or metro map.  A subway 
map was chosen for stylistic and clarity reasons (notably the ability to highlight 
disconnects as ‘terminating stations’).  This took time as the ‘map’ was not 
automatically generated from a list of connections, but had to be built.  So, overall 
‘network’ form is not important here.  What is crucial are the linkages that Auckland 
Transport has itself defined in its documents enabling both relative connectivity and 
disconnects to be readily and systematically identified.   
Performance measures were also mapped for the same documents plus measures 
from the two latest versions of Auckland Transport’s Statement of Intent (Auckland 
Transport, 2014d, 2014e).  The Statement of Intent (SOI) documents the short-term 
agreement between Auckland Transport and its parent organisation, Auckland 
Council.  As many of the ‘second-order’ plans specifically referenced the 
performance measures within the SOI, the SOI was included for completeness in 
this step.79  The mapping exercise has provided a useful way of understanding the 
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 Visually augmenting the descriptive analysis (Trumbo, 1999).   
79
 The SOI was not included within the initial strategic framework map, as the SOI is meant to 
articulate the short-term actions that give effect to the long-term ITP. 
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implications arising after significant shifts in strategy were noted between two 
different versions of the SOI. 
Benefit visibility 
825 board reports were available from Auckland Transport’s formation in November 
2010 to December 2015.  Of these, 765 were in an interactive PDF format that 
allowed the documents to be coded.  The excluded documents were either file 
dividers (titles only) or short financial statements, neither of which affected the 
commentary that follows. 
The ‘manifest content’ (Section 3.1) was coded in NVivo, this time according to a 
predefined schedule to enable the relative coverage of areas of interest to be 
compared: 
 benefits; 
 infrastructure lifecycle/organisational structure: 
- strategy; 
- operations; 
- capital development; 
 performance and feedback; 
 AMETI visibility. 
Benefits and performance reflect the key dimensions of first stage of this detailed 
study, and AMETI, provided a link to the third stage of this study.  The functional 
divisions were chosen to support the system-level analysis. 
Whilst the manifest content analysis provided a systematic assessment of the 
documentation, it must, by its very nature remain qualitative in essence, so has not 
been reported directly.  This is because the actual percentages cannot be 
generalised; there is nothing to suggest that any given percentage is appropriate or 
otherwise.  However, the assessment provided a quantitative basis for describing 
relative trends (i.e. ‘more’ or ‘less’ coverage), a means of sifting data, and a 
framework for assessing the ‘latent content’ (Section 3.1).   
The coding process also assisted in readily extracting examples from documents 
as evidence to support the detailed analysis.  The predefined codes were 
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supplemented with emergent sub-themes.  These were then grouped into thematic 
clusters for further consideration (again, using the processes described in 
Section 3.1).  Accordingly the results are structured to firstly follow the coding 
schedule before moving on to the other matters to emerge from the analysis. 
Project-level benefit management 
This step entailed an overview of 128 available project documents to enable key 
issues to be identified.  Rather than coding the documents directly in NVivo, in this 
instance it was simpler to firstly tabulate issues within Excel before sorting these 
into themes (Section 3.1).  Project-specific material was then augmented by: 
 Prior organisational case studies.  Previous Auckland Transport or legacy 
organisation projects that have relevance to this study. 
 Preliminary research interviews (Chapter 3).   
 An additional 7 semi-structured interviews with staff from across Auckland 
Transport, including the Programme Director, as well as senior consultant 
advisors (see Appendix II).  These were to source and clarify information, and to 
seek views on preliminary observations. 
 Observations from the data gathering and review process, and the literature 
available from Auckland Transport over the course of this study. 
System-focused Appreciative Enquiry underpinned the approach, so this study 
explores the extent to which benefits are already articulated and managed within 
existing practice, then investigates disconnects (if any).  The aim was to identify a 
range of factors that could affect the benefit realisation process and therefore the 
ability to deliver the benefits being sought.   
Influencing change 
A one hour workshop was held with two senior Auckland Transport specialists 
(August 2016) to canvass the range of matters that would need to be changed or 
addressed in response to this study (see Appendix II).  The issues were captured 
by the Auckland Transport workshop participants on a whiteboard as a mind map.  
The workshop output was then replotted using Gephi networking software, which 
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enabled the relative connectivity of issues/actions to be highlighted, establishing a 
hierarchy to assist the organisation prioritise its response.   
The outputs could inform and help the organisation to prioritise change, as highly 
connected points are likely to create ‘leverage’ or to have a disproportionate effect 
upon the system.  To this end, the workshop also served as a consciousness 
raising exercise and ‘socialised’ the issues and concepts.80  Whilst Auckland 
Transport has advised changes have arisen already as a consequence of this work 
(Section 9.2.2), implementing any change is not part of the scope of this research 
(Chapter 4).   
5.3 Detailed study 1 results 
The results of this detailed study are attached within Appendix VI, which includes 
examples from the available documentation to support and augment the analysis.  
For brevity, only those key matters have been included which provide a link to the 
key themes set out below and within the discussion to follow.    
5.3.1 Strategic interrelationships 
Presenting the organisation’s strategic and performance management frameworks 
as a simple ‘map’ (Section 5.2; Figure AVI.1 and Figures AVI.3-AVI.4) proved a 
useful analysis tool.  As Auckland Transport was not wholly clear how their 
strategies fitted together, it was also useful for socialising the findings.  The 
mapping technique therefore has potential to be of use to this, and other 
infrastructure organisations to understand, check, and communicate strategic 
direction. 
As a general observation, Auckland Transport’s strategies are dominated by the 
hard infrastructure typology through either asset management or capital 
                                              
80
 ‘Socialising’ is broadly an organisational ‘teaching/learning’ process (Van Maanen & Barley, 
1982), which can be useful in change management, and/or in gaining acceptance/uptake of new 
or challenging initiatives.  See also Yankelovich (1991); Yankelovich and Friedman (2010), and 
Section 2.2.   
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development.  Service-related strategies are largely absent or reduced to general 
satisfaction surveys within performance measures.  The study also found that 
strategic frameworks can be undermined by factors such as: 
 The relative timing of strategy development.  In this instance the hierarchy 
appears to have been immediately compromised by the order in which 
documents were produced. 
 The ability to manage change.  This includes the iteration and review of 
strategy, and the ability to synchronise and align documents.  The inability to 
follow ‘threads’ throughout the system exacerbates disconnects within the 
strategic framework (proposition 3). 
 The promulgation of new strategies, and measures. 
 The ability to understand, connect, and align all parts of the system, namely: 
documents, strategies, measures, and then among all three layers.  This is 
more than a matter of complexity, but requires a purposeful documentation of 
explicit links so that meaning can be communicated and connections 
understood.  Connectivity is important for several key reasons: 
- Whilst linkages might be inferred, these can be open to interpretation, 
whether between organisations, departments, or by stakeholders.  So this 
requires more than the application of ‘common sense’ for transparency and 
strategic direction. 
- The more connected a strategy or measure, the greater the visibility within 
the organisation.  This relates to the matter of salience (Magness, 2008; 
Mitchell et al., 1997; Neville, Bell, & Whitwell, 2011; Neville, Menguc, & Bell, 
2003).  Strategies or initiatives that become isolated are at risk of being 
omitted due to lack of visibility within the wider system.  
- What is more, transparency would enable outcomes to be evaluated across 
multiple levels of the organisation — recalling that performance measures 
do not measure or target everything — and enable organisational learning 
and (r)evolution. 
 The complexity of the strategy and therefore the inability to clearly communicate 
requirements and how everything fits together (i.e. ‘how do I contribute?’). 
These factors affect transparency, accountability, follow-through, and thence the 
ability to review, learn, adapt, and evolve.  
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With the strategic framework having the potential to be compromised in this way, 
there is, in turn an issue for the management of outcomes, as there is nowhere for 
project-level benefits81 to tie into the strategic framework.  There are simply too 
many disconnects.82  Subsequently, even with a stage-gate assessment of benefits, 
the contribution to the overarching system-level objectives may not be able to be 
ascertained or have much meaning. 
5.3.2 Benefit visibility 
Nadler and Tushman (1980), amongst others, argue that goal attainment is one of 
the fundamental pillars of organisational performance.  At face value, then, one 
would expect benefits to be highly visible within board documentation given the key 
role of governance “is to ensure that corporate management is continuously and 
effectively striving for above-average performance, taking into account risk” 
(Australian Independent Working Party into Corporate Governance, in R. Grant et 
al., 2011, p. 55).   
Yet in the subject organisation: 
 benefit management is not highly visible at board level; 
 there is both a disconnect and a lack of transparency between strategic intent 
and the proposed benefits of projects or initiatives; and 
 reported follow-through and feedback is virtually non-existent, or not reported in 
a way that that suggests the organisation retains knowledge or enables 
organisational learning and adaptation. 
The organisation and its board are clearly aware of some of these issues and are 
trying to effect a culture change.  There is, for example, a project audit framework 
(which includes benefit realisation), and there are examples where benefits were 
being actively managed within parts of the organisation.  There has also, more 
recently, been a greater focus on operations and service delivery than was seen 
within strategic documents. 
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 Arising from capital development and operations. 
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 See Appendix VI, Section AVI.1. 
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However, just as the strategy is dominated by the hard infrastructure typology, 
board documentation is dominated by features, which become little more than a list 
of actions and outputs in the absence of clearly established benefits and feedback 
loops (and is reinforced by the current form of the strategic documents).  This ‘red 
queen-like’ busyness without a sense of progress has been noted by Auckland 
Transport’s shareholder (Auckland Council) and in the public’s submissions to 
strategic plans.   
What is also not clear from the available documentation is how the individual parts 
of the organisation and network act upon each other and influence the benefits at 
the system level.  This was particularly apparent in the way performance indicators 
were reported; there was no sense that the whole of the organisation considered 
how their actions either benefited or adversely affected strategic goals 
(proposition 2).  Finally, the documentation often relied on inference or superficial 
assessment in areas such as: 
 between strategy and performance indicators, projects, or actions; 
 project alignment with, or interpretation of, strategy; 
 the inherent ‘goodness’ of a project, action, or technical process (e.g. BCR). 
This curtails the unbundling of project benefits, transparency, and feedback, and 
thence organisational/system-level knowledge retention, learning, and 
accountability.  Consequently, project-level benefit management can only be one 
part of the solution and in itself is unlikely to result in the improvements to the 
system-level infrastructure outcomes being sought. 
5.3.3 Project-level benefit management 
At the project level, it appears that this matter is as much about the benefit 
realisation process, as it is about realising that there are benefits (and dis-benefits) 
to be managed, and that those benefits:   
 are the primary focus for the project or programme;  
 are externally focused;  
 unfold in detail as the project advances; 
 may still evolve and change over time; 
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
88 Detailed Study 1 CMB150717_E 
 exist at multiple levels and respond to many functional (e.g. organisational 
department and technical discipline) needs; and 
 have several dimensions that respond to customer need, beliefs, choice, and 
aptitudes. 
Stage-gate frameworks are therefore all well and good, but as Lenfle and Loch 
(2015, p. 2) point out: 
The performance track record of megaprojects is dismal, even though 
the basic ingredients of successful large project management are not 
new.  Put simply, the trick is to combine uncertainty in dealing with the 
difficulties of long time horizons and non-standard technologies with 
stakeholder complexity as expressed through the involvement of 
multiple powerful interested parties (Flyvbjerg and Cowi 2004). 
It might be trite, but as this study has shown, it is necessary to add: whilst retaining 
focus on the intended, right, and/or all benefits.   
Whilst there are many challenges with the delivery of complex infrastructure 
projects and their benefits (e.g. as examined by Bertolini & Salet, 2008; Flyvbjerg, 
Bruzelius, et al., 2003; Lenfle & Loch, 2015; OMEGA Centre, 2012), those benefits 
are ultimately directed at a third, often amorphous, party: a community or society at 
large.  Irrespective of any community consultation or collaboration by the 
organisation or project team, those stakeholders do not often have a strong voice 
within the organisation itself.  Furthermore, their organisational proxy — the 
operational divisions of an infrastructure organisation — also do not seem to be 
actively involved to provide the voice of ‘the client’.  Alternatively, there is the risk 
that the operational focus is upon moving traffic, freight, and/or buses.  In other 
words, things rather than people. 
It is also telling that benefit management was delegated to the financial team, 
inherently aligning the benefit management process with the investment and 
funding decision.  This may be necessary at one level; however, whilst benefits are 
assessed at the project-level as part of investment and statutory decision making 
processes, this is not necessarily addressing system-level outcomes.  The benefits 
as assessed by a BCR might be useful in an ex post assessment and review of 
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benefit delivery, but should not be assumed as the complete picture, as benefits 
need to be considered from multiple perspectives and through many levels.  Whilst 
the BCR notionally provides for a wide range of benefits, these can be mired in the 
focus upon traffic modelling, or receive less attention because wider benefits may 
be: 
 less familiar, or less readily able to be quantified; 
 omitted or given cursory attention because traffic-related benefits were deemed 
sufficient to get the project ‘over the line’. 
Dis-benefits, too, need to be managed and this is not necessarily the same as risk 
management or the weighing of the benefits versus the disbenefits of project 
options (Breese, 2012).  Something more active is required.  For example, in the 
New Zealand context, statutory processes are likely to include requirements that 
avoid, remedy or mitigate adverse environmental effects (Appendix I).  
Consequently, the benefits needing to be managed may have a different focus and 
scale from those aimed at the system or strategic level. 
Similarly, there is no process for managing ‘deferred benefits’ (explored in detail 
within Chapter 6).  This study reiterated the importance of deferred benefits, and 
their links to how benefits are perceived, framed, and communicated, giving rise to 
a belief that certain benefits have been delivered or ‘problems sorted’.  Overcoming 
the inertia that this creates, let alone any funding shortfall, can be challenging.   
Finally, the following matters also emerged from the analysis: 
 Feedback:  There is currently no mechanism to provide feedback to the project 
team even though benefits and organisational reputation were two of the 
attributes upon which project success would be judged.83  Information and 
assumptions used to assess and approve the project are not re-used (and so 
tested), and necessary benchmark or baseline information obtained to enable 
the necessary comparisons to be made.  It was felt that there would be a 
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 Doz and Kosonen (2014) describe this as strategic atrophy. 
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reluctance to actually complete such an assessment as the project/organisation 
would be found wanting. 
Ex post feedback was sought from the community surrounding the project 
(Board visibility; Appendix VI).  However, this appeared to extend to generic 
satisfaction surveys.  One problem with customer satisfaction surveys is that 
they are really only asking about the customer’s satisfaction with the asset.  
This is not the same as asking whether they are satisfied that it helps them with 
their lives (see Chapter 7).  So, although the project was predicated on 
achieving a significant modal shift (Auckland Transport, 2013b), this does not 
appear to have been explored by, for example, asking the community whether 
they now believed that they could give up a car (and if so, why/if not, why not?).  
Such a question, and change in focus, would have enabled ongoing learning 
and goal-seeking behaviour as advocated by the likes of Pahl-Wostl and Ackoff, 
and a shift beyond outcomes to aptitudes (Section 1.2). 
 Feed-forward:  There is currently no mechanism for passing feedback on to 
strategy, to inform traffic models, patronage data, or other factors associated 
with planning.  Newig et al. (2010) too, highlight the need for learning at the 
level of network governance rather than actor level. 
 Follow-through:  Similarly, there is no process for capturing the multiple layers 
of benefits as they emerge within the project, and to follow the threads through 
both the organisation and the lifecycle.  This needs to transcend organisational, 
functional, personal, and other boundaries.  The impacts of this were seen 
through the assessment of cOPEX (Chapter 6). 
5.3.4 Influencing change 
Auckland Transport provided some initial reflections on the research and actions 
and/or issues that might be required to effect positive change stemming from the 
findings (see Appendix VI, Section AVI.4).  Themes of particular note were: 
 People:  Shaped around perceptions/beliefs and the need to re-orient the 
organisation.   
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 Operational costs: Highlights the concern with the implications of actually 
delivering all of the benefits attached to both the current system and new 
projects (‘doing everything we said we would’), and the ramifications for wider 
practice.   
 Accountability:  The workshop showed that change does not rest within one 
part of the organisation (or indeed only within the study organisation itself).  But 
it was not clear which part of the organisation would own the process, or ensure 
the various ‘threads’ had been followed through.  Personal accountability was 
seen as being central to the ability to effect change to the system and current 
practice, and underpinning, more generally, the change network that had been 
drawn. 
5.4 Detailed study 1 discussion 
5.4.1 System-level benefit realisation 
There are a number of mechanisms available for managing benefits, whether as 
part of a specific benefit realisation framework, or general asset or project 
management guidance.  However, the dynamic, and non-linear nature of 
infrastructure as a system, means that these are unlikely to be sufficient on their 
own.  This is because they target one part of the infrastructure lifecycle, and this is 
reinforced by organisational structure and other decision-boundaries. 
What has been shown by the examples provided within Appendix VI, and can be 
deduced from this study, is that benefits need to be understood and managed at a 
variety of levels that reflects organisational structure and function, customer 
need/system objectives, discipline, and timescale (amongst others).  Furthermore, 
whilst various tools may be useful in managing discrete packages or projects, they 
may actually reinforce system-level disconnects by suggesting a sufficiency rather 
than continuum of outcome.  Moreover, they may do so from a singular perspective 
that may not necessarily capture or reconcile all requirements.   
The preliminary research revealed four dimensions that affect how long-term 
infrastructure outcomes are understood: needs, precepts, choices, and aptitudes 
(Section 3.2).  These dimensions envelop matters that enrich benefit complexity, 
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such as value delivery (Basole & Rouse, 2008; Liyanage & Kumar, 2003).  Benefits 
also need to extend beyond merely society’s interaction with infrastructure assets 
(how it uses the infrastructure) to what the infrastructure enables (Chapter 7).  
Consequently, infrastructure requires particular care to orient benefits towards the 
communities it is being designed to serve.  In the transport sector, for example, the 
movement of things should not be conflated with the movement of people, just as 
congestion should not always be construed as need.   
As a new organisation, Auckland Transport has had the opportunity to re-establish 
strategy and orient the organisation towards benefit delivery.  So it also has the 
opportunity to avoid the default ‘coping strategies’ identified by Johnston and 
Pongatichat (2008).84  However, the focus on maintaining the delivery of projects 
has resulted in the misalignment of strategic documents in several areas, and the 
strategic intent becoming tactical.  Whilst the programme and project prioritisation 
framework has been a major and necessary initiative, in this context it reinforces 
the project-oriented focus.  These factors contribute to a situation whereby benefits 
are neither highly visible nor transparent at the governance level of the 
organisation.  This in turn amplifies the absence of benefit management at the 
project-level and the failure to feedback into strategy.  Again, the preliminary 
research interviews indicate that Auckland Transport is not alone. 
For infrastructure management to better align with strategic intent, of vital 
importance is another level of benefit management aimed at the whole of the 
organisation, the infrastructure system, and the progressive and continually 
evolving outcomes it is seeking to achieve.  This is not simply a matter of applying 
existing tools and frameworks to the organisation as a whole (but they may help).  
This study has also identified multiple actions and areas where improvements can 
be made (see Appendix VI), but many of these will be specific to the subject 
organisation at the very detailed level. 
Beyond this, it would appear that there would be merit in purposeful system 
stewardship.  Zimmerman and Sparrow (1997) describe stewardship as “a 
                                              
84
 See Section 1.2. 
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collective sense of ownership or accountability”, and the concept is described by 
Senge (2006) as a paradox akin to that of evolution: “a process of "transformation 
through conservation"”.   
Figure 5.1 indicates where this function might sit within a generic infrastructure 
administration structure (potentially introducing the role of ‘system steward’ to 
better define accountabilities). The introduction of system stewardship into the 
operating model, as well as its integration within the organisational culture or 
‘mode’, should assist in redirecting governance towards operations and system-
level outcomes.  It also has the potential to establish system-level operations as the 
basis through which projects, if any, are defined.  This is indicated in Figure 5.1 by 
the increased emphasis given to the governance–stewardship–operational 
relationship.  As such, this offers an alternative to the current, project-oriented 
paradigm (Chapter 3). 
System stewardship is not proposed as another layer of bureaucracy.  Rather, the 
key to this operating model and mode is that: 
 The organisational model is operationally oriented towards the system and its 
long-term outcomes by emphasising the function of the existing system and its 
operation.  This is a move away from the current project dominance and is 
aimed at emphasising the role projects have in transforming the system 
(proposition 1).  This also provides for the resolution of divergent commitments, 
objectives and resources (Doz & Kosonen, 2014), and the incremental 
development of strategy (Thiry & Deguire, 2007). 
 System stewardship provides a governance interface by synthesising feedback 
so that this may be integrated within strategy and governance-level decision-
making.  This provides for the loss of co-ordinating roles (e.g. Borough 
Engineer), and is aimed at developing “system fitness” (see propositions 1-3). 
 There is greater accountability within the system.  Operations must define, and 
capital development must follow-through on project outcomes and benefits. 
 Operational divisions are oriented away from functional boundaries and focused 
upon integrated long-term, service outcomes. 
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Figure 5.1:  System stewardship model 
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The notion of system stewardship is not new — at least in New Zealand where it 
has cultural roots in the principle of kaitiakitanga,85 and has since been enshrined in 
the RMA (1991).  Whilst in the 1990s Dunning noted that public sector 
organisations were “the only agent to have broad social system stewardship 
responsibilities” (in Doz & Kosonen, 2014, p. 8), the concept seems only more 
recently to have been gaining traction, mainly within the healthcare sector (e.g. 
Alvarez-Rosete, Hawkins, & Parkhurst, 2013; Majdzadeh, Yazdizadeh, Nedjat, 
Gholami, & Ahghari, 2012).86  It is also supported by Hallsworth (2012, p. 11; as 
introduced by Nash), in the field of ‘new economic thinking’ (emphasis added): 
Government institutions, law makers and civil servants could learn a lot 
from complexity science.  While the broad trend in government over the 
years has been to approach ever more complex challenges by ‘a more 
sophisticated application of traditional, linear thinking, such as more 
analysis and evidence reviews, more detailed strategies and plans, 
more rigorous performance monitoring’, this has had limited success.  
An appreciation of complex adaptive systems would [...] overcome the 
policy inertia that results from rigid, preformed plans, as well as 
generating greater feedback and learning.  It would also ensure that 
complex, cross-cutting challenges were dealt with in a system-wide 
manner, rather than by isolated central government departments.  Such 
‘system stewardship’ would [...] significantly improve strategies for 
governing. 
Whilst the need to integrate benefits at the system level might seem self-evident, 
this is not a concept that currently appears widely within the literature associated 
                                              
85
 “Guardianship, stewardship, trusteeship” ("Maori dictionary," 2003-2016). 
86
 McArthur (2012) has explored public sector stewardship more generally and also notes the 
cultural context of the term.  This cultural context is important, and it would therefore be 
appropriate for the meaning of stewardship be refined within a local context.  That does not 
change the broad intent of system stewardship being proposed here.  
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
96 Detailed Study 1 CMB150717_E 
with the ‘hard’ infrastructure sectors.87  Moreover, industry-wide interviews suggest 
this is also not prevalent within practice.88   
Without proactive and purposeful system stewardship, infrastructure benefits are 
unlikely to be realised over the long term (proposition 2).  The establishment of a 
system stewardship function provides a mechanism to enable strategic agility and 
adaptive capacity.  It should also evoke the story telling necessary to augment the 
management of a complex adaptive system over time (Boal & Schultz, 2007; Doz & 
Kosonen, 2014; Snowden, 2003). 
5.4.2 Wider industry relevance 
This study is, by its very nature, organisation-specific in its detail (and not 
generalisable at that level).  However, comparison of the commentary from the 
wider, international industry (Chapter 3) points to shared high-level concerns and 
issues (Appendix IV).  Where opinions differed, these tended to be in the category 
of ‘could do better’, or a ‘work in progress’, and in the minority.   
One of the interesting aspects to be commented on within the wider interviews,89 
related to the role of ‘unrelated’ organisational processes such as the personal 
performance and development measures stemming from human resources.  This is 
broadly on the same continuum as the measures of success for project managers; 
however, whilst a project manager might be an external provider, in-house 
performance measures can be more difficult to unpick and reorient.  This thread 
was explored in more detail with a human resources specialist from the 
infrastructure sector.  They acknowledged that linking career development to 
specific tasks in this way had created issues in the past, and whilst the practice was 
changing, still had some way to go ([PR59]).  It would therefore appear that just as 
                                              
87 Although there is limited high-level recognition of the need for infrastructure stewardship (e.g. 
IPENZ (2010); Zimmerman and Sparrow (1997).   
88
 e.g. [PR15-PR16], [PR18-PR19]. [PR22], [PR24], [PR26-PR28], [PR30-PR33], [PR37], 
[PR42], [PR44-PR45], [PR47], [PR50], [PR53], [PR58], [PR60], [PR63], [PR66]. 
89
 [PR16], [PR65]. 
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study 2 recommended financial practice change to better enable long-term 
infrastructure outcomes, other support areas such as human resources also need 
adjustment to better align these to the public administration of infrastructure.  This, 
of course is not new (e.g. Box, 1999; Metcalfe, 1993), but given the observations 
from within industry, it is yet to be fully resolved (see also Doz & Kosonen, 2014). 
5.5 Detailed study 1 conclusions 
This study has explored benefit management across the strategy–project interface 
using mechanisms aimed at different aspects of this interface:  the connectivity of 
the strategic framework, benefit visibility at board level, and project-level benefit 
delivery.  A summary of the key points from the deep dive are provided within 
Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1:  Summary of the benefit management deep dive 
Strategy—project transition: System benefits management (Auckland Transport) 
How is the misalignment being generated (what are the reasons for the misalignment)? 
Strategic Mapping  Homogeneity:  dominance by assets and projects. 
 Document (strategy) development order. 
 Poor iteration/change management. 
 New strategies/measures as a response to problems. 
 Ability to understand, connect and align all parts of the system. 
Benefit visibility  Dominance by features (outputs). 
 Lack of system-level benefit visibility. 
 Disconnect between strategic intent and project benefits. 
 Reported follow-through and feedback non-existent. 
 Unclear how teams act on others/strategic intent. 
Project-level 
benefit 
management 
 Under development/emergent. 
 Focused on project not system. 
 Dominated by tipping points from BCR (e.g. traffic). 
 Lack of disbenefit management. 
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Strategy—project transition: System benefits management (Auckland Transport) 
 Deferred benefits — over-claimed system benefits. 
 No feedback, feed-forward, or follow-through. 
Synthesis
90
  Dynamics of system not managed. 
 Benefits not understood at multiple dimensions (scale, customer, 
function, timescale etc.). 
 Embedded misalignment through incremental change. 
 Wider corporate practice (e.g. HR/personal performance 
requirements) can also impede. 
Effects 
 Absence of service-related strategy (and outcomes). 
 Loss of connectivity and transparency. 
 Complicated framework — proliferation of requirements. 
 Unclear how individuals, teams etc. contribute (counterproductive/silos). 
 Loss of knowledge/reduced capacity for organisational learning. 
 Red-queen busyness with unknown progress/benefits not visible. 
 Loss of customer voice. 
 Loss of outcomes (simplification, homogeneity of customer/function/service). 
 Movement of things misconstrued as movement of people (technical vs service outcomes). 
 Does not support strategic intent. 
Implications and interventions 
 Project-level benefit management is not enough — benefits must also be managed at 
system level. 
 System stewardship required:  System-level synthesis/management of multiple benefits and 
multi-dimension benefits plus system dynamics. 
                                              
90
 Because this detailed study involved three separate stages and methods, as described in the 
methodology, it involved its own cross-case analysis and synthesis.  This does not, therefore, 
appear within the equivalent tables for the other detailed studies. 
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Strategy—project transition: System benefits management (Auckland Transport) 
 Deferred benefits need to be understood and managed. 
 Corporate process (e.g. HR) also needs to align to outcomes. 
 Detailed interventions per specifics of case/organisation. 
The study shows that whilst theoretical frameworks are likely to be useful, these are 
bounded approaches that do not necessarily assist the organisation in aligning the 
benefits with a strategic context that is dynamic, and which should be system-
focused and externally-oriented.  Furthermore, the organisation needs to actively 
anticipate feedback, feed-forward and follow-through from the tactical delivery of 
operations and capital development to enable any benefit management or 
realisation ‘scheme’ to have any real meaning or traction.   
It is clear from this study that system-level co-ordination and integration is being 
lost within the ‘tactical strategy’ of programmes and initiatives.  As a consequence, 
this is creating a ‘red queen’-like busyness without any real understanding of 
whether anything has been achieved relative to the intended or necessary 
outcomes being sought.  The notion of system stewardship has therefore been 
advanced.  Whilst this is not a new concept, it has only recently appeared within the 
health sector and is novel within hard (built) infrastructure.  Moreover, it appears to 
be an appropriate response to system-level complexity and a potential enabler of 
strategic agility and adaptive capacity. 
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6 DETAILED STUDY 2  
WHOLE-OF-LIFE 
MANAGEMENT 
The previous detailed study has identified issues in the strategy–project interface that disrupt 
the ability to align infrastructure management practice with its strategic intent.  This second of 
the three detailed studies now investigates the project to operations interface of the 
infrastructure lifecycle, being the second of three processes to span key lifecycle interfaces or 
transitions (Tables 2.1 and 4.1).  Like the first study, it is aimed at providing clues or analogies 
to develop an understanding of the issues.  The material, in turn, provides the evidence-base 
and inputs for the subsequent cross-case analysis that is to follow within Part III. 
Brief description:  Post project delivery, operational estimating of the cOPEX arising from new 
projects and programmes. 
Strategic intent:  Auckland Transport, as a Council Controlled Organisation, is charged with 
aligning with the wider plan objectives (strategic intent) of the Auckland Plan (Auckland Council, 
2012a) and specifically the delivery of Auckland Council’s transport related objectives.  The 
organisation delivers projects within this context, and in so doing, articulates project-level 
objectives and intended system-level benefits which it expects to be delivered. 
Contributing factors investigated (see Table 3.1): 
 Handover (feed-forward). 
 Transition from asset to system. 
 Whole-of-life performance. 
Organisation:  Auckland Transport (local government organisation). 
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This study explores the project–operations interface through a detailed assessment 
of consequential operating expenditure (cOPEX).  cOPEX is the new maintenance 
and operational expenditure arising from capital development and is a subset of 
total OPEX.  It includes the maintenance of assets at nominated or defined levels of 
service, plus any associated management, compliance, and service costs (such as 
public transport services in the case of transportation infrastructure).   
Although there are requirements to undertake whole-of–life cost assessments as 
part of capital development, issues with the forecasting of cOPEX have been found 
in New Zealand local government (Controller and Auditor-General, 2014a).  Given 
the extent and complexity of Auckland Transport’s forward works programme, its 
cOPEX has been identified as a significant issue for the city.  The issue is currently 
understood by Auckland Transport to be more than a matter of simply applying 
existing theory; however, the scope and materiality of the issues are not well 
understood. 
6.1 Introduction to consequential OPEX 
Auckland Transport is again the focus of this study.  Its wider regional and sector 
context is described in Appendix I.   
Auckland Transport has estimated NZ$60B76 of capital expenditure and investment 
(CAPEX) over the next three decades (Auckland Transport, 2013a), with a short-
term annual capital works budget of NZ$600M–NZ$650M excluding renewals 
(Auckland Transport, 2014d).  NZ$1.86B over the next 10 years has been provided 
for “network maintenance and asset operations”.  In this context, this means the 
maintenance of the local road network, and transport-related assets such as public 
transport facilities and commuter rail depots and rolling stock, but excludes the 
provision of transportation services, or maintenance of the wider rail and State 
highway networks.  Notwithstanding any limitations with the current approach to 
estimating OPEX, this excludes growth, the current renewals programme, and the 
“increased requirement for maintenance that will arise from the reduced level of 
renewal investment from 2019 onwards” (Auckland Transport, 2015b).  Auckland 
Transport (Ibid.) estimates the additional 1.5% of asset growth will result in an 
annual cOPEX of NZ$2M, bringing the total OPEX to NZ$119M over a ten year 
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period, just to stay apace of the growth in assets.  Yet (Auckland Transport, 2014b, 
p. 1; emphasis added): 
Historically, there has been little, if any, coupling between the capital 
development programme and the increases to maintenance and 
operational costs.  CAPEX and OPEX budgets are mainly viewed and 
managed in isolation.  There is little visibility or reporting around the 
consequential OPEX implications of capital development at a 
board or executive leadership level.  
Whilst operational budgets have been increased to allow for growth, this 
has largely been on the basis of a simple percentage uplift.  Historically 
this has been in the range 0.8% to 2.5% [of the existing operational 
budget], with the level mainly influenced by budget pressures or linked 
to population increase.  
This formulaic approach does not accurately reflect the increasing 
pressure on operational and maintenance budgets arising from: 
1. The growing influence of amenity and urban design considerations 
in infrastructure design 
2. The increasing use of non-standard materials and fittings  
3. Increasing network complexity and interrelationships. 
Not surprisingly, Auckland Council (Auckland Transport’s sole shareholder) also 
considers the impact of “consequential OPEX” to be a key issue at this time 
(Auckland Council, 2012b).  But Auckland is not alone.  As part of a review of all 
New Zealand local authorities’ audited financial statements, and the long-term 
plans and asset management information for 31 local authorities, the Controller and 
Auditor-General (2014b, p. 17) found that:  
When local authorities forecast their spending, they typically base their 
forecasts on assumptions about […amongst other things, the] 
consequential effects on operating expenditure of the forecast capital 
additions. 
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However, there is a perception that cOPEX is minor and so does not warrant 
detailed evaluation: in considering the drivers of New Zealand local government 
expenditure in New Zealand, GHD (2007, p. 24) was of the view that: 
One would expect that for transport, capex has a small influence on 
opex because usually a capex project is a relatively small part of an 
extensive transport network and opex costs occur 10-15 years later — 
apart from debt servicing.  
Yet such issues are not limited to the New Zealand local government or 
transportation sectors.  For example, in the preliminary research (Chapter 3), it was 
found that the underlying operational system rarely adjusts to accommodate 
changes arising from the delivery of a new project (e.g. changes to maintenance or 
other specifications/contracts and/or delivery of additional projects or changes to 
assets or services).   
The Green Book (HM Treasury, 2011, p. 29) also observes that: 
Many project parameters are affected by optimism — appraisers tend to 
overstate benefits, and understate timings and costs, both capital and 
operational. 
However, optimism bias (as it is known) is a slightly different matter from the focus 
here, as it relates to project and investment decision-making in the first instance.  
The cited incidence of OPEX underestimating (Ibid.), coupled with the use of 
cOPEX forecasts (Controller and Auditor-General, 2014a), suggests that the 
theoretical handover of operational schedules prepared during the project delivery 
stage is not occurring and/or these are not being used by, or have relevance to, the 
operational division(s) of an infrastructure organisation. 
This research responds to this problem by providing an in-depth analysis of the 
cOPEX of a complex, multi-modal transportation programme.  Rather than the 
usual project or asset management approaches, the research instead adopts a 
whole-of-organisation, and system-oriented perspective.  Interviews from the 
preliminary research (Chapter 3) were also used to augment the study and test its 
broader applicability.  The focus of the study is how OPEX arising from new project 
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CAPEX has been estimated by the operational divisions of an infrastructure 
provider, and the implications that this has for long-term infrastructure outcomes. 
6.1.1 Definitions and current conventions 
OPEX is typically defined as, and understood to be, operational 
expenditure/operations expenses (e.g. Audit New Zealand, 2010; Greffioz, Olver, & 
Schirmer, 1993; Lantz, 2013; Van Themsche, 2016).  Simply put, it includes all 
costs required to provide services (e.g. public transport), and to operate and 
maintain assets at defined levels of service over the long term at an asset, network, 
and systems level.  Also included are “costs for operations personnel, materials, 
fuel, chemicals and energy consumption” (National Asset Management Support 
(NAMS) in Audit New Zealand, 2010).  Some costs may derive from new capital 
expenditure (CAPEX), and this has been termed ‘consequential OPEX’ (cOPEX) to 
reflect current industry use (e.g. Auckland Council, 2012b; Auckland Transport, 
2014b; and to paraphrase, Controller and Auditor-General, 2014a).  The term has 
been adopted by infrastructure practitioners as a shorthand way of defining new 
project operational costs as a subset of the wider OPEX budget, and to distinguish 
the estimate from any of those prepared as part of project development or delivery. 
With such an all-encompassing but clear definition, it might be supposed that 
understanding OPEX, and more so cOPEX, is relatively straightforward.  
Unfortunately this does not appear to be supported by either literature or industry 
practice.  Indeed the literature is rather sparse in advancing matters much beyond 
the generic definition.  However: 
 Greffioz et al. (1993) identify three commonly used methods for assessing 
OPEX for oil and gas production facilities: the use of multiplication factors 
applied to CAPEX, the use of spreadsheets, and “ad hoc comparisons with 
previously estimated or known costs for other similar plants”.   
 HM Treasury (2011, pp. 29-30) states that: 
Sensitivity analysis should be used to test assumptions about operating 
costs and expected benefits. 
Adjustments should be empirically based, (e.g. using data from past 
projects or similar projects elsewhere), and adjusted for the unique 
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characteristics of the project in hand.  Cross-departmental guidance for 
generic project categories is available, and should be used in the 
absence of more specific evidence.  But if departments or agencies 
have a more robust evidence base for cost overruns and other 
instances of bias, this evidence should be used in preference.  When 
such information is not available, departments are encouraged to collect 
data to inform their estimates of optimism, and in the meantime use the 
available data that best fits the case in hand. 
Asset management practice also includes consideration of operational cost as the 
following definitions demonstrate (NAMS, 2011): 
 Asset management:  “The systematic and coordinated activities and practices of 
an organisation to optimally and sustainably deliver on its objectives through the 
cost-effective lifecycle management of assets.” 
 Lifecycle cost:  “The total cost of an asset throughout its life including planning, 
design, construction, acquisition, operation, maintenance, rehabilitation and 
disposal costs.” 
ISO (2014a, 2014b) is less specific, with ‘lifecycle’ being simply the “stages 
involved in the management of an asset”, and noting that “the naming and number 
of stages and the activities under each stage usually varies in different industry 
sectors and are determined by the organisation”.  However, similar definitions to 
those used by NAMS may be found in other asset management guidance (e.g. The 
Institute of Asset Management, 2008).   
Some might perceive asset management to therefore be sufficient (Chapter 3).  
However, there are several issues with such an assumption: 
 OPEX is not limited to hard infrastructure and assets; and 
 asset management processes and tools: 
- often have gaps in asset capture and data reliability issues (Controller and 
Auditor-General, 2014b, p. 30; GHD, 2015); and 
- may have been developed for linear assets (such as those within a road 
corridor), so may not be suitable for non-linear and/or complex assets such 
as public transport facilities, parking, town centres, and ‘blue-green’ 
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infrastructure such as wetland ponds and rain gardens (e.g. Blom, Irwin, & 
Rangamuwa, 2011). 
Furthermore, areas of asset management practice should not be confused with the 
ability (or need) to develop an appropriate operational budget, or be misconstrued 
as necessarily providing for all organisational needs. 
Projects delivered by Auckland Transport, are partially funded through a land 
transport fund administered by the NZTA.  As a consequence, NZTA funding 
requirements and guidance documents are relevant to, and have an influence on 
current practice (e.g. NZTA, 2010; NZTA, 2013a, 2013d).  Unfortunately, any 
discussion of whole-of-life costs and cOPEX within NZTA guidance is also limited, 
and may in fact result in perverse outcomes.  For example the NZTA Cost 
Estimation Manual (NZTA, 2010), defines ‘whole of life’ as the period from project 
investigation and reporting through to the end of construction (and such an 
assessment was undertaken for the programme of works discussed later).  This is 
not necessarily inconsistent with wider practice.  ISO (2011), for example, 
describes lifecycle costing as a “methodology for systematic economic evaluation 
of life-cycle costs over a period of analysis, as defined in the agreed scope” 
(emphasis added).   
So whilst there may be a perception that cOPEX is, or should also be covered 
within a whole-of-life assessment, as this shows, a lifecycle assessment does not 
necessarily provide for everything.  There is, therefore, a good possibility that there 
will be miscommunication around the term ‘whole-of-life’ assessment, with the 
meaning ‘lost in translation’.   
Where a whole-of-life assessment is undertaken as part of a project business case 
or investment decision, any sensitivity analysis and/or long-term implications may 
also be obscured by the use of discount factors.  Yet from an operator’s 
perspective, discount factors do not apply.  Indeed, OPEX figures need to be 
inflation adjusted.  As long-term expenditure is not static and needs to respond and 
adapt to an evolving asset condition, levels of service, and context, there is a need 
to address cOPEX for operational needs.  This requires a whole-of-organisation, 
and a system-oriented approach. 
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Whilst Dobbs et al. (2013) have observed that there are significant opportunities to 
optimise infrastructure maintenance and operational practice, they do note that the 
first step in this is to assess and catalogue needs.  The New Zealand Controller 
and Auditor-General (2014b, p. 6) appears to concur: 
Spending according to budget is only sensible and appropriate if the 
budget is likely to be a good guide of what should be spent. 
Such a basic and perhaps obvious step of firstly understanding what is required 
appears not to have received the attention it should.  After all, “if you rely on 
something, you need to recognise it and manage it over the long term” (Ibid., p.4). 
6.1.2 Detailed study 2 context 
In the preliminary research, practitioners were asked whether competence was a 
factor.  Whilst it would be easy to summarily dismiss issues (such as those 
identified here) for this reason, it was found that it was not so simple (Chapter 3).  
So for completeness and context:  New Zealand has had a strong reputation in 
public sector reform (Hood & Peters, 2004; Sehested, 2002; The World Bank, 
1998), and thence Asset Management, particularly in road infrastructure (Aikman & 
Doherty, 2006; Federal Highways Administration, 2005; and NAMS, 2011 (which is 
referenced in the ISO 55000 series, 2014)).  Preceding amalgamation, local 
government in the Auckland region had also previously contributed examples of 
good asset management practice to industry guidance (e.g. Audit New Zealand, 
2010).   
Current Auckland Transport practice 
Auckland Transport has advised that cOPEX is currently assessed at the 
‘programme’ level rather than on an individual project basis, as follows (Auckland 
Transport, 2014b, p. 5): 
1. Identify the individual asset classes created by each project 
included in the capital new work programme. 
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2. Establish the level of growth (the increase in the quantity of the 
asset) for each asset class using a representative sample of 
projects. 
3. Assess the annual increase for each asset class using the ratio of 
the value of the new assets being created to the aggregated 
replacement value for that asset class. 
4. Apply the ratio calculated to the operational budget for that asset 
class. 
The organisation is aware of the shortcomings of this approach, and is working on 
the development of a more robust method.  This study is understood to be 
informing that process, so at the detailed level also provides an example of the 
application of Systems Thinking to Action Research (Flood, 2010). 
Compliance context 
In Campbell, Jardine, and McGlynn (2011), legal compliance and the environment 
are two of five identified ‘hidden’ operational costs.  However, this misses the point: 
legal compliance is mandatory.  Costs should therefore be identifiable by 
association with known actions and requirements.   
Notably, in New Zealand, the RMA (1991), provides the statutory framework for the 
sustainable management of natural and physical resources (Appendix I).  The Act 
includes criminal liabilities and significant fines for offences against the Act (Ibid.), 
underlining both the compulsion and the significance of understanding and 
implementing operational compliance requirements.  AMETI, which is again used 
for this detailed study, required several authorisations under the RMA, which have 
conditions to avoid, remedy, or mitigate adverse effects, and which include long-
term requirements.   
6.2 Detailed study 2 methods 
This detailed study again uses the AMETI programme (Chapter 5/Appendix V).  
The methodology investigates cOPEX from across the infrastructure lifecycle and 
across the study organisation.  This can therefore be viewed as a series of studies 
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that look at a single project through different lifecycle perspectives.  Chapter 5 
gives the rationale for the choice of AMETI as a single case within this detailed 
study. 
Assessment of consequential OPEX 
The main task comprised a review of available project documentation to enable the 
development of a cOPEX schedule from first principles, but with reference to 
existing contracts and the organisation’s Asset Management Plan (Auckland 
Transport, 2015b).91  Where costs were available from previous estimates, these 
were added to the schedule.  The schedule was then provided to Auckland 
Transport to cost, and compared with other recent estimates of cOPEX as well as a 
high-level comparison with other projects.  The final phase of the process included 
meetings and a workshop.92  The workshop included a line by line analysis of key 
worksheets within the schedule, drawing on Auckland Transport’s maintenance and 
asset cost database where possible.   
Although Auckland Transport involved multiple parts of its organisation in the 
estimating process, the schedule could only be partially populated.  Some costs, 
such as road markings, could be estimated to the nearest dollar.  Whereas the 
costs for areas such as compliance and structures were largely absent.  The 
organisation concluded it would need to outsource the estimating to complete the 
schedule.  In short, basic operational requirements were not readily available or 
understood, and this was affecting the scope of ongoing operational actions.   
For completeness, it is noted that whilst operational revenues are important, the 
focus of this research is upon operational expenditure from the perspective of the 
day-to-day organisational operations.  The study therefore does not revisit the 
whole-of-life assessment or BCR calculated as part of the initial programme 
investment decision-making.  Similarly, whilst procurement routes may purport to 
offer different operational outcomes, there is still a need to investigate this area — 
                                              
91
 Approximately 128 project reports/documents were available and reviewed within the study 
period. 
92
 Refer to Appendix II (Section AII.2). 
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at least within the New Zealand setting — where infrastructure is largely in public 
ownership, and public-private-partnerships used selectively. 
Assessment of wider issues 
As the cOPEX schedule was compiled, key issues to emerge from the project 
documentation were also grouped into thematic clusters for further consideration by 
‘cutting and sorting’ (Ryan & Bernard, 2003).  The process was augmented by the 
additional sources cited in Chapter 5.  Extracts from the source material provide 
examples/evidence, but only some are included for brevity. 
Influencing change 
The wider matters were then reassessed to identify connections between themes to 
generate a network map of the linkages and connections (using social network 
mapping/graphing programme Gephi).  The purpose of this step was to produce a 
visual, rather than just a descriptive, picture of the system-level matters to be 
addressed, and to enable the ‘communities’ of change and possible implications to 
be understood.  To augment this, a short (one hour) workshop was held with two 
senior Auckland Transport specialists (September 2016), with the purpose of 
focusing this further and to canvass the range of matters that would need to be 
changed or addressed in response to this study (see Appendix II).  The issues were 
captured by the Auckland Transport workshop participants on a whiteboard as a 
mind map.  The workshop output was then replotted using Gephi networking 
software, which enabled the relative connectivity of issues/actions to be highlighted, 
establishing a hierarchy to assist the organisation prioritise its response.   
The outputs could inform and help the organisation to prioritise change, as highly 
connected points are likely to create ‘leverage’ or to have a disproportionate effect 
upon the system.  To this end, the workshop also served as a consciousness 
raising exercise and ‘socialised’ the issues and concepts.  Whilst Auckland 
Transport has advised changes have arisen already as a consequence of this work 
(Section 9.2.2), implementing any change is not part of the scope of this research 
(Chapter 4).   
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6.3 Detailed study 2 results 
Because the calculation of the cOPEX is so fundamental to the discussion that 
ensues, this short section has been retained within the body of the thesis.  The 
detailed assessment of the wider implications arising from the study, together with 
the assessment of influencing change, are found in Appendix VII.  For 
completeness, a brief summary of both is also provided within the sections to 
follow. 
6.3.1 Assessment of consequential OPEX 
The revised schedule of cOPEX enabled the reassessed costs (termed the 
‘amended cOPEX’) to be compared with other estimates (Table 6.1).  These cover 
the generic methods outlined by Greffioz et al. (1993) and HM Treasury (2011) as 
described previously (Section 6.1.1).  The amended cOPEX schedule identified a 
wide range of matters that other estimating techniques used by Auckland Transport 
had failed to identify.  However, only some of these were able to have costs 
determined.  Accordingly, the amended cOPEX figures still exclude a significant 
number of cost items that were also missing from other estimates, such as (but not 
limited to): 
 The cost of completing the project or rectifying issues (e.g. completion of 
stormwater treatment and related amenity requirements).  These are 
considered to be CAPEX but remain outstanding costs to the organisation. 
 The incremental cost to general overheads (i.e. if the project requires less than 
one full time equivalent for any one role).  These were seen as the ‘cost of 
doing business’ but included a substantial scope and list of un-costed 
activities/resource requirements. 
 Variations to existing maintenance/operational contracts:  these would not be 
‘seen’ within the estimate until retendering of the associated contract. 
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Table 6.1:  Comparison of consequential OPEX 
Estimating 
method 
Estimate 
(NZ$M) 
Comments % change: 
prorated 
cOPEX 
(approx.) 
Actual Not 
available 
Costs for first year of operations.  Actual costs 
not specifically tracked and not readily 
identifiable.  <1% of the ‘total amended cOPEX’ 
could be traced. 
Not available 
Prorated  $2.15M/y Current estimating method.  Assumes OPEX is 
a percentage of CAPEX.  No rate was available 
for the tunnel and NZ$167.51M CAPEX had no 
OPEX in the previous ‘estimated cOPEX’ 
exercise.  To provide a minimum figure, the 
lesser road rate was applied to the unassessed 
CAPEX.* 
0% 
Estimated  $1.26M/y Recent asset-led estimation.  This uses rates 
sourced from Auckland Transport, maintenance 
contractors, and benchmarks from other similar 
assets or facilities.   
60% 
Amended  $2.49M/y 
 
 
($7.49M/y) 
 
This study.  Excluding public transport services, 
most compliance actions, and tunnel and major 
structures maintenance costs. 
Including additional bus services (known within 
subject organisation but not included in previous 
OPEX estimates). See exclusions (above). 
115% 
 
 
(350%) 
Additional 
costs 
$1.06M Additional one-off costs able to be readily 
identified.  Includes estimated cost of resolving 
archaeology, opportunity cost from resale of 
contaminated land, and emergency and 
operational training associated with the new 
tunnel. 
 
*The CAPEX:OPEX ratio arising from the estimated cOPEX was comparable to the ratios 
assumed in the prorated estimate.  By contrast the CAPEX:OPEX ratio arising from this exercise 
was typically greater (sometimes significantly so).  If relatively minor changes were made to the 
prorated figures using the lower of the assessed ratios, then the recalculated prorated annual 
OPEX would be in the order of NZ$3.1M (i.e. +40% of current/prorated and +145% of the 
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Continued from Table 6.1: 
estimated cOPEX figures).  In a study of public transport growth for Auckland, Deloitte (2013) 
note that the OPEX:CAPEX ratio used in their assessment also excludes any consideration of 
additional public transport services to accommodate growth.  That ratio, whilst slightly higher 
than the rate used in this study to calculate a prorated value for the road-related assets, is 
significantly less than that for the stations. 
Note:  The overall accuracy of the amended cOPEX cannot be assessed given the scope of 
outstanding omissions.  However, it is considered that the amended cOPEX is a minimum value.  
A list of the more substantive omissions and unknowns are given in the body of the text. 
 Longer-term costs, particularly assets such as significant structures that have 
increased maintenance requirements and costs towards the end of their design 
life.  There is no current framework for estimating these and then accounting for 
the costs that will eventually be incurred, but which is currently outside the 
budgetary cycle of three years or the long-term estimating period of 30 years.   
 Costs that are too difficult to readily break down to the project level (e.g. 
finance, insurance) or to cost (e.g. the cost of changing context or technology, 
natural disasters, risk).  These include costs that could not be assessed as 
requirements could not be identified (e.g. because some of the required 
management plans have not been delivered), together with ongoing 
programmes to help the system evolve (such as network optimisation). 
This exercise has not added new requirements.  Rather, it captured undertakings 
made within design reports or required within consent and other approvals-related 
documents and authorisations, all of which would have been subject to sign off as 
part of project development and delivery.  However, these can be ‘lost to the 
system’ when project records are archived at the end of the project delivery phase. 
Comparison of schedule scope, let alone the costs, highlights a significant number 
of requirements for which costs have not been previously assessed.  Indeed 
operational personnel indicate that they were not even aware of many of the 
ongoing requirements.  Although not the sole reason, there is a danger that without 
budgetary prompting, operational requirements get overlooked.  Ackoff (2006, p. 
706) offers an apposite observation in this regard:   
Accounting systems in the western world only take account of errors of 
commission, the less important of the two types of error.  They take no 
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account of errors of omission.  Therefore, an organization that frowns on 
mistakes and in which only errors of commission are identified, a 
manager only has to be concerned about doing something that should 
not have been done.  Because errors of omission are not recorded they 
often go unacknowledged.  If acknowledged, accountability for them is 
seldom made explicit. 
The implications of course go beyond simple accounting practice, as this affects 
what ‘gets done’ and in the case of compliance or social and environmental 
outcomes, what costs (and/or effects) are ultimately externalised.93  Flyvbjerg, 
Holm, and Buhl (2002, p. 288) also touch on this point, but in relation to project 
delivery, where they assert “Project promoters and forecasters may deliberately 
underestimate costs in order to provide public officials with an incentive to cut costs 
and thereby to save the public’s money”.  The effect of such practice is to 
disincentivise the inclusion or consideration of cOPEX early within project delivery 
process lest this affect the business case.  The absence of feedback within the 
process (Flyvbjerg, Skamris Holm, et al., 2003) is such that project managers are 
unlikely, in any event, to be held to account for any OPEX estimated during this 
phase. 
This exercise has shown significant adjustments need to be made to cOPEX 
estimating practice, and that OPEX:CAPEX ratios can be misleading.  However 
whilst the percentage change is significant, an annual increase of $1.23M over 
previous estimates (or even $6.23M with the new public transport services 
included) may not be seen as significant when considered in the context of the 
operating budget as a whole (approximately $186M annually).  The ‘known’ or 
‘identifiable’ impact of the first stage of AMETI alone, with a CAPEX of NZ$215M is 
approximately 5% inclusive of public transport services, or if these are still to be 
reported in a separate budget, then by approximately 1%.   
                                              
93
 This may also be an indirect effect when unscheduled/unplanned consequential costs redirect 
budgets from other areas and/or affects levels of service. 
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However, the total AMETI programme has an estimated CAPEX of NZ$1.16B.  
Setting aside the additional public transport services for the time being, if the same 
issues are replicated across the remainder of the AMETI programme (which is 
reasonable to expect), this will have an impact on the Auckland Transport’s OPEX 
budgets by approximately 5% (even with the extensive estimating limitations).  
However, if just the Stage 1 ‘additional costs’ (Table 6.1) are added to an amended 
cOPEX figure for the whole AMETI programme, the impact on the overall annual 
organisational OPEX is approximately 10%, and challenges the assumption that 
CAPEX does not significantly affect OPEX in transportation (see GHD, 2007).  
There is then an obvious question as to whether similar ‘discrepancies’ exist across 
the organisation and other projects or programmes.  The organisation itself 
considers the AMETI to be an indicative programme and of a scale to test a large 
number of organisational processes and practice.   
Another counterpoint to the possible perception this might be an inconsequential 
‘error’ is that the cost of actually completing all of the tasks originally proposed — 
thereby enabling the delivery of the envisaged project benefits (compliance, sound 
engineering, function/social/system outcome, reputation) — is relatively small.  The 
additional CAPEX to address system shortfalls, by contrast, is more significant and 
therefore presents an opportunity cost to the organisation.  The impact of 
opportunity cost, such as other projects not being delivered or reduced levels of 
service, has not specifically been assessed through this exercise and remains an 
area for further study. 
6.3.2 Assessment of wider issues 
The reassessment of the cOPEX estimate should enable improvements to the 
estimating process by identifying firstly a need to look in further detail and secondly, 
key areas requiring further attention.  This is what Argyris and Schön refer to as 
single loop learning (in Pahl-Wostl et al., 2010; see Table 9.1 (this document)).  Yet 
the very process of developing and estimating the schedule has highlighted a 
different set of interrelated issues that underline the importance of looking across 
the infrastructure lifecycle, the wider system, and organisation.  In many ways, 
these are equally, if not more important than the ‘bottom line’ as they are not only 
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likely to influence the estimate but help to identify areas where attention is needed 
to affect systemic change.  This is reflected in the discussion, to follow. 
Consideration of these issues — detailed in Appendix VII and summarised in 
Table 6.2 — provides a further learning opportunity in which existing assumptions 
can be revisited within their existing organisational frameworks.  Argyris and Schön 
refer to this as ‘double loop learning’ (in Pahl-Wostl et al., 2010; see Table 9.1 (this 
document)).  It is noted that whilst this considers project-level matters, it does so 
from the perspective of the operator or operations division of the organisation.  
Consequently, this is not an audit of whether the project has delivered against its 
requirements (although it does touch on these matters).  Rather, it considers the 
implications of what was found for operational practice and thence long-term, 
system-level outcomes.   
Table 6.2:  Summary of wider issues 
Issues Comments 
General processes 
Information 
accessibility 
No clear bundle of information aimed at operations: 
 Information archived at end of project delivery including 
compliance material.  Management systems may not assist as 
data may not be accessible or useable.   
 Difficult to ascertain whether all requirements have been captured 
and to track changes arising during delivery. 
Issue salience and 
summing of the parts 
 Project versus operational: ‘Best for project’ sometimes prioritised 
over long term or operational matters (e.g. poor whole-of-life 
design choices).  Compounded by project delivery objectives 
(delivery cost, programme, construction safety and compliance) 
which do not necessarily align with strategic objectives and 
system level project purpose.  Costs may therefore arise in 
delivering missing components (CAPEX & cOPEX). 
 Functional focus versus systemic need:  Organisational belief 
systems can lead to assumed boundaries of accountability and 
belief that excluded matters are either dealt with elsewhere within 
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Issues Comments 
the organisation or not the responsibility of the functional area.  
Costs that are not cOPEX but still a cost to the organisation (e.g. 
completing project actions after practical completion) therefore 
become ‘hidden’ by being absorbed.  Sum of parts does not equal 
total cOPEX / cost to organisation. 
 Familiar versus less defined:  Preference for scheduling assets 
conventionally found in conventional databases.  For example 
road marking was estimated to the nearest dollar and structures 
maintenance and renewals were absent.  Issue with management 
tools becoming decision-making proxies.  Requirements (and 
therefore costs) were shown to be greater than the sum of the 
parts; whole of organisation assessment required before dividing 
accountabilities across structure or function. 
Compliance Integration of compliance requirements:  Largely omitted from 
cOPEX, raising larger issues of risk and liability, plus potentially 
significant costs in completing or rectifying mitigation requirements.  
This also has a potential impact on project benefits as compliance 
linked to social and environmental outcomes. 
Compliance also relates to the following matters, which have been 
integrated in the issues that follow: 
 the purpose of project documentation; 
 the completion of project delivery requirements; 
 third party interfaces; and 
 consequential operational implications. 
Strategy and project planning 
Business case and 
funding 
Business case or funding assessments of ‘whole-of- life’ is not 
necessarily suitable for calculating cOPEX from an operational 
perspective.  Meaning also potentially lost in translation.  Does not 
include maintenance or renewals beyond 40y horizon even though 
requirements for major structures (for example) may exponentially 
increase towards the end of their design life.  cOPEX also not always 
be included in other project scheme assessments and attention to 
operations not part of industry Gateway processes until completion of 
construction (State Services Commission, 2010, 2013a, 2013b, 
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Issues Comments 
2013c, 2013d, 2013e). 
Project planning and 
approvals 
Project documentation not focused on operations and often cursory 
consideration given in documents.  Highlights the need not merely for 
inclusion of maintenance with design and consenting documents but 
rather a set of documents to be prepared specifically from the 
operators’ perspective.  This would not only facilitate handover but 
contribute to an improved cOPEX assessment early within the project 
delivery cycle. 
Benefit management Omission of requirements may artificially lower cOPEX and erode 
benefits and / or levels of service.  This may not always be obvious as 
this may manifest at the ‘system’ rather than asset or project level.  
Also, the effects of any omission may not be realised within the 
system that manages it (e.g. externalised effects on society or the 
environment), and / or the effects are only realised in the long term 
(e.g. shortened asset life).  Consequently cOPEX related omissions 
may not be ‘seen’ within the infrastructure organisation. 
Project delivery 
Design and 
construction 
procurement 
Operational requirements need to be bolstered within contract 
documentation and written specially to meet the requirements of the 
operations teams.  This particularly needs to consider how the 
information is to be accessed and used.  Designs need to give more 
than cursory consideration to maintenance (e.g. ‘robust materials 
equates to low maintenance’), and to specifying exactly which parts of 
standards and guidelines have been applied.  Consideration also 
needs to be given to organisational capability and capacity, which 
may also affect budgets ahead of project delivery. 
Project completion Additional organisational costs (may not be cOPEX) are omitted and 
otherwise not directly captured.  This includes those costs associated 
with resolving secondary project consequences (e.g. archaeology), 
completing mitigation, completing other compliance requirements 
(e.g. monitoring).  Omissions become absorbed or result in 
consequential spend that was not anticipated. 
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
120 Detailed Study 2 CMB150717_E 
Issues Comments 
Deferred benefits Aligned with benefit management but relates to the reconciliation of 
statements with project assessments with the finally delivered scope.  
Examples were often found in relation to claimed improvements to 
connectivity except that the delivered asset did not connect to a wider 
network.  This raises issues in relation to benefit: cost assessments 
and the ability to later justify smaller projects to ‘join the dots’.  This 
suggests there is some merit in variable project envelopes by mode 
particularly where walking, cycling, public transport envelopes might 
logically differ from general traffic. 
Operations 
Handover processes Clear need to improve handover requirements and to ensure full 
integration of the project into the operational system.  Not all 
requirements had been delivered (especially compliance 
requirements), or were available meaning not everything could be 
costed or understood by operations.  Whilst changes to the handover 
area would be an obvious first step, limiting improvements to this area 
is unlikely to achieve an effective change as the issues are complex 
and interrelated. 
Maintenance 
specifications and 
requirements 
Largely focussed on hard assets, these need to include non-standard 
(e.g. architectural features, ‘blue-green’ stormwater management), or 
consequential impacts (e.g. ongoing contaminated land or 
archaeological requirements) arising from the project.  Consideration 
as to how variations are managed for non-standard items is also 
required around precedent, efficiencies, and organisational capability. 
Organisational interfaces 
Organisational 
integration 
See also ‘issue salience and summing of parts’, above.  Significant 
scope but uncertain cost associated with incremental changes to the 
‘cost of doing business’.  Introduces impacts on transparency, and 
uncertain accountability.  Particularly noted for tasks associated with 
compliance, social or environmental outcomes, mitigation, risk, 
adaptation and evolution.  Whilst costs may be difficult to define this 
does not abrogate responsibility. 
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Issues Comments 
Third party interfaces The study project had a number of operational interfaces with third 
parties for areas such as rail, dam and stormwater management, 
parks and landscaping, and traffic control.  Because requirements 
had not been identified and included in a schedule, both costs and 
transfer requirements had not been fully determined.  This included 
issues with future performance auditing, and follow through.   
Programme staging The implications of delaying future stages on the benefits delivered in 
Stage 1, the need to undertake deferred maintenance or upgrade 
‘temporary’ project interfaces was unknown.  This could add 
additional cOPEX and also CAPEX is auxiliary works are required to 
adjust interfaces. 
6.3.3 Influencing change 
Complex issues are unlikely to be resolved with linear thinking or a single solution, 
which can be challenging for a technically-based organisation (Bosch et al., 2013).  
Although cOPEX might be viewed as simply a project–operations handover matter 
and thence the reliability of the estimate, the range of wider issues (Section 6.3.2, 
Appendix VII) demonstrate the reality is much more complex.  Figure 6.1 presents 
those same issues graphically, showing the linkages and connectivity between the 
various factors (established from the detailed assessment; see Section 6.3.2).   
Figure 6.2 is a similar output from a short workshop aimed at refining the short-term 
focus for practitioners (see Appendix II, Section AII.3).  What these figures show is 
that whilst the handover and estimating processes might be a good place to start, 
attention will need to be given to the wider system.  This is particularly if change is 
to be both effectual and enduring (accountability, culture and budgets are once 
again central themes). 
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Figure 6.1:  Mapping of consequential OPEX-related issues 
Note:  Node and edge (connection) colouring denotes issue/factor communities.  Text/node size 
indicates level of influence.  These show the connectivity of issues/actions, establishing a 
hierarchy to assist the organisation prioritise its response. 
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Figure 6.2:  Practitioner mapping of required change 
Note:  Node and edge (connection) colouring denotes issue/factor communities.  Text/node size 
indicates level of influence.  These show the connectivity of issues/actions, establishing a 
hierarchy to assist the organisation prioritise its response. 
6.4 Detailed study 2 discussion 
Bosch et al. (2013) use an iceberg analogy to describe the management of 
complex issues.  They argue that the obvious symptoms or quick fixes are only a 
very small part of the approach required and rarely offer long-term solutions.  
Instead, they suggest a further three levels of thinking which “hardly ever comes to 
the surface” (Ibid., p.117).  Interestingly, these aligned with three of the key points 
that warrant further discussion around this matter of cOPEX: 
 change management (including interactions between components);  
  
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
124 Detailed Study 2 CMB150717_E 
 controlling (mental) models; and  
 system structure. 
One further matter relates to the implications of this study for infrastructure 
governance and high-level decision-making.  Governance in this context relates to 
the board level rather than political function. 
6.4.1 Change management 
In addition to responding to the issues surfaced through this detailed study (i.e. 
‘corrective action’), there is of course a second dimension to the matter of change 
management in this context.  It is one thing to change the existing system, it is quite 
another to respond to the dynamic nature of (or change to) that system 
(proposition 3).  This is where the conventional linear representation of the 
infrastructure is singularly unhelpful (Figure 1.1).  Whilst there may be a view that 
projects have a life of their own (Flyvbjerg, 2009; Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, et al., 2003), 
ultimately projects should respond to an operational need, which is in turn providing 
a societal outcome.  A systems lifecycle, such as the model proposed by Blom 
(2014), is perhaps more helpful in this regard (Figure 3.1).  The current penchant 
for ‘best for project’ needs to urgently be refocused at the system level and 
ultimately the end user or community.  
Whilst the wider issues of the existing system will be a good guide for managing the 
transition of projects back into the operational system, this will need to be 
periodically reviewed (discussed next).  Goodman and Ramanujam (2012) have 
identified three areas of change which they suggest needed to be addressed if 
change is to be effectual at the organisational level: people, organisational 
structure, and technology (taken to also mean technical change in this context).94  A 
change matrix results if these are combined with the central themes identified by 
this study (Figure 6.3).   
                                              
94
 This accords with others such as Lozano, Nummert, and Ceulemans (2016) and includes 
both internal and external considerations after Freeman (2010); Freeman and McVea (2001). 
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
CMB150717_E Detailed Study 2 125 
 
Figure 6.3:  Whole-of-life change matrix 
The detail within Figure 6.3 under the ‘key issues’ has been purposefully omitted, 
but if populated on a context-specific basis, the matrix could provide a simple 
cross-check for practitioners that all of the key issues and dimensions have been 
addressed for whole-of-life (i.e. ongoing) change.  For example, Auckland 
Transport could populate the matrix with the issues identified within Figure 6.2, and 
use this to develop an organisational change process. 
Goodman and Ramanujam (2012, p. 20) caution that negative change “can result 
in an unintended, and often unacknowledged, risk: a buildup of latent errors in 
operations.  [Managers] must consider ways to enhance organizational attention 
and memory during and after the implementation of major change”.  This may well 
be true, but given Goodman and Ramanujam use Dekker’s definition of latent 
errors,95 this does not go far enough.  Rather, this study has indicated a need for 
                                              
95
 “Deviations from rules and standard operating procedures that can potentially result in 
adverse outcomes of organizational significance” (Dekker in Goodman & Ramanujam, 2012). 
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there to be a continual review of processes and procedures.  It is argued next that 
sometimes this needs to be more than incremental change. 
The overarching point here is that the transfer of a project into the ‘system’ creates 
‘threads’ of action and change that need to be followed through that system, and 
there needs to be accountability for doing so.  The corollary is that all dimensions 
and all the key issues within the matrix need to be addressed to reduce the 
likelihood of similar problems being encountered in the future (propositions 2 
and 3).  Ongoing change, and change management will be important in an evolving 
system, modified by project delivery and changing context (Sutcliffe, 2011, p. 137): 
Reliable performance in complex systems is complicated because it is a 
dynamic, non-event that is difficult to specify and visualize.  It is dynamic 
because safety is preserved by timely human adjustments; it is a non-
event because successful outcomes rarely call attention to themselves.  
Because reliable outcomes are constant, there is nothing to pay 
attention to.  This can decrease vigilance, the sense of vulnerability, 
increase the propensity towards complacency and inertia and decrease 
the quality of attention across the organisation.  This can be deadly.  
Although adverse outcomes, sometimes, occur because of performance 
and execution mistakes, there are flaws in that portrayal.  Mistakes in 
perception, conception and understanding lead to much greater harm.  
6.4.2 Controlling models 
Multiple departments and disciplines need to contribute to the assessment of 
cOPEX.  Moreover, any approach needs to be more than the summing of parts to 
provide a whole-of-organisation, whole-of-life cost.  Both Bosch et al. (2013); and 
Newell et al. (2005) observe the importance of mental or controlling models when 
integrating different functions, departments, or disciplines.  There are two areas 
where this study suggests that convention, and therefore the associated controlling 
(mental) models, merit a review.   
The first relates to the prevalence of the project-oriented mind set, organisational 
structures, and general industry practice prevalent not only within the subject 
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
CMB150717_E Detailed Study 2 127 
organisation, but within the wider infrastructure industry.  This has already been 
touched upon,96 but is considered to be crucial for effecting change going forward. 
The second relates to historic context.  The current practice that surrounds project 
delivery and the estimation of cOPEX draws upon industry convention and 
organisational learning.  In other words, ‘history’.  In this instance Auckland 
Transport has had the opportunity to draw upon best practice from its ‘legacy’ 
council organisations.  This can result in incremental change which is, in many 
respects, a form of institutional lock-in as it gives the impression of change but 
does not fundamentally reflect on the underlying mental models.  This in turn may 
give rise to a sense of stability, something Snowden (2003, 2005) and Sutcliffe 
(2011) tell us is problematic.  The longevity of infrastructure will only serve to 
exacerbate this sense of stability. 
Several points emerged from this study, which suggest it is timely to review how not 
only the matter of cOPEX is approached, but the overall management of 
infrastructure: 
 Relevant information and costs were readily available for simple road-related 
assets, but significantly curtailed for complex or non-standard assets. 
 Much of Auckland Transport’s forward development programme and its 
overarching strategic objectives relate to transformation (Auckland Transport, 
2013a, 2014d).  Most of the significant projects (and therefore expenditure) 
relate to complex (technical, environmental or other contextual matters) and/or 
multimodal projects, many of which interface with other organisations. 
 Whilst the widespread use of prorated estimates might have been considered 
by infrastructure organisations to be appropriate, this was based upon 
considerable lengths of reasonably uniform road corridor, so variance was more 
likely to be absorbed within the averaging effect of that network. 
 By contrast, there is not the same quantum for emerging complex assets, and 
therefore the ability to both schedule and cost in a way that adequately reflects 
the complexity of the asset, is much more important than before. 
                                              
96
 See also Blom (2014) and Blom and Irwin (2011), and more recently Lenfle and Loch (2015). 
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Whilst obviously an issue for the matter of cOPEX (i.e. cost and performance 
information for novel assets need to be gathered then used), this also raises the 
bigger question of whether current approaches to infrastructure management are 
still relevant and appropriate.  New Zealand, like many ‘new world’ or post-World 
War countries, has undergone a sustained period of infrastructure growth.  
Although this continues, the nature of that growth has changed.  Within Auckland’s 
transport context, the focus has shifted from simply infrastructure delivery (as a 
series of projects) to ‘transformational shifts’.  The above-mentioned points, visible 
at the cOPEX level, may well have the potential to inhibit Auckland Transport’s 
ability to meet its long-term objectives and strategies.  Changing the controlling 
models, or the way in which infrastructure is viewed within the organisation as a 
whole, will therefore be an important part of an organisation’s ability to change, 
adapt, and learn.  It would be expected that Auckland would not be alone in facing 
this issue (Chapter 3). 
6.4.3 System structure 
Although the definition of OPEX is very simple and all encompassing, it was 
apparent from this research that at a practical level, it is not managed as such.  
Accountability for ‘a figure’ rests with one part of the organisation, but this does not 
include other contributing costs such as from public transport services.  However, 
even if collated, this is still the sum of parts, and appears to be driven from 
functional reporting and data management tools rather than the actual overall 
costs.  The study identified many underlying reasons for this but significantly, 
arising costs did not always neatly fit within currently defined budgetary categories 
and so were omitted.  If this is not understood, like the definition of ‘whole-of-life’ 
costing, this will be lost in translation, and there will be an expectation that OPEX 
figures are a holistic and all-encompassing assessment of ongoing operational 
costs. 
Currently, and in simple terms, CAPEX consists of new project expenditure and 
asset renewals, and OPEX covers maintenance, services, and asset management.  
Maintenance and renewals are a sliding scale, so the threshold above which works 
are classified as OPEX or CAPEX may vary over time or from organisation to 
organisation.  These components are identifiable within Figure 6.4. 
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Figure 6.4:  Visualisation of the modified operating model 
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The interplay between maintenance and renewals is in itself significant as 
(Controller and Auditor-General, 2014b, p. 14): 
Local authorities adopted financial strategies that included “just-in-time” 
responses to growth-related capital expenditure.  Many reduced the 
forecast level of renewals and took a “sweating the assets” approach 
[...] and adopting “run to failure” approaches — which meant waiting 
until a component stopped working before replacing it, rather than 
replacing a component before it failed.   
This interplay has implications for how long-term maintenance and the associated 
budgets might be perceived (see also levels of service, below, and Section 6.4.4). 
Aside from the completeness of the OPEX estimate itself, there were two particular 
areas where costs were being omitted from the wider organisational system, both 
of which require a different means of managing funds than the current approach: 
 CAPEX-related deferred benefits:  These are the ‘claimed’ project benefits that 
are not delivered due to scoping, specification, lack of follow-through, budgetary 
constraints, or other reasons.  Many relate to connectivity to a wider network 
such as bus priority measures, walking or cycling. 
 OPEX-related adaptive capacity:  This includes components that have the 
potential to arise over time such as emergency scenarios including natural 
disaster.  However, these are also as much about enabling the organisation to 
adapt and respond to change as they are to responding to risk.  These include 
provision for technology or compliance requirements through review or renewal, 
future proofing, resilience-related initiatives, and opportunistic works.   
Providing for these two matters would produce a new operational model, a visual 
representation of which is shown in Figure 6.4.  This would not only provide a place 
for the more significant ‘orphan’ or currently hidden costs, but provides a tension 
between short- and long-term requirements.  The approach should also increase 
transparency and certainty within the system. 
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An associated matter is level of service, which relates to delivering the whole-of-life 
outcomes of the asset such as design life or services provided.  Operational service 
levels can be affected by budgetary changes, or as seen through this study, get 
degraded through (for example) project decision-making, ‘handover disconnects’,97 
or lack of specification.  Instead, it is suggested that operational levels of service 
should be fixed relative to how they were proposed (or at least provide a baseline 
for improvement over time).  Any reduction should be related to need rather than 
budget boundaries acting as a proxy for such.  This is also linked to the ‘adaptive 
capacity budgets’ for improvements to, or reorientation of, levels of service).  Any 
discretion should rest within the CAPEX phase, and in particular how investment is 
focused.98  This is aimed at supporting the current strategy of doing more with 
existing assets, and underlining the role of CAPEX in transforming the system.   
The final point within this Section is a challenge for those within finance (as this sits 
outside of the ambit of this research).  The following issues were raised during this 
research, and it is clear that the current accounting approach is not well suited to 
long-term OPEX in the infrastructure sector, and needs to address a range of 
matters, including: 
 Budgetary horizons:  Long design-life infrastructure such as structures will likely 
have little routine maintenance within short- to medium-term budgets.  However, 
these costs do remain and will eventually enter the ‘system’.  Currently these 
costs are being ‘lost in time’. 
 Discounting versus inflation adjustment:  Linked to the preceding point, because 
initial whole-of-life costings are completed for funding purposes, discount rates 
are used (and exclude long-term maintenance requirements).  By contrast, 
inflation is applied to any ongoing OPEX figure (but it appears long-term costs 
are omitted as these were not material when assessed initially).  Early project 
                                              
97
 Meaning the disruption that can occur when infrastructure transitions between lifecycle stages 
and is ‘handed over’ from one function/division to another. 
98
 This is shown in Figure 6.4 within the left-hand, CAPEX triangle as a variable budget based 
on the willingness/ability to pay.  The identified need to secure operational levels of service is 
shown as a fixed/defined shape within the right-hand, OPEX triangle.  
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and ongoing assessments of OPEX need to be undertaken from the 
organisation’s operational perspective not just for funding purposes as they are 
asking and answering different questions. 
 Non-conforming assets:  Some assets, for example travel demand measures 
such as the ‘walking school bus’ (resource cost rather than a tangible asset), or 
appreciating assets such as riparian margins and wetlands may not sit neatly 
within standard accounting frameworks.  Accounting imperative may therefore 
result in perverse outcomes or drivers.  
 The use of time-dependent (use it or lose it) budgets can be unhelpful in the 
operational preparation for project delivery (e.g. if the project is delayed), or in 
providing for the adaptive capacity of the system.  Whilst there is a tension with 
rating practice and issues with the establishment of large contingency sums, 
this does not seem to be well provided for at present. 
This is not to say that the system should be made unduly complicated, but rather 
high-level changes are required to improve the system structure, and to provide 
better transparency and improved accountability for delivering strategic outcomes. 
6.4.4 Governance 
This study will also have implications for governance (proposition 2), in at least the 
following areas: 
 OPEX-specific:  The true cost of OPEX, once known for the originally proposed 
levels of service, will have an influence on high-level strategies and decision-
making, and in particular the relative emphasis placed on maintenance and 
long-term outcomes. 
 More generally:   
- Well established management tools may promulgate a sense of certainty but 
may include significant levels of uncertainty and omission.  The complexity 
of the contributing processes and organisational matters may make this 
difficult to ‘unpick’ when presented at a high level and may be masked by 
terminology, perspective, and expectation.   
- The dynamic and complex nature of infrastructure as a system requires 
change management and a periodic review of controlling mental models, 
both of which would benefit from governance leadership. 
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6.5 Detailed study 2 conclusions 
A summary of the key points from the deep dive are provided within Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3:  Summary of the whole-of-life management deep dive 
Project—operations transition: Whole-of-life management (Auckland Transport) 
How is the misalignment being generated (what are the reasons for the misalignment)? 
cOPEX estimating 
practice 
 Actual cOPEX unknown — inhibits feed forward, learning, feedback. 
 No whole-of-organisation approach.   
 Whole-of-life may have different scope/meaning. 
 Dominated by familiar assets — services and multi-functional assets 
not well provided for (more often missing). 
 Investment processes over-reach (e.g. long-term cOPEX missing 
including for major structures).  Investment not operationally 
focused. 
 Best for project can hide some costs. 
 No provision for change, events, adaptive management. 
Assessment of 
wider implications 
 Dominated by project processes — best for project. 
 Embedded misalignment through institutional lock-in. 
 Information not accessible post-project nor prepared for operational 
needs. 
 Assumed accountability boundaries/belief that excluded matters are 
dealt with elsewhere. 
 Other costs/actions (e.g. project defects, compliance) not in budgets 
(absorbed/hidden). 
 Known requirements not transferred — become unknown 
unknowns. 
 Deferred benefits — over-claimed system benefits in business 
cases. 
 No feedback/feed forward. 
 Third party disconnects. 
 No programme staging reviews. 
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Project—operations transition: Whole-of-life management (Auckland Transport) 
Effects 
 Can have material impact upon total system OPEX — need to understand these are not 
from new but omitted requirements.   
 Overplays project benefits and underplays operational requirements. 
 Hidden system benefit loss through inadequate OPEX spend. 
 Omitted cOPEX equates to omitted actions/levels of service/outcomes — narrow asset-
centric focus. 
 Does not support strategic intent. 
 Poor cOPEX estimating impacts on future budgets/opportunities /levels of 
service/outcomes. 
 Erodes services, multi-functional assets, mitigation, trans-organisational/departmental 
(wider) outcomes and long-term asset life/performance. 
Implications and interventions 
 Change needed to cOPEX estimating practice, particularly for system transforming projects. 
 Need to follow project threads through organisation/system so fully integrated/embedded.  
 Whole-of-organisation approach to whole-of-life required.  
 Deferred benefits and adaptive capacity need to be understood and managed. 
 Corporate process (e.g. accounting/finance) also needs to align to outcomes. 
 Governance to reflect on true OPEX and drive ongoing system review. 
This study has provided useful insights at two levels.  Firstly, it has provided an in-
depth study of how cOPEX is estimated and managed.  This has highlighted a 
complex series of compounding issues that raise questions about veracity of 
cOPEX estimation and indicate that many factors are being lost in either translation 
or time.  Eroded levels of services may not be immediately apparent as they may 
not manifest within the system in which it is managed (e.g. effects are externalised 
to the environment or society), or may not manifest within conventional business 
timeframes (e.g. effects or implications are not realised within 40 years).  This in 
turn raises a second order of issues which relates to the impact that a series of 
wider issues have upon long-term infrastructure outcomes.  The study corroborates 
earlier research which indicated that more attention needs to be given to the 
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system perspective of infrastructure and the organisations that manage it 
(Chapter 3).  After all, as stated in Chapter 1, this is arguably the level relevant to, 
and the reality of, much of the realm of day-to-day public infrastructure 
management. 
Whilst the research has highlighted significant underestimation of cOPEX, the 
effect on the bottom line is only part of the equation.  It is, perhaps, less relevant 
than what the study has shown about the wider issues within the technical-
organisational realm and the context in which this sits.  In the least, the study 
qualifies the performance management maxim: you can’t manage what you don’t 
measure, ‘and don’t have a budget for’.  It is necessary to add: but first you need to 
know what you are both required and intending to achieve. 
There is considerable scope for additional research on this matter.  Whilst this 
could include additional case studies, and/or other infrastructure sectors, there 
remain auxiliary questions such as what happens when assets are ‘vested’ to the 
public by a private developer, and whether alternative procurement, such as 
public/private partnerships necessarily address or defer the issues raised here.  
This study also levels a challenge to those in finance to develop accounting 
practice that better facilitates and responds to the specific needs of public 
infrastructure administration.  Finally, the research underlines the need to research 
the interface between engineering and management as it relates to infrastructure 
practice, but to do so with a focus upon long-term system outcomes. 
Public infrastructure assets are a reflection of the development legacy, and of both 
past maintenance practice and budgetary factors.  Cromwell (1991), for example, 
suggests that the dilapidated condition of infrastructure is not merely a reflection of 
the age of the existing capital stock, but rather an artefact of the compounding of 
project-oriented policy with bureaucratic and political pressures.  With £40T of 
global infrastructure investment needed between 2013-2030 (USD$57T; Dobbs et 
al., 2013), understanding the long-term commitment to operational expenditure, 
and the actions and outcomes that underpin it, is paramount.  
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7 DETAILED STUDY 3  
PERFORMANCE 
MANAGEMENT 
The previous two detailed studies have both identified issues that disrupt the ability to align 
infrastructure management practice with its strategic intent.  This last detailed study investigates 
the operations to strategy interface of the infrastructure lifecycle, being the feedback process of 
the infrastructure lifecycle and final interface or transition to be considered here (Tables 2.1 
and 4.1).  Like the two earlier studies, it is aimed at providing clues or analogies to develop an 
understanding of the issues.  The material, in turn, provides the evidence-base and inputs for 
the subsequent cross-case analysis that is to follow within Part III. 
Brief description:  Road smoothness as an indicator of the strategic objective (strategic intent) 
to improve customer comfort. 
Strategic intent:  The New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA) is charged with delivering “an 
effective, efficient, and safe land transport system in the public interest” ("Land Transport 
Management Act," 2003).  The organisation’s outcomes and objectives (strategic intent) 
cascade into performance targets (NZTA, 2013b, 2014a) which includes the key result area 
‘improving customer comfort’, as measured by road smoothness. 
Contributing factors investigated (see Table 3.1): 
 Performance (benefit) monitoring. 
 Follow-through/reconciliation with system-level objectives.  Feedback to strategy 
development. 
Organisation:  NZTA (central government organisation). 
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Performance was one of the key matters to emerge from the preliminary research 
(Chapter 3).  This study looks at a common sector performance measure — road 
smoothness — which has been adopted by the NZTA as an indicator for one of its 
strategic objectives (customer comfort).  By way of wider context, in the past two 
years, the Accident Compensation Corporation of New Zealand has recorded more 
than 53,000 “falls annually in the road or street that have not involved motor 
vehicles”.99  For the same period, the value of claims has an estimated cost of 
greater than NZ$52M per annum (Accident Compensation Corporation, 2015). 
Conventionally, studies of this type have focused on the technical measures 
themselves.  By contrast, this study has explored the engineering processes 
through the lens of the outcomes they sought to achieve, in this instance, customer 
comfort.  This usefully provides a mechanism to engage with those that 
infrastructure both impacts and benefits, and as such, this aspect has relevance to 
both the other studies and the overarching research ‘question’. 
7.1 Introduction to performance indicators 
During the 1980s, the concept of ‘New Public Management’ emerged, and with it, a 
greater emphasis on business-like performance and stakeholder collaboration (see 
Chapter 1).  This has latterly converged in the realm of public infrastructure with the 
development of performance- or service-led infrastructure management, and is 
especially evident in asset management wherein level of service, or performance, 
is a key tenet (e.g. NAMS, 2007).  Consequently, public infrastructure 
organisations, such as local government, are often required to articulate service-
level objectives and to report regularly on performance (e.g. Department of Internal 
Affairs, 2013). 
Infrastructure performance can be measured by defined levels of service across a 
range of factors including reliability, availability, capacity, and cost efficiency.  
                                              
99
 This should not be assumed to be a fall that singularly results from tripping.  The statistic 
encompasses a range of injuries and risks.  Data on the root cause of the fall was requested but 
this is not currently recorded. 
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Whilst they may also be measures of performance, customer demand and need are 
also underlying objectives that are ultimately reflected in infrastructure strategy and 
service delivery (Controller and Auditor-General, 2014b; NAMS, 2007, 2008-2015).  
The importance of integrating customer need into infrastructure management is 
being reinvigorated as infrastructure providers reorient from a technical or project 
structured organisation to service-led delivery.  This is further underlined as 
infrastructure managers seek to do more with existing assets. 
Interface with strategic intent 
Amongst its other functions (Appendix I), the NZTA manages New Zealand’s State 
highway network, including maintenance, improvements and operations activities.  
It has recently articulated a series of long-term (20 year) goals, which see a 
renewed focus on customer service and outcomes (NZTA, 2014a).  The aspirations 
(strategic intent) cascade into performance expectations, organisational key result 
areas, and performance indicators.  In particular, these recognise that there is a 
need to better understand its customers’ attitudes, needs and behaviours.   
The study has a direct relationship with NZTA’s comfort service key result area 
(improving customer comfort), which is measured by road smoothness.  One of the 
secondary aims was therefore to assist the NZTA in integrating customer feedback 
within decision-making and prioritisation processes so that the services provided 
could be better aligned to customer needs.  Accordingly, this also underpinned 
another strategic objective: making better use of existing assets (Ministry of 
Transport, 2013a; New Zealand Government, 2011b); see also Dobbs et al. 
(2013)).   
7.1.1 Roughness indicators 
The NZTA has adopted road smoothness as an indicator of customer comfort, 
technical conditions (e.g. surface and/or subsurface condition; D. Brown, Liu, and 
Henning (2010)), and road user costs.  ASTM E867 defines road smoothness as 
“the deviations of the surface from a true planar surface with characteristic 
dimensions that affect vehicle dynamics, ride quality, dynamic loads and drainage” 
(in D. Brown et al., 2010, p. 12).  Many roads are of course not planar, but it is the 
deviations in the road surface that are of interest to this study. 
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The International Roughness Index (IRI) and the Smooth Travel Exposure (STE) 
are both measures of road smoothness that have been widely used internationally 
for some time (e.g. Geiger et al., 2005; Haas, Felio, Lounis, & Cowe Falls, 2009; 
Henning, Costello, & Tapper, 2013).  Both measures purport to measure road user 
travel comfort and focus on how effectively changes in the longitudinal road profile 
are absorbed by vehicle suspension and then perceived by the user (D. Brown et 
al., 2010; Henning et al., 2013).   
The NZTA currently measures the longitudinal profile of the highway network using 
lasers located over each wheel path, in conjunction with accelerometers fitted on 
the transverse beam of the survey vehicle.  The IRI is then calculated from this 
longitudinal profile and reported every 20m (NZTA, 2009).   
Despite its prevalence, the use of the IRI has been questioned (e.g. D. Brown et al., 
2010).  One of the concerns with the indicator is the adequate assessment of 
roughness from a human health and comfort perspective  (e.g. Kropáč & Múčka, 
2005; Lenngren & Granlund, 2002).  By contrast, Haas et al. (2009, p. 6) argue 
that: 
The public mainly notices the discomfort.  Policy-makers can easily 
misunderstand a presentation of IRI as mainly a measure of ride 
comfort, and under-value the economic implications unless the 
transportation values of travel time and user cost are also presented.  
Thus, even though the IRI is objectivity measured, its misuse can cause 
its objectivity to be lost. 
The above-mentioned literature and several focused industry interviews100 suggest 
that, from the perspective of customer-led infrastructure strategies, there are issues 
with the current indicators and approach: 
                                              
100
 Six asset engineers from several New Zealand local authorities and different NZTA offices 
were asked for their views on (amongst other matters) the current measure and approach, and 
whether customer feedback affected decision-making (Appendix II, Section AII.4, DS3.1-
DS3.6).  
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 the IRI and STE are vehicular measures and so do not necessarily provide a 
suitable index for other modes (e.g. cyclists, pedestrians), or customer (user) 
variability (e.g. children, elderly, mobility impaired);  
 there is an inherent assumption that road smoothness is indeed a good 
indicator of comfort from the customers’ perspective; and 
 there is an apparent disconnect with how road smoothness is related to comfort, 
and then actually used by practitioners or decision-makers to change customer 
outcomes. 
However, the issues do not mean that the indicators are not appropriate for the 
other technical uses to which they are put (Henning et al., 2013; NZTA, 2000, 
2013c).  For example, road smoothness, as an indicator of road condition, is now a 
mandatory reporting requirement for local government (Department of Internal 
Affairs, 2013).  Consequently, this study does not consider the wider technical merit 
of the indicators for issues such as road user costs, road condition, or noise.  
Rather, the identified issues underline the need for this research, which considers 
the relevance of the indices from the customers’ perspective, since this is how the 
performance strategies have been expressed. 
7.1.2 Customer satisfaction indicators 
Further review of industry and academic literature indicated that the use of 
roughness factors is often augmented by general customer satisfaction surveys.  
Such surveys frequently include road smoothness as one of the factors that 
customers are asked to prioritise or rank (notably, the customer is not involved in 
generating the range of issues being surveyed).  For example, the NZTA 
contributes to the biennial user satisfaction survey undertaken by AustRoads 
(2011).  However, such surveys do not enable direct comparison between IRI and 
customer feedback (see also Neely & Bourne, 2000).  Furthermore, user 
satisfaction is multi-dimensional, does not solely depend on physical attributes, and 
does not necessarily accord with technical/engineering conditions (Department of 
Transport of Wisconsin, Iowa and Minnesota in Ramdas, Thomas, Lehman, & 
Young, 2007). 
This was a recurring theme and was similarly the case with annual local 
government surveys (e.g. Key Research, 2013; Versus Research, 2013), as well as 
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studies undertaken by, for example, Bonsall, Beale, Paulley, and Pedler (2005); 
Department for Transport (UK) (2012); Government of Karnataka (2004); Ramdas 
et al. (2007).  This was acknowledged by Bonsall et al. (2005) who observe that 
few studies considered customers’ beliefs.  Indeed, there appear to be few related 
studies that consider the customer from the customers’ perspective at all. 
7.2 Detailed study 3 methods 
Scope 
One distinctive element of the overarching study method relates to its scope and 
New Zealand’s jurisdictional boundaries.  The State highway network ranges from 
roads with motorway status through to connecting rural highways.  It also includes 
highways that pass through urban areas; paths are typically managed by local 
government along with the local road network.   
However, funding and jurisdictional boundaries are not discernible (nor relevant) to 
customers (see Appendix VIII).  The inclusion of urban highways and both paths 
and roads within the scope of this study is therefore unusual within this context.  
The broadened scope (which included all roads and paths, including ‘share-with-
care’ and cycling paths, but not off-road tracks), was aimed at being more inclusive 
to enable interface issues (if any) to be explored.  Typical road cross-sections are 
given within Figure 7.1. 
Methods 
This detailed study comprised three stages: 
 customer workshops (and survey piloting); 
 a national survey; and 
 an investigation of influence and change. 
The research design was initially based on a similar UK study (Ramdas et al., 
2007), which focused on road smoothness as the indicator of comfort and 
condition.  However, that approach assumed the customer was aware of road 
smoothness, and that it was important to them.  Focus groups were therefore 
added to test the relative importance of smoothness in how condition and road 
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performance is understood by customers, and to pilot the questionnaire.  This 
methodological departure from the earlier study enabled this research to better 
orient to the overarching thesis. 
Because the methods are so closely coupled with the analysis, the detailed 
methods are attached in Appendix VIII along with the detailed results. 
 
Figure 7.1:  Typical road cross-sections  
Top:  Rural; Bottom:  Urban 
Source: Transfund New Zealand (1997)  
Note:  In New Zealand a ‘sealed road’ is a generic term and so does not necessarily reflect the 
materials used to construct the road surface.   
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7.3 Detailed study 3 results 
The results of this detailed study are attached within Appendix VIII.  A copy of the 
questionnaire is also attached within Appendix IX. 
7.3.1 Customer workshops 
The customer workshops provided a rich source of information and insight into 
customer needs, and how this interfaces with organisational drivers and technical 
performance.  It underscored the point that the notion of comfort is indeed complex.   
With the establishment of smoothness measures and performance conventions, 
customers appear to be asked less frequently about their needs (see 
Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2).  In the very least, it would be expected that customers 
would be asked periodically as both society and technology changes over time (e.g. 
improved vehicle suspension may affect smoothness requirements).  Furthermore, 
the conventional approach of asking customers directly about road smoothness is 
likely to restrict discussions to tensions or competing requirements between user 
groups (e.g. cyclists might prefer smoother roads, but this might be dangerous for 
other user groups such as motorcyclists).   
There is also an inherent assumption that smoothness affects comfort; indeed by 
failing to ask this question the approach runs the risk of comfort becoming an 
indicator for road smoothness.  By contrast, customer feedback would suggest that 
road smoothness might cause discomfort, but not in itself result in customer 
comfort.  As Steve Jobs once stated “you‘ve got to start with the customer 
experience and work back toward the technology — not the other way around” (in 
Solomon, 2014). 
7.3.2 Survey 
The survey undertaken as part of this research appears to be the largest survey 
undertaken in recent times by the NZTA (see Appendix VIII, Section AVIII.2.2.4).  
Some 1,619 responses were generated from around New Zealand as a whole, 
giving a 95% confidence limit with an associated 1.96% margin of error.  
Consequently the survey has added to the insights into customer needs, and how 
this interfaces with organisational drivers and technical performance.   
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The survey reinforced messages from the earlier customer workshops that roads 
are generally good from the perspective of car users, but that more significant 
issues arise from the perspective of other modes and user groups, and in particular 
those that are more vulnerable.  The survey also reinforced the importance of 
considering paths, interfaces between users, and also the interfaces between roads 
and paths.  For example feedback indicated that there are many parts of the 
network without paths (or with paths provided on only one side of the road).  In 
such instances, and on occasions when obstructions or other users blocked 
passage, the road became the sole means of access.   
Indeed, the survey underlined the value and importance of liaising directly with 
customers.  Surveys may not always be as detailed as in this instance, and the 
open-ended comments provided a level of richness that might otherwise be lost.  
The direct customer discussions at the workshops as well as the open-ended 
questions enabled customers to explain how they were interpreting terminology 
(which may be different to what engineers and others that manage the system may 
assume), which modal ‘hat’ they were wearing to answer, or to give further detail to 
explain why a given issue was important to them.  Issues were often intertwined 
and inseparable from other performance areas (most notably, safety), and could be 
easily misconstrued if considered from a single perspective.  This was often the 
case for comments relating to road surfacing matters, for example: 
 Current maintenance strategies (patching versus reseals, frequent rework, 
programming, and other practices), was one of the key factors affecting overall 
levels of satisfaction with roads.  This was able to be distinguished from other 
road surface related issues from the detail of the comments.  This might 
otherwise have been rolled into a single indicator relating to road surface 
conditions. 
 Whilst the quality and smoothness of pavements was important, so too were 
other factors such as the presence of loose material, the practice of sweeping 
loose material to the side of roads (in the path of cyclists), tar bleeds and 
slippery smooth surfaces, the use of metal covers, bumps around manholes, 
and the extent of seal on shoulders, and issues forcing customers to swerve 
(amongst other factors). 
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 The quality of shoulders (and the extent of seal, surface transitions, and other 
factors) was important to cyclists (shoulders often cited as a de facto cycle 
lane), or to pedestrians and other users forced to walk on the road for a number 
of reasons, such as: 
- paths are sometimes not present along the network; 
- paths abruptly ending or switching sides of the road; 
- path condition (too bumpy, undulating, broken); 
- obstructions on paths; 
- crossing points are not available or suitable (e.g. wheel chair users getting 
out of cars having to travel down the road to gain access via a driveway or 
kerb crossing); 
- paths are too narrow, steep, or highly cambered making the road a more 
attractive (or only) option. 
7.3.3 Influencing change 
Whilst inevitably dynamic with time and perspective, the ‘influencing change’ 
exercise does show how simply changing a performance indicator or metric is not 
enough on its own; even at the most basic of levels, ‘targets’ and ‘measures’ are 
only two of the myriad of areas where the need for change was identified 
(Appendix VIII, Figure AVIII.19).  So a change in indicator or the metric comprises 
only a very small part of the overall picture.101  Of interest and relevance to the 
wider research programme, was the inclusion of ‘consequential operating 
expenditure’ and ‘measuring benefits’ within the identified actions/issues; both of 
which are the subject of the previous two detailed studies in this thesis. 
7.4 Detailed study 3 discussion 
As New Public Management, infrastructure and asset management principles have 
all co-evolved, synergies have emerged, particularly in the area of performance 
                                              
101
 See Section 3.5, and the view expressed by Bosch et al. (2013, p. 116) that “despite many 
efforts to deal with these complex issues facing our society, the solutions so far have seldom 
been long lasting, because ‘treating the symptoms' and ‘quick fixes', using traditional linear 
thinking, are the easiest way out, but do not deliver the solutions”. 
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measurement and the establishment of service delivery indicators.  However, 
indicators are exactly that.  At the strategic level they can provide a health-check on 
performance (Franco-Santos et al., 2007).  They should not dictate or comprise the 
organisation’s actions; but action is required if the indicators are to be used 
effectively (Kennerley & Neely, 2003).  Each indicator may also have very different 
underlying objectives, and sometimes seek multiple, perhaps conflicting outcomes.  
The road smoothness indicator for comfort is one such example.  It is a relatively 
simple measure that acts as an indicator for several outcomes, and in relation to a 
range of organisational accountabilities.   
Road smoothness and comfort 
The NZTA has adopted road smoothness as an indicator of customer comfort, 
technical conditions, and road user costs.  The use of measures such as the IRI, 
and its association with comfort, appears to be in line with general international 
practice.  However, there are few studies in this sector that take a step back and 
ask customers what comfort means to them more broadly, and whether 
smoothness is the best or sole indicator in this regard.102  Moreover, there does not 
appear to be any published or otherwise available work that directly compares 
changes in the smoothness indicator with changes in customer satisfaction (i.e. 
customer needs and outcomes).   
Kennerley and Neely (2002) assert that performance measures should be dynamic 
and reviewed over time.  In this vein it would be expected that customers would be 
asked periodically about comfort requirements as both society and technology 
changes over time (e.g. improved vehicle suspension may affect smoothness 
requirements (D. Brown et al., 2010); the emergence of motorised mobility 
scooters).  This same point applies more generally within the ongoing management 
of customer-oriented outcomes in a continually evolving system (proposition 3). 
However it is cautioned against taking a conventional approach to such inquiry.  
Asking customers directly about road smoothness is likely to restrict discussions to 
                                              
102
 The issue of perspective in public services was canvassed in the 1990s with regard to 
cultural safety in New Zealand healthcare; see Koptie (2009); Ramsden and Spoonley (1993). 
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tensions or competing requirements between user groups (e.g. cyclists might prefer 
smoother roads, but this might be dangerous for other user groups such as 
motorcyclists).  This constraint was highlighted by this study, in which the 
workshops inverted the conventional approach of starting with a given range of 
factors and in so doing gained a broad insight into customer needs.  The customers 
themselves noted this during the workshops and valued the ability to gain an 
understanding of other’s needs.  This approach also enabled these ‘non-discursive’ 
elements to be explored (Hillier, 2007).  These are aspects “we experience largely 
subconsciously and which we often do not have language to describe” (Penn in 
Knight & Ruddock, 2008, p. 16).   
The results from both customer workshops and the more detailed on-line survey 
show that whilst road smoothness is both a frequently identified and critical comfort 
factor, the notion of comfort is complex.  The workshop had previously identified 
comfort as comprising both emotional and physical attributes.  This was reinforced 
through the survey with customers using emotive terms such as ‘scary’, ‘wish’, 
‘frustration’, as well as commenting on a range of physical issues.   
One aspect to emerge more rigorously from the detail of the survey is that 
customer comfort on roads and paths appears to have two further dimensions to it, 
each with a physical and emotive component: 
 ‘How I live my life comfortably’ (‘I can get where I want to, when I want to, and 
don’t feel excluded’). 
 ‘How comfortable I am on the asset’ (‘I have a pleasant experience, and I don’t 
feel unsafe or vulnerable’). 
Indeed, the survey reinforced much of the feedback from the earlier focus group 
workshops and underlines the value and importance of liaising with customers 
directly and face to face.  Both the workshop discussions and the open ended 
survey questions enabled customers to explain: 
 how they were interpreting terminology (which may be different to what 
engineers and others that manage the system may assume); and 
 which modal or user group ‘hat’ they were wearing to answer. 
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It also gave customers the opportunity to give further detail or to explain why a 
given issue was important to them. 
Comfort cannot, therefore, be considered in relation only to a single asset or mode 
if it is to have any real meaning to those the outcome is intended to benefit.  
Although the NZTA has a range of other performance indicators that might arguably 
address some of the wider comfort requirements, this study has highlighted that 
there are limitations with taking these at face value or without considering the 
interplay between measures.  In the least, feedback would suggest that any 
measure of smoothness needs to target: 
 the ride-lines of the various users, and modes; 
 footpaths; 
 transitions between road and footpath; and 
 the road cross-section (inclusive of the road shoulder and transitions). 
The study demonstrated that customer comfort is one result area that might lend 
itself to being refocused on vulnerable modes and users and broadened to 
accommodate the less tangible notions of comfort.  The research also highlighted 
the importance of broadening perspectives on mode use and need, for example: 
 Currently, bus accessibility might be considered only in terms of timetabling and 
route, not the ability to access the bus stop and bus (usability).   
 There are also many parts of the network without paths (or with paths provided 
on only one side of the road).  In such instances, and on occasions when 
obstructions or other users blocked passage, the road became the sole means 
of access.  In any event, as one customer observed, a pedestrian’s journey 
does not stop at the edge of the road (and conversely car drivers need to move 
from their cars to the side of the road).   
 Increasing footpath width (to allow for socialising, reduce conflict, and provide 
for new modes), and improved cycle lanes (width and connectivity), would also 
contribute greatly to improved customer outcomes.   
A much more holistic view of asset use, design, and management is therefore 
required.   
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Relationship with strategic intent 
It is noted that under s.94 of the LTMA (2003), the defined objective of the NZTA is 
to “undertake its functions in a way that contributes to an effective, efficient, and 
safe land transport system in the public interest”.  The inclusion of ‘public interest’ 
moves the transport system beyond artefacts and assets, to social outcomes, and 
this is reflected in the NZTA’s strategic objectives.  Presently the comfort key result 
area is only partially served by the road smoothness measure by targeting roads 
and some users only.  An asset-based approach is arguably a narrow view of what 
constitutes infrastructure, and may now be at odds with the organisation’s recent 
strategic focus on customer outcomes.   
All this is not to suggest that the IRI or road smoothness should be abandoned or is 
not an appropriate measure.  Rather, there is an opportunity to consider whether 
there is a measure that is either ‘mode agnostic’ and/or better targets the 
vulnerable user, and in so doing provides more integrated and inclusive system-
level outcomes. 
The NZTA is unlikely to be alone in facing this issue, indeed as Moodley (2015, p. 
2) observes, this is a “challenge for outcome-based infrastructure — a challenge 
the existing orthodoxy will have to overcome to deliver the desired outcomes.”  
Furthermore, it is arguable that whilst specific to the relationship between comfort 
and a measure of road smoothness, the study begins to explore a much wider 
issue of the interrelationship between strategic intent and the management of 
infrastructure.   
System-level implications 
In their overview of governance research, Daily et al. (2003, p. 2002) observe that 
“in nearly all modern governance research, governance mechanisms are 
conceptualized as deterrents to managerial self-interest”.  This points to an intrinsic 
conflict with both public administration and with the nature of infrastructure itself.  A 
conflict that New Public Management and service-oriented philosophies aim to 
reconcile for public sector organisations.   
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The work by Kaplan and Norton (1996, 2004), and their development of a balanced 
scorecard approach to reconciling strategy and operations, also attempts to frame 
this issue.  However, as Norreklit (2000, p. 67) observes, this is focused on the 
establishment of measures and, citing de Haas and Kleingeld, “invalid assumptions 
in a feed-forward control system will cause anticipation of performance indicators 
which are faulty, resulting in dysfunctional organizational behaviour and sub-
optimal performance”. 
However, whether the balanced scorecard, or indeed any other framework for 
strategic/operational alignment is appropriate, is academic.  This is because of the 
lack of feedback mechanisms that exist within infrastructure management (Busby, 
1998; Flyvbjerg, Skamris Holm, et al., 2003; Lenferink, Tillema, & Arts, 2008).  
Consequently, tools (such as those proposed by Kaplan and Norton or Osterwalder 
(2004)), whilst perhaps useful, arguably apply to the operation of infrastructure as a 
business unit, not the services derived from, and therefore the performance of, the 
infrastructure itself.  This remains a continuing theme in infrastructure delivery (e.g. 
Controller and Auditor-General, 2010, 2014; Dobbs et al., 2013; Institution of 
Professional Engineers New Zealand, 2010).   
Additionally, if Ackoff (1971) is correct in the assertion that complex systems (such 
as infrastructure) exhibit dynamic, goal seeking behaviour, the relevance of output- 
and outcome-based performance measures is called into question.  By contrast, 
assessing the attributes of services at the systems-level of assets, networks, and 
social context may well provide a more suitable approach (proposition 2).   
Although this study has usefully highlighted an immediate issue with one commonly 
used road infrastructure measure, it has also provided an insight into the wider 
alignment of infrastructure management with strategic intent.  The complexity of the 
social–technical interface calls into question the applicability of current 
management approaches when applied to system-level services (rather than the 
business unit of the infrastructure organisation itself).  It is suggested that this is an 
important distinction and this broader system-level issue remains an area where 
further infrastructure-related research is required.   
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7.5 Detailed study 3 conclusions 
Approaching the strategic objective of delivering customer comfort through a 
different lens has served to highlight not only the inherent complexity of the notion 
of comfort itself, but the need to adopt a more holistic approach.  The study has 
highlighted the importance of effects on vulnerable users, reconciling user need, 
and in considering both footpaths and the road cross-section.  Whilst some might 
argue that this is not the primary focus of road, and less so highway engineers (and 
there may be jurisdictional boundaries that reinforce this), it was the vulnerable 
user and non-vehicular modes that were of greatest importance to the actual 
customer despite the predominance of vehicular access and use amongst 
participants.  Furthermore technical, contract, or jurisdictional boundaries appear to 
be of little relevance to the customer.  A summary of the key points from the deep 
dive are provided within Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1:  Summary of the performance management deep dive 
Operations—strategy transition: Performance management (NZ Transport Agency) 
How is the misalignment being generated (what are the reasons for the misalignment)? 
Workshops  Terminology and the range of given issues often assumed — can be 
irrelevant/have different meaning to customers. 
 Focusing on technical issues too early curtails meaning/learning. 
 Embedded belief-system inhibits inquiry.  
 Organisational, contract, and administrative boundaries are 
irrelevant to customers. 
 Monitoring inherently assumed to contribute to strategic intent.  
 Face-to-face customer interaction around needs rare. 
Survey  Don’t usually ask potential/new customers. 
 Don’t target all customers (reflect technical/mode bias). 
 Don’t survey beliefs or reflect the complexity of an issue. 
 Satisfaction is a sliding scale and does not necessarily enable 
change, correlation to conditions/context, enable the system to 
evolve/learn. 
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Operations—strategy transition: Performance management (NZ Transport Agency) 
 Customers have different needs in different contexts and over time 
— current approaches over-simplify. 
Effects 
 Does not provide for all/future/new customers. 
 Particularly does not provide for vulnerable customers. 
 Does not reflect multi-functional assets or the multiple services provided by those assets. 
 May address how customers feel using the asset — but does not consider how the asset 
serves their lives (confuses interaction with an asset with enabling societal outcomes). 
 Many effects unknown/hidden as not measured. 
 Does not reflect the complexity of outcomes such as improved comfort. 
 Does not support strategic intent. 
 Does not enable meaningful feedback/feed forward to strategy (or projects and operations). 
Implications and interventions 
 Technical practice needs to evolve to reflect changes in context (e.g. society, technology). 
 Care is needed so that all customers are heard; particularly the vulnerable. 
 Not all outcomes are equal — technical outcomes are not the same as system outcomes. 
 Changing KPIs alone insufficient — systemic change required. 
 Outcomes may not be enough — measures need to include system aptitudes. 
 Feedback needs to feed forward.  Monitoring needs to generate information (not data) to 
enable the system to evolve. 
Whilst New Zealand specific, it is expected that the findings of this study will also 
be of general relevance and use elsewhere.  It shows: 
 The customers’ concerns do not appear to match the current engineering or 
technical focus: 
- the customers placed greater emphasis on a range of different factors and in 
relation to road smoothness were more concerned with the road cross-
section;   
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- footpaths and crossing transitions appear to play an important part in overall 
customer comfort.  Pavement-related matters reinforced issues with trip 
hazards, but also identified the importance of pavement width (the ability to 
socialise, navigate, and share);   
- customers identified the need for designs to both evolve to accommodate 
new modes (e.g. mobility scooters), but not to the exclusion of others (e.g. 
the smoothing of radii which makes cornering in a vehicle better but makes 
speeds difficult for pedestrians crossing the road); 
- there was a feeling expressed that many of the effects on vulnerable groups 
were not as readily apparent (and without diminishing the impact) as say a 
death or serious injury on the road. 
 Customers do not neatly aggregate or respond as modal groups.  There are a 
range of user groups that give an added complexity across many modes, and 
customers view the issues across all their modal choices and experiences.  This 
includes their interactions with other modes. 
 There is a need to widen or change the lens being applied to performance 
indicators or other measures, to check that they are delivering the intended 
outcomes from the perspective of those they are intended to benefit.  As 
indicators are never a complete measure, it is crucial then, that these are 
supported, augmented and reviewed so that the reason or outcome does not 
become secondary to the measure. 
 If infrastructure organisations are to truly give effect to outwardly-focused 
strategies, such as customer outcomes, then changes are likely to be needed to 
align current practice with strategic intent.  This may include changes to 
technical specifications, and contract boundaries (for example).  This is likely to 
require further consideration of how conflicts between user groups and modes, 
as well as technical matters, may be better reconciled.  Attention also needs to 
be given to less tangible aspects such as organisational belief-systems and 
aptitudes.  These may not make up many of the issues, but can have undue 
influence on the effectiveness of any change. 
 Any changes to orient technical practice with customer outcomes, is also likely 
to require inter-organisational or industry alignment.  For example, in New 
Zealand, NZTA practice has interfaces with local government, AustRoads, and 
central government reporting.  
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This study has provided a rich source of information and insight into customer 
needs, and how this interfaces with organisational drivers and technical 
performance.  It has underscored the points that: 
 the notion of comfort is indeed complex; and  
 whilst performance indicators are a useful management tool, it is important not 
to wholly rationalise measures to fit technical requirements or preference.   
It also underpins the need to manage infrastructure to achieve not only satisfactory 
customer outcomes from direct contact with the asset, but to also outcomes that 
improve the way in which the asset affects society’s needs and aspirations.  If 
outcomes-based infrastructure management, and in particular customer-centric 
strategies are to be adopted, then not only do these need to be supported through 
a more holistic philosophy, this may require a revision to how these are 
fundamentally approached in practice. 
 
  
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
156 Detailed Study 3 CMB150717_E 
 
 
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
CMB150717_E Summary of Detailed Studies 157 
8 SUMMARY OF DETAILED 
STUDIES 
To date, there has been little systematic research on the relationship between [public 
service] governance and performance.  Debate is driven by theoretical propositions and 
individual case examples rather than an integrated corpus of empirically based 
knowledge.  
Skelcher (in Hartley et al., 2008, p. 28) 
Part II has presented the results of three detailed studies undertaken as deep dives 
through key lifecycle interfaces within the land transport sector of New Zealand.  
This was to investigate how the misalignment between strategic intent and the 
management of infrastructure systems is being generated (Table 2.1).  The detailed 
studies were not intended to cover all aspects of the system, or indeed the 
infrastructure industry, sector, organisation, but to probe this through different 
lenses (Chapter 4).  Crucially, this also involved slicing vertically through current 
practice from first principles; an approach found to be necessary in effective 
strategic diagnostics and change (e.g. Bessant & Stamm, 2007; Dobbs et al., 2015; 
Horwath, 2009).  In so doing, the studies enable an integrated picture of systemic 
issues and performance to be developed (Part III). 
The detailed nature of the studies was also aimed at assisting practitioners 
understand that there is a problem by presenting this from a position of technical 
familiarity and evidence (rather than policy-driven directives).103  In other words, to 
show how system-level problems manifest themselves in real terms within current 
                                              
103
 Yankelovich (1991); Yankelovich and Friedman (2010).  See also Table 2.1: ‘clues’ and 
‘analogies’ (Davis, 1971).  
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technical and tactical practice.  This is particularly relevant for areas of practice that 
are well-established and engrained (such as the road smoothness performance 
measure; study 3), but equally serves as a cautioning opportunity in emergent 
areas (e.g. system-level benefit management; study 1). 
A number of contributing factors had previously been identified in the preliminary 
research (Table 3.1).104  As was expected, the detailed studies encountered these 
(summarised in Table 8.1).  These wider factors contribute to the ‘learnings’ arising 
from this research and point to opportunities for further process improvement.  
Similarly, the preliminary research identified key reasons why infrastructure did not 
perform over the long term (Section 3.4).  The detailed studies provided examples 
to support these, which have been integrated within the cross-case analysis 
(Chapter 9). 
Table 8.1:  Detailed study intersection with contributing lifecycle factors  
*Denotes matters where the deep dive investigated this factor in detail, so no further summary 
comment has been made. 
Contributing Factor Comment 
System benefit management 
Articulating benefits Study 1 investigated this from three angles: connectivity of strategic 
objectives, visibility of benefits at the governance level, and how 
benefits were being managed within project delivery (see Sections 
5.3.1-5.3.3, Appendix VI).*   
Business case 
boundaries 
Encountered in Sections AVI.2.2 and AVI.3.1, highlighting matters 
with the transparency of approvals processes, and of the BCRs 
contained therein.  The latter being particularly important as the 
bundling of benefits did not enable benefits to be understood, 
managed, or audited (nor compromises or dis-benefits in other areas 
to be understood). 
                                              
104
 These were identified within the preliminary research as lifecycle interface factors (topics of 
interest) and should not be confused with matters that characterise the system. 
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Contributing Factor Comment 
Also encountered within study 2 (Sections 6.3.1-6.3.2, and AVII.1.1-
AVII.1.2), where business case-thinking was found to be 
‘overreaching’ and impacting on operational processes (e.g. omission 
of long-term operational costs from cOPEX).  The information 
contained within the business case was not being updated as works 
progressed and no ex ante assessment was conducted to inform 
future processes. 
Lock-in/ momentum/ 
prioritisation 
This was encountered in everything from salience — who or what 
was being prioritised within the system (Sections 5.3.1 and AVI.3.3; 
this study, and Sections 6.3.2 and AVII.1.1) — through to process 
and institutional lock-in arising from incremental improvement, 
embedding of benefit assumptions, through to effects arising from the 
absence of feedback (Sections 5.4.2 and AVI.1.1, AVI.2.2, and 
AVI.2.4-AVI.2.5). 
Similar matters were found in study 2 (Sections 6.3.2 and 6.4.2) and 
was the underpinning basis of study 3 (which explored a well-
entrained industry metric in road smoothness; Chapter 7). 
Follow-through/ 
reconciliation with 
system-level 
objectives (feed-
forward) 
* 
Whole-of-life management 
Handover (feed-
forward) * 
Transition from 
asset to system * 
Whole-of-life 
performance * 
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Contributing Factor Comment 
Performance management 
Performance 
(benefit) monitoring 
Study 3 investigated this from the customer perspective (since this 
was how the strategic intent had been articulated in this instance).*  
Benefit monitoring was also encountered within the other studies (see 
elsewhere within this Table). 
Follow-through/ 
reconciliation with 
system-level 
objectives.  
Feedback to strategy 
* 
The detailed studies have also shown areas of systemic practice that are having a 
material effect upon long-term outcomes.  However, those effects are not often 
visible to the system itself; being acts of omission rather than commission.  This is 
being ‘aided and abetted’ by the misconstruing (whether intentional or not) of 
outputs and technical outcomes as infrastructure outcomes which, by definition, 
must be externally-oriented services.  Infrastructure is important, not because it 
exists as a physical feature, but rather because of the critical services that it should 
provide. 
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PART III:  SYNTHESIS 
 
Part III of this research synthesises the results of the three ‘deep dives’ to now 
consider the relationships between these and the implications (if any) at the system 
level.  This is aided by cross-case analysis of themes from the detailed studies.  
The overarching conclusions then consider the methodological aspects of this 
research, reflect upon the practical and theoretical contribution of this research, and 
summarise the research findings. 
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9 CROSS-CASE 
SYNTHESIS AND 
DISCUSSION 
Several years ago, Institution of Civil Engineers president Paul Jowitt (2010) 
observed that a more holistic and inclusive approach to infrastructure was required.  
He argued it was the time to reorient civil engineering practice back towards its 
imperative: that of delivering societal benefits.  This research shows that not only 
are such outcomes still being compromised (and ways in which this occurs), but 
that: 
 Outcomes are being eroded despite a growing awareness amongst 
practitioners of the need for a more holistic approach.  
 The problem cannot simply be explained away as poor organisational, sector, or 
country performance.   
 Projects are not well-integrated into operational infrastructure systems. 
Irrespective of any ability to deliver project benefits, there are fundamental 
problems within day-to-day infrastructure administration that affect the ability to 
deliver the intended long-term benefits.  
 A different approach was required to better understand, and then deliver, long-
term infrastructure outcomes.   
This, then, was a significant research opportunity as the application of theory to the 
practice of aligning strategy and operations is largely unexplored, and the study of 
whole-of-systems, emergent (Jackson, 2009a).   
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This research has investigated key leverage points (Bosch et al., 2013) identified 
by industry at this time.  It provides different perspectives by using three ‘deep 
dives’ through process, organisation, and sector (as well as longitudinally across 
the lifecycle itself).  This enabled issues to be tested from first principles and 
matters triangulated to give a picture of the matters that characterise and shape the 
misalignment or ‘gap’ (Table 2.1).  This Chapter presents the results of the cross-
analysis of those deep dives, and as such, integrates the findings of the earlier 
detailed studies. 
9.1 Matters that shape and characterise systemic 
misalignment  
In addition to highlighting the importance of lifecycle interfaces, the preliminary 
research interviews identified a range of related factors (Table 3.1); which were 
subsequently encountered in more detail within the deep dives.  However, those 
factors related to processes or practice areas.  They do not, in themselves, 
necessarily transcribe the relationships between the detailed studies or the system-
level stories that might enable the identified gap between the strategic intent and 
management of infrastructure systems to be characterised.   
To deduce the overarching themes, the results and case-specific thematic 
outcomes from the detailed studies were categorised and sorted alongside those 
from the preliminary research (Ryan & Bernard, 2003; Section 4.4.2).  This resulted 
in four interrelated themes: 
 Bounded influence, which is shaped by four aspects: 
- organisational structure; 
- strategic reach; 
- transfer dimensions; and 
- salience. 
 Business practice. 
 Feedback. 
 System stewardship. 
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It is these matters that contribute to, and characterise, the gap between the 
strategic intent and management of infrastructure systems.105  Each of these is 
discussed in turn below.106   
9.1.1 Bounded influence 
Each of the detailed studies explored an infrastructure lifecycle transition or 
interface.  ‘Handover disconnects’ are a well-known problem (Chapter 3), and 
current convention is that the transitions are unidirectional (Figure 1.1).  Handover 
dysfunction is often seen as solvable by checklists and data transfer, and obviously 
this may work well in certain situations.  However, the studies have shown that not 
only were all of the researched lifecycle interfaces complex and multi-directional,107 
they were further complicated by layers of what will be termed ‘bounded 
influence’.108 Here, bounded influence refers to matters which limit influence and the 
ability to implement the change necessary to effect the intended outcomes.109   
  
                                              
105
 There will be others, as the approach adopted here is a probing one.  However, it is not so 
much what these matters are, but rather what they tell us — the stories they bring — about the 
wider system, its functioning, and the outcomes that are possible (or in this instance curtailed) 
as a consequence. 
106
 This section includes cross-references to the preceding sections of the thesis to show where 
examples that support the assessment may be found.  This is not a proxy cross-case 
assessment.  As with the rest of the document, examples have been given to demonstrate a 
point or a cross-connection.   
Note:  Headings and captions within appendices are numbered A[appendix number].[number]; 
e.g. Section AVI.1 is within Appendix VI. 
107
 Different parts of the system are at different lifecycle stages, and multiple projects or 
operations may be affecting a given part of the system, and these will be simultaneously acting 
on the interface.  
108
 See Bourne and Walker (2005) and Pfeffer and Salancik (2003). 
109
 The willingness, capability, and/or capacity to effect that change is a separate matter (see 
Section 10.2.2). 
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Both study organisations reflected on the complexity of the matters to be addressed 
at each interface if the effectiveness of lifecycle transitions were to be improved; 
firstly to correct and adjust existing practice, and secondly to continue the process 
of learning and adaptation as the system evolved.  The organisations also signalled 
the complex and multi-dimensional nature of the interfaces were also challenging 
current perception and mental models.110  It is one thing to know something is 
complex, and quite another to see where one can direct, influence, or merely 
observe.111  It is also important to understand what is being omitted as a 
consequence of an overly simplified transition or response.  This is analogous to 
putting theory into practice in that it must be “seeded by a real-life problem that is 
worth solving” (Madhavan & Mahoney, 2011). 
Organisational structure 
The effect of organisational silos is also well recognised, and often focused upon 
the project–operations interface (Chapters 3 and 6).  However, study 2 in particular, 
challenged this by highlighting disconnects created by the relative ease at which 
the primary functions are, in fact, identifiable silos.  To this end, whilst the capital 
development part of the study organisation was complex, ‘the project’ was typically 
a known or identifiable team.  However, in reality, ‘operations’ was not as neatly 
identifiable as it comprises multiple functions.112   
This raises a number of fundamental questions: 
 Who or where within the organisation was ‘the project’ to be handed to, and 
who was accountable for the outcomes (including co-ordination and integration 
with other newly delivered capital works)?   
 Who was accountable for that process?  Was this capital development given the 
tendency to close a project shortly after close of contract, and/or was there an 
                                              
110
 Sections AVI.4, 7.4.1, AVIII3.2. 
111
 Figures 6.1-6.2, AVI.5, AVIII.19. 
112
 Sections 7.4.3, AVIII.1.1, AVIII.1.3-AVIII.1.5. 
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individual in operations (given the need to follow the ‘threads’113 through the 
organisation)? 
 Who subsequently ‘owns’ those threads, where they are stored, and what value 
they are given over time (or when they are lost)? 
 Who, then, was responsible for providing integrated operational feedback to 
those developing strategy, or was the customer/user voice on a project? 
Historically, many of these issues have been managed through tools such as an 
asset management database.  However, as complexity increases and infrastructure 
is re-purposed, such tools are no longer adequate on their own, have become a 
proxy for decision-making, and enable the abrogation of responsibilities 
(e.g. Section 5.4.1).114  This was visible in all three studies, but was particularly 
demonstrated by the limitations of current cOPEX estimating practice115 and the use 
of an overly simplified performance measure (road smoothness) as an indicator for 
strategic intent (improved customer outcomes; customer comfort).116   
Furthermore, such a simplified view of operations is problematic in large 
organisations, where ‘operations’ consists of multiple departments and functions 
including multi-modal services.112  In this regard, detailed studies 1 and 2 also 
demonstrated that effective change or ongoing implementation was not simply a 
matter for the asset management team and that delineation according to 
organisational structure, system tools, and/or processes does not account for all 
requirements.117  Instead, the ‘threads’ need to be firstly defined and understood 
and then followed through the organisation to their logical conclusion.  This is 
inclusive of any consequences (secondary threads) generated by that process.  
                                              
113
 e.g. strategy, benefits, compliance or other requirements, levels of service, standards. 
114
 Seddon (2008) cites similar problems with the reliance on tools by UK public services, noting 
that “to codify method is to impede thinking” (Ibid., p.68). 
115
 Chapter 6. 
116
 Chapter 7. 
117
 Benefit management: Sections 6.4.3, 6.4.5, AVI.2.4; cOPEX: Sections 7.3.1, AVII.1. 
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Moreover, because public infrastructure organisations can best be viewed as a 
complex adaptive system, this is (necessarily) an ongoing and evolving process. 
Infrastructure only exists as a project for a very short period of its lifespan.  Post-
delivery, it disperses across and is absorbed by the physical and organisational 
system.118  The transition is perhaps less about project to operations, than project to 
system.  This is where the notion of system stewardship developed within study 1 
has merit (Section 5.4.1). 
We’re bringing together […] literally dozens of disparate systems that have not 
been designed to […] work together or invested in, as a coherent collection of 
networks.  So we are having to get to grips with […] different pieces of 
infrastructure, not necessarily aligning nicely with […] the way the network is 
operated […] we’re still probably adding operating costs that we would be better 
to avoid.  And […] I’m not being critical of what we’re doing [… … but] we’ve got 
quite a bit more […] to achieve.  
[PR19] 
 Proposition 1:  Individual infrastructure projects automatically, by their nature, 
become part of, are embedded in, and change, a complex infrastructural system 
(e.g. interactions, feedback, emergent properties).119 
  
                                              
118
 This was apparent within study 2 with the way in which the cOPEX schedule was developed, 
its interface with other operational departments (e.g. public transport/AT Metro), maintenance 
contracts and compliance (amongst other matters).  Section 7.3.2, Appendix VII. 
119
 This is the first of the three original research propositions outlined within Section 2.1.  It 
should be noted that the themes within this section are (as with all the themes in this research), 
intertwined.  These boxes have been located as closely as practicable to an applicable point.  
Other supporting statements/examples may also be found in other parts of the discussion.   
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Strategic reach 
Currie and Proctor, (in Walshe et al., 2010, p. 251) advise that: 
Although the public sector literature is giving increased attention to 
strategy, there have so far been few explanations about how public 
sector managers develop and implement new strategic approaches. 
Whilst study 3 investigates the implementation of a new, customer-oriented 
strategy (NZTA, 2014a), it was study 1 which charted the development of the 
strategic framework of a newly formed infrastructure organisation, through to 
project delivery, and, through study 2, to operational implementation.  This showed 
that the effectiveness of strategies was being curtailed from their formation.120 
As one delved deeper into the organisation and wider industry, the impediments to 
the delivery of strategy kept building.  Study 2 demonstrated the significant role 
played by handover omissions and other systemic disconnects.121  All studies found 
that, in general, outcomes relating to existing organisational processes or tools 
were more likely to be retained than: 
 Complex/non-standard assets (e.g. architectural features). 
 Long-term requirements (e.g. maintenance for long-design-life structures). 
 Those relating to: 
- how the infrastructure enabled society (e.g. provision for local place-making, 
customer comfort); or  
- its context (e.g. environmental mitigation or enhancement).122   
There was a sense of society working around its infrastructure, despite the strategic 
intent of the infrastructure organisations responsible for its management.123 
                                              
120
 Sections AVI.1, AVI.2.1. 
121
 Sections 7.4.1, AVII.1. 
122
  Sections AVI1.5, AVI.2.5, 7.4.1, AVII.1, AVIII.1.2, AVIII.2.2. 
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 Section AVIII.1.2. 
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Whilst the subject organisations showed a broad awareness of their overarching 
strategic direction, generic strategic justifications in organisational processes and 
documents also led to disconnects, or strategies being reinterpreted by different 
parts of the business.124  This led to the partitioning of outcomes by functional area 
and compounded the barriers to the organisation as a whole aligning with its 
strategic intent.125  Certain strategies appeared to be favoured over others because 
they might have sustained a convention or ‘belief-system’.  Others have also 
encountered this.  For example, in relation to study 3 (Controller and Auditor-
General, 2010, p. 36): 
NZTA has a detailed set of technical levels of service and overarching 
performance targets and measures for maintenance and renewal work.  
But it was unclear how these levels of service were determined, or what 
they mean for road users [... …] NZTA's overarching levels of service for 
pavement maintenance were inherited [...] and have been in place for 
many years [... …] It told us that these [...] are comparable with those of 
overseas roading authorities.  
Accordingly, this also serves in underlining the importance of the deep dive from 
first principles (Dobbs et al., 2015). 
Study 1 found that the organisation was well-connected to some strategies whilst 
others had been completely omitted without documented justification: strategic 
connectivity by preference, not plan (Section AVI.1).  This raises the issue of who 
decides which factors are most important, and what is to be omitted, particularly 
where there are democratic and statutory processes that call for transparency and 
invite public participation in the decision-making.  This, in turn, affected board 
reporting, leading to study 1 asking “If not the board, then who is responsible for 
closing the system-level strategic loop?” (Section AVI.2.2). 
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 Sections AVI.1, AVI.2.5, Appendix VIII. 
125
 Chapter 6, Section AVI.2.3. 
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Detailed studies 1 and 3 highlighted the importance outcome-oriented performance 
plays in affecting strategic reach.126  However, not all outcomes are equal.  This 
point was made in study 3 (Section 7.4), whereby outcomes need to be directed at 
two levels: 
 how an individual interacts with the asset (e.g. they have a pleasant experience, 
and don’t feel unsafe or vulnerable); and 
 how the infrastructure enables that individual’s life/business (they can do what 
they want to, when they want to). 
Many of the performance ‘outcomes’ encountered during this research were 
focused on the first of these.  This might provide valuable information on 
maintenance and asset performance, but is ultimately introspective and may not 
necessarily align with community expectation or need.  Rather, technical 
requirements are system-level outputs, not outcomes (see also Seddon, 2008).  
This touches on two further matters that bound, or limit, influence: transfer 
dimensions and salience. 
Transfer dimensions 
In study 3,127 analysis of all the workshop material showed effecting change was a 
matter of: 
 Needs:  What is delivered and how it is delivered. 
 Precepts:  What customers believe or expect to be delivered. 
 Choices:  Whether the choices are appropriate, purposeful, and that 
compromises have been understood.128  
 Aptitudes:  Whether there is the ability to change both reactively and 
proactively. 
                                              
126
 Sections 6.4.5, AVI.1.3, 8.4. 
127
 Section AVIII.3.2. 
128
 This differs from the issues raised by Seddon (2008) with the provision of customer ‘choice’ 
in the public sector.  
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 Process/technical requirements. 
 Institutions/entities/functions. 
The first four of these had been firstly identified as ‘problem dimensions’ within the 
preliminary research, and were subsequently found to affect how problems were 
being understood by the organisation within study 1 (Section AVI.2.5). 
It emerged from study 3129 that whilst responding to existing requirements (needs) 
or processes might be an obvious and relatively straightforward option, there were 
secondary areas that, due to their disproportionate influence, would have to be 
addressed if change was to be effective.  Attending only to existing function, need, 
and/or process was likely to curtail the effectiveness of the project–system transfer 
and amalgamation.   
By contrast, study 2 identified a slightly different range of factors and proposed a 
whole-of-life change matrix (Figure 6.3) as a result.  Although aimed at effecting 
change across the infrastructure lifecycle (‘lifecycle change’), and also to account 
for organisation change requirements, there was nonetheless overlap with the 
preliminary research and the other detailed studies (e.g. process, organisational 
belief, structure, function).130  Furthermore, all the dimensions/factors encountered 
across the research programme were found to reinforce disconnects with strategic 
intent through omission, organisational inertia, and factors such as 
redirection/reinterpretation.  Therefore, to effectively transfer a project into an 
operational infrastructure system, whilst retaining the intended outcomes across the 
infrastructure lifecycle, change processes need to address the organisational, 
lifecycle, and wider contextual outcomes that are the imperative of infrastructure 
(‘contextual change’).131 
                                              
129
 Section AVIII.3.2. 
130
 Sections 3.2, AVI.2.5, AVIII.3.2. 
131
 The highlighted text is returned to in Section 10.1.4; notably these terms appear as 
dimensions of change within Figure 9.1. 
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Salience 
The detailed studies highlighted a range of salience-related factors,132 for example:  
 the ability of customers to be ‘heard’ over technical and funding 
considerations;133 
 the voice of the vulnerable customer;134 
 relative performance and levels of service between areas and modes;135 
 ‘best for project’ over operational and system-level considerations;136 
 control, responsibility, culture, and familiarity/convention;137 
 perceived personal relevance/interest (e.g. introspective outcomes, disciplinary 
background);138 
 the relative level of attention given to tasks related to performance measures;139 
and 
 visibility of an issue.140 
It was the first two of these matters that are perhaps of the greatest importance.141  
Whilst study 3 explored this matter directly and in the most detail (Chapter 7), the 
issue of stakeholder, community, or customer salience was a recurring theme 
throughout all detailed studies and the preliminary research interviews.142  
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 Defined in Section 3.2. 
133
 Sections 3.2, 6.4.3, 8.4, AVI.2.2, AVI.2.5, AVIII.1.2 AVIII.2.2. 
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 Section 6.4.3, 8.4, AVIII.1.2, AVIII.2.2. 
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 Sections 6.4.1, 6.4.2, 7.3.2, AVI.1.3-AVI.1.4, AVII.1.3, AVIII.1.2, AVIII.2.2. 
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 Sections 7.3.2, AVII.1.1. 
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 Sections 3.4, 6.4.1-6.4.3, 6.4.5, 7.4.2, 8.4, AVI.1.5, AVI.3.2, .AVII.1.1. 
138
 Sections 3.4, 6.4.3, 7.3.2, AVII.1.1. 
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 Section 3.4, AVI.1.5, AVI.2.2-AVI.2.3. 
140
 Sections 6.4.1, 6.4.2, 6.4.5, 7.3.2, and AVI.1.2, AVI.1.5, AVI.2, AVII.1.1, AVII.1.3. 
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 Relative to the meaning of infrastructure and public administration (Sections 1.1 and 2.3). 
142
 Sections 3.2, 6.4.1, AVI.3.3, AVII.1.1. 
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
174 Cross-case Synthesis and Discussion CMB150717_E 
Worryingly, the inclusion of customers as active participants is deemed 
‘unorthodox’ for industry (Moodley, 2015).   
Bonsall et al. (2005) noted that few customer surveys and studies considered 
customer beliefs.  Study 1 picked up this theme by recommending the inclusion of a 
belief-oriented performance measure to assist the development and assessment of 
customer-oriented outcomes (Section 5.3.3).  The study also highlighted the lack of 
customer voice during the operational phase to protect or argue for the retention of 
outcomes or levels of service (Section 5.3.3).  Given the requirement for community 
participation in the study context, this was not so much about higher-order 
community consultation, but where or who within this amorphous area of 
‘operations’ was the proxy for the customer voice (and which customers were being 
‘heard’ the most). 
9.1.2 Business practice 
Failure to account for the lifecycle and context dimensions of infrastructure was 
shown to impact on the ability to deliver appropriate outcomes in all three of the 
detailed studies.143  Accounting convention (study 2) was particularly problematic 
with issues ranging from the over-reaching of investment assessment tools (e.g. 
use of BCR parameters or discounting in the assessment of long term requirements 
and costs), through to budgetary horizons, and the management of non-
standard/complex assets/services (Section 6.3.2, Appendix VII). 
Hussein and Hafseld (2016), too, describe a range of organisational influences 
encountered by a governmental project in Norway.  Many of the issues raised, such 
as culture, human resources frameworks, change management, and user 
involvement are issues-in-common with this research, which found these can 
create a form of ‘running interference’.   
The point is, improved co-ordination, incremental improvement/establishment of 
best practice is unlikely to be sufficient and may result in perverse outcomes.  Just 
as engineering and other technical processes may need to change mental models 
                                              
143
 Sections 6.4.3, 7.3.2, AVI.2.2, Appendices VII-VIII. 
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and orthodoxy to provide better alignment with customer- and system-level 
outcomes (i.e. efficacy), business practices do too.  This is an area for further 
research and development for the relevant sectors. 
9.1.3 Feedback 
The wider industry interviews and subsequent detailed studies found that benefits 
(infrastructure outcomes) are: 
 often being deferred or are not being followed through during project delivery;144 
 rarely followed up and reassessed post-project delivery;145  
 frequently not following on within the wider operational system;146 and 
 mistaken for technical and/or administrative measures during both operations 
and project delivery.147 
This affects organisational memory as the information is not available to feed 
forward into the incremental development and the evolution of strategy (Thiry & 
Deguire, 2007).  Ackoff (1971, p. 665) observed that if a goal-seeking system has 
memory, then “it can increase its efficiency over time in producing the outcome that 
is its goal”. 
Where feedback was encountered in this research, it was generally found to be in 
the realm of incremental improvement (Figure 1.2).  Such feedback is introspective 
— little more than a lessons-learned exercise aimed at the project level — useful, 
but not all that is required from a system perspective.  The reduced scope and 
project-level specificity reinforced retrospection and a perceived or actual reduction 
in wider applicability: 
                                              
144
 Sections 3.4, 6.4.3, 7.3.2, AVI.3, AVII.1.3, Appendix IV.  Note that the ‘follow-through of 
benefits is not just a matter of completing a project checklist.  This is also a matter of (for 
example) resolving conflicts, delivering consequential actions/requirements, and ensuring 
services and operational matters are provided for and handed over. 
145
 Sections 3.4, 6.4.2-6.4.3, AVI.2.1-AVI.2.3, Appendix IV. 
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 Sections 6.4.3, AVI.2.3, Chapters 6-7, Appendices VII-VIII. 
147
 Sections 6.4.2-6.4.3, AVI.2.1, AVI.2.3, AVI.2.5, Chapter 6. 
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 Because an infrastructure system consists of assets, projects, and networks at 
various stages in their lifecycle, an end-of-pipe expectation of feedback is 
neither practicable, nor likely to happen, because: 
- of the time scales involved;  
- of the existence of silos, not only within the infrastructure organisation itself, 
but within its consultant teams, who may specialise in one particular stage of 
infrastructure management (e.g. scheme assessment and consenting 
versus detailed design or construction supervision); 
- infrastructure is a chaordic system (Olmedo, 2010; Snowden & Boone, 
2007); and 
- there is not, in fact, an end to the process as a project may be one of many 
that are simultaneously acting on an infrastructure system. 
 Not only is there a need to feed back between lifecycle phases, but there is also 
the need to do so between the organisational levels of strategy, operations and 
tactical management.   
This is where the depiction of feedback processes (such as that shown in 
Figure 1.2), can be problematic as they do not incorporate the ongoing change to a 
system that occurs independently of any transformative feedback.  This is not just a 
matter of graphics.  Rather, this was found148 to be more indicative of how feedback 
was both being thought of, and thence managed, in practice.  Whilst Figure 1.2 
shows two additional levels of feedback and learning, there is yet another 
(complementary) way to look at this.  This is that, quite simply — but paradoxically 
— when viewed as a dynamic and evolving system, feed-back actually feeds-
forward and contributes to systemic change.149   
                                              
148
 In the preliminary research interviews, subsequent detailed research discussions/interviews, 
and also within reviewed documentation. 
149
 This includes enhancing organisational learning.  As study 3 found, this is vital given the 
changing technology and complexity of infrastructure. 
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At face value, this might seem at odds with Snowden and Boone (2007).150  But 
feedback/feed forward is not the same as foresight, and both need to be 
accommodated and reconciled; for unless feed forward occurs, strategies are at 
risk of redundancy without this necessarily being immediately clear.  This is 
particularly so, given the chaordic nature of the system (Section 1.1).  Accordingly, 
infrastructure administration needs to be re-oriented to system-level matters. 
 Proposition 2:  The governance and management of such systems will not be 
effective if focused on outputs at the level of projects, assets, or even 
subsystems.  Governance and management needs to address the 
desired/intended strategic, externally-oriented outcomes and aptitude of the 
whole system.  They also need to address the contributions of individual 
projects and of the day-to-day operations to that system. 
9.1.4 System stewardship 
The ‘better use of existing assets’,151 as a first step towards improved infrastructure 
outcomes, is not just a matter of asset management.  It is enabled by both 
managing the transfer and system assimilation of new projects/renewals and 
services (studies 2 and 3), and the ongoing stewardship of customer-oriented 
benefits over the long term in a continually changing system and its interrelated 
context (all studies; see previous Section).   
Change management in the context of an infrastructure system has been 
discussed already as has the importance of feedback as a feed-forward 
mechanism.  The latter was highlighted by studies 1 and 3 and in particular the role 
community engagement and collaboration played in that feedback/feed-forward 
flow.  However, providing an integrated operational response can be challenging 
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“Since hindsight no longer leads to foresight after a shift in context, a corresponding change 
in management style may be called for.” (Snowden & Boone, 2007, p. 2). 
151
 This is a directive that supports several current strategies; from those of the subject 
organisations (e.g. Auckland Transport, 2015b), New Zealand land transport directives (e.g. 
New Zealand Government, 2011a), the global infrastructure review undertaken by Dobbs et al. 
(2013), through to core asset management principles (e.g. NAMS, 2011). 
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when ‘operations’ is, by contrast to a project’s delivery, a diverse group of 
autonomous functions. 
During the preliminary research interviews, it was observed that roles such as that 
of the borough engineer (who had oversight of the infrastructure of an area) no 
longer exists.152  As the system increased in complexity, this has, through 
necessity, increased specialisation.  So as a consequence, this specialism created 
a barrier to systems-thinking.  The ‘glue’ within the organisation and/or the system 
had been lost, and any connection to “social advancement or social improvement” 
had also gone missing [PR51].   
Whilst all studies highlighted the need for silo-spanning roles, the effect of silos and 
specialisation was particularly noticeable in both studies 2 and 3 where benefits 
were being eroded by, for example, falling between decision-making boundaries, 
functions, or management processes and tools, or between management and 
governance (Chapter 3, Appendix IV).  To respond to the issues raised within 
study 1, a model for system stewardship was proposed to reintroduce this system 
overview (Section 5.4.1).  
Accordingly, the three dimensions of lifecycle, organisational and context-oriented 
change,153 have been integrated with the notion of system stewardship and centred 
on externally-oriented outcomes (i.e. the customer).  The aim is to provide a model 
for how the project-system transition and other system-level change might be 
improved (Figure 9.1).154 
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 Although the scale of that oversight was problematic as linkages to the greater system were 
lost. 
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 See ‘Transfer dimensions’; Section 10.1.1.  This also reflects the required internal, external, 
and system-level foci identified within the preliminary research (Section 3.4). 
154
 As such, this augments and extends the service-oriented framework proposed by Seddon 
(2008); a six step check comprising establishing the customer-oriented purpose, types and 
frequency of demand, system response to demand, system flow, system conditions, and 
management thinking.  The model described by Figure 9.1 notably recognises the asset-as-
service- requirements of the built infrastructure environment, and the role of the infrastructure 
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Figure 9.1:  Infrastructure system change management model 
This integration is important, but will inevitably require the balancing and 
management of requirements, or ‘threads’ through the system — and over time.  
This is not a unidirectional model, but provides for iteration and feedback/feed-
forward.  As such, this aims to give voice and visibility to customer-oriented 
outcomes (and synaptic-like system connectivity).155  The model also provides a 
forum for reconciling and managing all the dimensions of change and system 
dynamics/evolution that appear, from the research, to be necessary to effect 
strategic intent.  This research has shown that these integrated aspects are missing 
                                                                                                                                    
lifecycle in shaping this.  The two concepts are thus complementary, not mutually exclusive.  It 
is noted that ‘system steward’ is an accountability (Section 5.4.1), so may be distributed across 
multiple functions, or established as a boundary-spanning role or group function on a case-by-
case basis.  It may also exist as part of an organisational culture or operational mode.  
However, the key point here is that there needs to be an accountability for integrating system-
level outcomes and guiding the ongoing evolution of the system. 
155
 Not to be mistaken for ‘big-data’ or more information, but rather learning and adaptive 
capacity. 
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from current practice with a resultant adverse effect upon long-term infrastructure 
outcomes. 
 Proposition 3:  No matter how well individual projects are designed and 
delivered, or strategic outcomes are initially defined, systems are dynamic.  
Accordingly, infrastructure administration needs to both accommodate and 
continually respond to this time dimension. 
9.2 System-level implications  
9.2.1 Implications for long-term infrastructure outcomes 
The long-term implications arising from the management of infrastructure systems 
being unable to connect with, fulfil, or align with strategic intent are complex and 
interwoven with the four themes just discussed.  Just as study 3 highlighted two 
levels of outcomes (inward and outward looking),156 and all studies two levels of 
response (‘corrective action’ and ongoing system evolution and adaptation)157 there 
are implications for infrastructure organisations and their environment.  
By exploring the lifecycle interfaces (which provides a longitudinal profile and also 
explores organisational boundaries in this context), it is observed that strategic 
intent is not supported from the outset.  Directives, objectives, and other statements 
of intent dissipate or become disconnected by strategy development.  This is 
exacerbated across the project interface and project delivery where strategic intent 
can be adversely affected by project management drivers and ‘best for project’ 
thinking/behaviour (Chapter 5).  Then, even if projects are able to fully develop and 
deliver upon the strategic outcomes being sought, there are subsequent milestone 
or key processes within the lifecycle of that infrastructure which inhibit its ability to: 
 deliver upon the strategic intent (Chapters 6 and 7); and  
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 Section 8.4. 
157
 Chapters 5-7, and explicitly discussed within Section 6.4.1. 
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 fully integrate and transform the system (as was inherently the intent of the 
capital works in the first place; see Chapter 1). 
Many of the effects or implications of this arise from an insidious issue of omission 
and unrealised potential rather than acts of commission.158  Furthermore, many of 
the negative implications are unlikely to be observable within the current 
conventions of an infrastructure organisation and therefore may appear as a ‘latent 
failure’ to that organisation.  For example: 
 Asset life:  In the preliminary research, several ‘legacy’ issues were identified 
as arising from past infrastructure-related decisions and management choices 
(e.g. Section 3.5).  However, every example referred to large-scale 
infrastructure that was less than a century old and therefore notionally within its 
design life.  Examples included operational changes with unintended/unknown 
consequences (such as might be made to a water treatment plant) through to 
planned/purposeful deferred maintenance that knowingly reduces asset life.  
Whether purposeful or not, both are ‘active failures’ but may become absorbed 
or latent over time as that system knowledge is lost.   
Study 2 detailed this further (Section 6.3), showing a suite of active failures that 
included (amongst other matters) omissions and eroded levels of service.  
However, because the loss of asset life may not be known, or able to be tracked 
back to this root cause through organisational processes, a loss in asset life 
becomes a latent effect upon community levels of service (and potentially on 
rates or other levies).  In other words, a latent social, environmental, and/or 
economic impact.  Furthermore, all the studies suggest that even if the design 
life were achieved, the infrastructure may not necessarily have fulfilled its 
potential or delivered the intended benefits. 
 Social exclusion:  Study 3 showed (Appendix VIII) how parts of the community 
such as certain modes, sectors (e.g. rural), or user groups (in particular the 
vulnerable) are excluded or compromised by technical and organisational 
decision-making and processes.  Furthermore, whilst organisational salience 
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 Sections 7.3, AVI.1, AVI.2.2, AVII.1.1-AVII.1.3, Appendix VIII. 
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and other factors may have led to this, the disparity or absence may not be 
visible to the organisation if those affected do not have a strong community 
voice to start with (social, cultural impact).159  
 Environmental impacts:  Study 2 showed (Section 6.3.2) matters of 
compliance including environmental mitigation and social outcomes were not 
being incorporated into cOPEX assessments.  Should any adverse effects 
result, then these would not be seen by the subject organisation in this instance 
as there were no internal checks and balances at the time the study was 
undertaken (environment, social, cultural, economic impact).160 
 System fitness:  The preliminary research interviews highlighted resilience and 
related factors as top of mind for many infrastructure organisations.  Study 2 
also highlighted the omission of factors that might affect system ‘fitness’ (being 
aspects such as resilience, adaptive capacity, enabling future value).161  These 
will likely only be observable to the organisation in retrospect, including after a 
major event such as a natural disaster (environment, social, cultural, economic 
impact).   
Study 1 showed that it was not the strategic intent to exclude any of the above 
matters, in fact for the subject organisation, quite the opposite.162  Yet that study 
showed that in order for long-term infrastructure benefits to be realised, more than 
a project-oriented benefit realisation process is required, that this requires the 
stewardship of our infrastructure systems; the feedback, feed-forward, and follow 
                                              
159
 This was underscored in study 2 through the apparent lack of clear ownership for long-term 
operational matters, due in part to the diversity operational functions and therefore structure 
(see Section 10.1.1). 
160
 This was also seen in study 1 with the weighting and preference given to traffic related 
benefits rather than to wider environmental and other aspects (see Sections AVI.2.1-AVI.2.2, 
AVI.3.2-AVI.3.3).  
161
 Sections 7.3, 7.4.3. 
162
 See AVI.1-AVI.2. 
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through at all levels of the organisation.163  Moreover it requires not just the delivery 
of outcomes, but outcomes that are customer-oriented, and enable the goal-
seeking behaviours of the complex, adaptive system that is infrastructure. 
 Hypothesis:  The strategic intent and the day-to-day management of 
infrastructure systems are often misaligned, with negative consequences for 
achieving the desired long-term infrastructure system outcomes.   
9.2.2 Implications for infrastructure administration in practice 
The preliminary research, followed by the three detailed studies, aims to bridge one 
of the gaps between theory and practice (Table 2.1).  Although the individual 
studies considered areas in which there is often extensive existing research and 
practice guidance, a different approach was adopted so that every study: 
 advanced both practical and theoretical knowledge and could be applied in its 
own right; 
 continued to test the ability to fully deliver appropriate and relevant 
infrastructure outcomes over the long term; 
 provided an evidence-base for why this might be so for each of the given 
examples (i.e. adds knowledge to underpin policy or industry/theoretical 
guidance and therefore the level of understanding; Table 2.1); 
 contributed to the overarching problem both directly as a lens through which the 
overarching research question could be explored, and through the 
methodological approach. 
Consequently, whilst much may be known about, say, asset management, this 
does not provide the whole picture.  So whilst we might be familiar with the 
problems and/or some of the solutions, this research shows that there is more to 
the matter.  Table 9.1 provides a summary of the broader applicability of the 
detailed study component of this research relative to the double- and triple-loop 
learning described in Sections 1.2 and 4.4.  The summary draws upon preliminary 
interview material to assess the ability of the research to have wider influence.   
                                              
163
 Sections 6.4.3, 6.4.5. 
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Table 9.1:  Applicability of this research 
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The Table shows that this research is applicable at multiple levels and scales, and 
has the potential to enable ‘triple-loop learning’ or a change to underlying belief-
systems and mental models.  This speaks to the nested nature of complex systems 
(Section 1.2) and that of system aptitude, which is more than the attributes of the 
system, but also the inherent or acquired ability and inclination of the system to 
respond and adapt to its evolving context (Section 2.3).  Moreover, challenging 
from first principles, whilst arguably necessary for purposefully ‘disruptive thinking’ 
(Dobbs et al., 2015), still needs to be socialised, understood, and takes time 
(Yankelovich in Constanza, 2000; see also Chapter 2).  This is particularly so at the 
levels of organisational-, sector-, and general infrastructure-practice considered 
here.  This research contributes to that ‘socialising’ process80 by providing evidence 
to raise awareness and develop understanding.  It has also provided sense-making 
models and recommendations to contribute to practice improvement. 
So, ultimately the applicability of the research will depend on the willingness and 
the ability of an organisation/sector/industry to respond to the issues and 
opportunities that have been raised.  The ‘influencing change’ workshops have 
already started the process and have shown how the change process might be 
approached.164  In this regard, Auckland Transport has advised that it is currently 
(Auckland Transport, pers. comm., 12 September 2016): 
Reviewing the role of asset management in the organisation [...] one 
strand of which is the involvement of asset management and operations 
in early design decisions and the consenting process to ensure whole of 
life costs and customer needs are considered [...] We are also actively 
reviewing how benefits management can influence investment decisions 
at a systems level and how customer perceptions of road smoothness 
may influence future investment decisions.  It is early days for these two 
work streams but already there is a clear indication that system level 
benefits will accrue.     
                                              
164
 Sections 7.4.1, AVI.4, AVIII.3.2. 
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Study 3’s influencing change workshop (Appendix VIII) also formally formed part of 
the change process for the NZTA, and was supported by an executive ‘white paper’ 
which considered how the research might interface with other key organisational 
initiatives.165   
However, although change is clearly intended (and forthcoming), it is not within the 
scope of this research to either implement that change or to monitor its 
effectiveness (Section 4.3).  That is a future opportunity.  But given the complexity 
of the system, the point is that the effects of any change should not be completely 
discernible/separable, and that by effecting any change, the system itself has 
evolved.  In other words, the system is chaordic (Olmedo, 2010).  In this regard, the 
sense-making models generated within each of the detailed studies should assist in 
supporting change;166 not only for the study organisations and the New Zealand 
land transport sector, but more widely within infrastructure practice.  Whilst the 
details within each study or process might differ, these are shared lifecycle 
interfaces and broadly common issues (Chapter 3).   
Those same models are also complementary.  This research deduced the need for 
system stewardship (Chapter 5); whether as a formal role, or as a boundary-
spanning culture/mindset within an organisation, sector, or the wider industry.  The 
other sense-making models166 support the function/notion of system stewardship 
and should therefore assist sense-making both within and across the system.  They 
should also assist in orienting practice towards adaptive practice and customer-
oriented outcomes. 
 
                                              
165
 The reports prepared for study 3 have also been provided to the NZTA, and form part of their 
research library (NZTA, pers. comm., 20 April 2015). 
166
 System stewardship (study 1; Figure 5.1), modified operating model (study 2; Figure 6.4), 
and ‘outcome differentiation’ (study 3; Section 7.4).  See also Figure 9.1 and the overarching 
research methodology as a sense-making and diagnostic tool. 
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10 REFLECTION AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
This Chapter reflects upon the wider research matters including the academic 
contribution of this research and the scope for further research.  It then draws 
together the overall research conclusions. 
10.1 Reflection 
10.1.1 Mental models and the infrastructure lifecycle paradigm 
The conventional infrastructure lifecycle (of plan, build, maintain, dispose) 
presumes the building of more projects and then the optimisation of those hard 
assets.  This may have been appropriate in the establishment of ‘new world’ 
economies or in response to specific events such as post-world war or disaster 
recovery.  However, this ‘pipeline’ view of infrastructure does not necessarily assist 
(as best it might), with managing the complexities of less tangible objectives and 
the messy, non-linear reality of day to day service-led infrastructure management.  
Edkins and Zerjav (2014) contend the asset-based and service or provision-based 
typologies need to be broadened, and Snowden and Boone (2007) have already 
told us that the application of simple solutions or approaches can fail when applied 
to a complex situation or system.   
The concept of a system-centric lifecycle had been developed before commencing 
this research (see Blom, 2014).  The concept separated the delivery of projects 
from business-as-usual operations, and recognised that these were means through 
which the system transformed, but not in itself its raison d’être (Figure 3.1). This 
was proposed as a mental model through which this research was investigated, 
largely to facilitate systems thinking at the system level.  Whilst this research did 
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not set out to test or prove the concept described within Figure 3.1, the model not 
only emerged as novel, but apposite, particularly as it aligns with, and supports, 
propositions 2 and 3. 
It is the project-centric mindset that continues to be problematic.  In short, 
conventional, linear thinking goes only so far in delivering intended long-term 
infrastructure outcomes.  A new ‘philosophy’ is required, one that is both focused 
on outwardly-looking outcomes, and is systems-oriented.  This is a point supported 
by not only the preliminary research, but also the three detailed studies:  
 Study 1 highlighted the current focus upon technical or ‘in house’ outcomes 
such as those benefits strongly coupled with funding criteria, project 
management, or departmental (or personal) performance metrics. 
 Study 2 showed the limitations of functional support tools (such as those 
oriented around one part of the asset base) and silos rather than whole-of-
organisation, whole-of-life thinking and practice. 
 Study 3 demonstrated what can happen when technical outputs are 
misconstrued as customer outcomes. 
This is where this research has demonstrated the system lifecycle model offered by 
Blom (2014) has a contribution to make: 
 The model was critical to the methodological framework developed for this 
research which now offers another means for approaching complex 
infrastructure systems.  It is as much a way of thinking as a representation of 
the system lifecycle and notably the: 
- transformative (but not central) role of projects; and 
- eventual assimilation and subsuming of those projects into the ‘system’. 
 The model provides an alternative framework for stimulating changes in 
infrastructure management and supporting disciplines (such as project and 
asset management).  The model as much supporting the reorienting of 
organisations, processes, and structures, as a change in mindset and culture. 
 The paucity of systems-level infrastructure research and the subsequent 
findings of this research indicate that the model is not only ‘interesting’ (Davis, 
1971) in practice (from whence it was developed), but also in theory. 
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10.1.2 Methodological insights 
As Rabah (2015) observes: 
Issues in public administration are very complex and engage 
phenomena that are not easily manipulated and identified (Wright, 
Manigault, and Black, 2004) [...] Making a decision of whether to use a 
qualitative, a quantitative or a mixed method in studying public 
administration is not based on legitimacy of any of these methods but it 
depends on how to apply a method that reveals confident research 
results.  There should be a "move beyond arguments as to which 
research is more legitimate, toward discussions as to whether the 
methods have been appropriately used" (Lan and Anders, 2000, p. 150).  
Experiences garnered and the results obtained through this research would support 
Rabah’s observation and those current proponents of probing, pluralist, trans-
disciplinary research into complex systems discussed earlier.  The methodological 
approach developed and adopted here has enabled the layered and multi-faceted 
nature of a complex system to be investigated to reveal evidence from the detailed 
(micro) through to the system (macro) level:   
Whole-of-system working road map 
Complexity and Systems Thinking literature warns against trying to simplify 
complexity, but rather to learn how to respond and adapt to it instead (e.g. 
Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Snowden & Boone, 2007).  As such, the methodology 
has proven useful in its own right; one of the key advantages of the approach is 
that it provides a form of road map, both about how to approach complex issues, 
and how diffuse, high-level questions might be addressed systemically.  The 
methodology has enabled both detailed and system level insight, without an 
expectation that there be a simple, replicable and/or identifiable solution.  This is an 
important for both academics and practitioners alike when faced with an ever 
changing and evolving array of issues and key areas of interest that means 
probing/diagnosing the system is not a one-off exercise.   
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The methodology, then, contributes to our understanding of a ‘systems level 
approach’ — of Systems Thinking at the system level — and how that might be put 
into practice.  In the very least, in the area of public infrastructure administration as 
researched here, this responds to a recognised need (see Jowitt, 2013). 
The methodology provided a research mechanism and framework for collating 
system-level stories and evidence to enable sense-making and shared meaning 
(discussed below) for without this we cannot be sure of whether the problems are 
material, and are left with unconnected anecdotes that are of limited value in 
improving the delivery of infrastructure outcomes.   
Sense-making and socialising 
Whilst the methodology does provide a road map and gives meaning to a systems-
level approach to infrastructure administration, this is more sense-making model 
(Weick et al., 2005) than ‘how to’ guide, check list, or ‘cook book’, as it: 
 outlines an example to follow that makes sense of the system without defining 
its boundaries and limiting its meaning or applicability; 
 recognises that the system is dynamic and therefore that the investigation and 
response is ongoing; 
 collates stories for shared understanding and learning and enables 
stakeholders within those stories, with similar stories, or within the wider system 
to understand where they fit; 
 accommodates the duality of Action Research and the need to not only provide 
sense and plausible outcomes for practitioners and academics, but different 
stakeholder groups within these; 
 results in plausible outcomes and ‘lessons in action’ by way of detailed 
evidence which provides not only insights into the specifics of a given aspect, 
but enables reflection upon the wider system and future implications (i.e. sense-
giving and coming to resolution; see Table 2.1).   
 that same evidence can then be triangulated with stories to provide meaning 
and relevance to others within the wider industry, and ‘clues’ as to where to 
probe within their own systems; and 
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 provides a focus and forum through which challenging outcomes and concepts 
may be discussed and socialised to assist with culture change, wider uptake, 
and action.   
Many of these relate to the development of understanding (‘consciousness raising’) 
identified by Yankelovich (1991) and the need to address the “perceived 
applicability to self” and “concreteness and clarity” of an issue (Ibid, pp.77-79; see 
also Table 2.1, this document).  Given that this research started from the position of 
emergent theory, that academic evidence is scant, and ‘the problem’ had not yet 
crystallised within the collective consciousness of infrastructure practice, these 
attributes are particularly important.  So too is the ability to sense-make and 
socialise the problem, describe both its characteristics and the wider issues (Davis, 
1971; see also Table 2.1, this document), and a willingness and ability (aptitude) to 
learn and evolve. 
Diagnostics  
Whilst the academic literature considers the deep dive as an executive intervention 
(and there are limited examples of this; Yu and Bower (2009) being one), the 
literature does not appear to contemplate its use as a diagnostic tool.  Because the 
deep dive is more than an audit (as it drives from first principles), the methodology 
outlined here can fulfil this diagnostic function.  It does so by identifying ‘clues’ to 
where systemic problems may reside, and increasing our shared understanding of 
these (see Table 2.1).  
However, as noted, this is not a one-off diagnostic process.  Indeed, Dobbs et al. 
(2015) argue that such an approach is a necessity in the current age of disruption 
and complexity:  
Our intuition has been formed by a set of experiences and ideas about 
how things worked during a time when changes were incremental and 
somewhat predictable [...] In the new world, executives, policy makers, 
and individuals all need to scrutinize their intuitions from first principles 
and boldly reset them if necessary.  This is especially true for 
organizations that have enjoyed great success. 
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
194 Reflection and Conclusions CMB150717_E 
Any evolution in approaches to organisational structure and practice (e.g. Piercy, 
2009) is likely to only serve to further underline the need for ongoing system 
diagnostics and research into ‘whole-of-system working’ (see Jackson, 2009a).  
Limitations and opportunities 
However, there are a number of limitations which do exist with the approach.  
Those inherent within methodological preference and novelty have been well 
canvassed by others or resolved already within this thesis (Chapter 4), so not 
discussed further.  Other limitations (and also embedded opportunities) include: 
 Understanding/communicating component relevance:  This approach 
requires there to be a shared understanding of the working and nature of the 
system in question otherwise the relevance of component deep dives may be 
lost to others.  Ultimately this becomes a communication challenge (and 
therefore a sense-making opportunity), as linking the component parts to the 
wider ‘whole’ remains intrinsic to systems research (Edson & Metcalf, 2017). 
 Ability to see both the wood and the trees:  The approach outlined here 
provides detail at multiple scales and from several perspectives.  This invokes 
an ability to consider often contradictory positions or paradox.  The level of 
detail (both the detail within the deep dives and/or at the system level) may not 
be accessible to everyone, may even confuse, and therefore could impede 
socialising and uptake.   
The flip side of this is, as noted above, stakeholders have multiple opportunities 
to find meaning/relevance, and/or to understand where they fit (this also 
references the concepts of single- double-, and triple-loop learning discussed 
earlier).   
 Selling success:  Unfortunately the approach, although robust, does not offer a 
‘silver bullet’ or single solution.  Therefore defining success, let alone measuring 
it may be problematic (including issues described by Lester (2004)).  The 
approach requires a move away from the expectation of ‘command and control’ 
style single solution outcomes; albeit, such a move is encouraged by 
Yankelovich (1991), amongst others.  Whilst simple, single solutions are 
problematic in complex systems (Seddon, 2008), there may be reluctance to 
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invest in, or support an approach that is ‘impact challenged’.  There is also a 
risk that corrective action which responds to initial diagnostics is mistaken for a 
need for the system to be continually re-evaluated and reset.  Incremental 
improvement and the standardisation of diagnostic tools may then embed a risk 
of failure (Snowden & Boone, 2007). 
The opportunity here is that a programme of ongoing diagnostics provides 
practitioners a model to assist evolution and to contribute to adaptive capability.  
For researchers, ongoing diagnostics provide the opportunity to understand 
matters such as the longitudinal implications of the approach and to contribute 
to the ongoing development of the interwoven, trans-disciplinary mesh of 
Complexity Theory, Systems Thinking, and Public Administration (amongst 
others).   
By understanding the approach as a sense-making model that has the intrinsic aim 
of stimulating conversation and shared understanding, the limitations of the 
approach can therefore be recast as opportunities.  From both practitioner and 
academic perspectives, the methodology provides an effective means of testing 
whether strategic intent has been organised into actions that will have meaning at 
multiple levels (Section 4.3.3).  In this regard, the research is repeatable within 
different contexts, or with a different focus, enabling other cross-case comparisons 
to be made on system-level matters.  At the same time, the approach enabled the 
complexities of the New Zealand land transport sector to be probed across multiple 
processes, organisations, scales, and perspectives to provide insights into where 
and why the system was underperforming.  This responds to Hartley and 
Skeltcher’s challenge (see Section 2.4) that evidence-based theory in the realm of 
public service improvement is “better assessed through the achievements of the 
whole institutional field” (in Hartley et al., 2008, pp. 10-11). 
10.1.3 Academic contribution 
This research has investigated the rather diffuse problem of the relationship 
between the strategic intent and management of infrastructure systems, using the 
New Zealand land transport sector to probe issues from different perspectives.  The 
research has been able to be generalised by using cross-sectoral and cross-
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country material obtained from earlier interviews (as similar stories also arise in 
other contexts), to conclude: 
The strategic intent and the day-to-day management of infrastructure 
systems are often misaligned, with negative consequences for achieving 
the desired long-term infrastructure system outcomes.   
This is supported by three underpinning propositions (Section 2.1). 
Section 9.2.2 discusses the practical implications of this.  The academic 
contribution has a number of dimensions, which include those covered within the 
previous two sections.  In addition, this research: 
 provides a ‘worked’ example of the application of Systems Thinking to Action 
Research (Flood, 2010), of which there are few applied whole-of-system 
working examples and none in built infrastructure sectors (Jackson, 2009a); and 
 for this reason contributes to the wider corpus of ‘pracademic’ literature (M. 
Bolton & Stolcis, 2003), and so seeks to bridge the knowledge gap in a number 
of areas (which follow). 
 extends the issues raised by Almklov and Antonsen (2014; see Section 1.1); so 
providing further evidence as to why the New Public Management model may 
be problematic for public sector infrastructure administration.  It also provides 
sense-making models to address some of the issues encountered; 
 supports current proponents of trans-disciplinary research into complex systems 
(e.g. Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Snowden & Boone, 2007); 
 contributes to: 
- engineering knowledge within each of the detailed study areas, including 
challenging some of the orthodoxies of infrastructure practice (e.g. see 
Moodley, 2015 in response to Blom, De Marco, and Guthrie, 2015);   
- the nexus of public administration/services, New Public Management, 
general management and business practice, engineering, infrastructure 
administration, and even disciplinary areas such as Asset Management.  
However, any contribution to any individual practice cannot be unpicked as 
they were approached together and the research focused on the blended, 
trans-disciplinary ‘grey-space’ of practice.  Yet it can be said that the 
research contributes to the development of multi-level, trans-disciplinary 
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management research, and in particular the implementation of strategy, 
which Hitt et al. (2007) tell us is still missing from the academic literature. 
The research, then, contributes to our understanding of a ‘systems level approach’ 
— of Systems Thinking at the system level — and how that might be put into 
practice (responding to Jowitt (2013)).  All this makes the research ‘interesting’ 
(Davis, 1971). 
10.1.4 Scope for future research 
Irrespective of the outcomes and contribution of this research, there remains 
considerable scope for further research.  This is a diverse opportunity arising from 
several levels of the research, and includes, but is not limited to: 
 additional detailed studies, and/or diversification other infrastructure sectors that 
add to the understanding of the interface between engineering and 
management as it relates to infrastructure practice; 
 ongoing research to review and reflect upon technical practice: from first 
principles and to respond to the continually evolving system and its context; 
 resolving auxiliary questions, for example: 
- what happens when assets are ‘vested’ to the public by a private developer; 
- whether alternative procurement, such as public/private partnerships 
necessarily address or defer the issues raised; 
 means to improve and tailor finance and human resource practice to better 
facilitate and respond to the specific needs of public infrastructure 
administration; 
 development of the system-level themes of this research (Chapter 9); and 
 the implications of any changes to the system arising from system-level 
interventions and change arising from the application of Systems Thinking. 
It is also the opportunity to develop the ‘conversation’ further, to undertake research 
that develops each of the ‘Yankelovich’ and ‘Davis’ tranches previously listed in 
Table 2.1. 
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10.2 Conclusions 
This thesis has investigated the strategic intent and the management of 
infrastructure systems, how factors such as organisational structure and business 
practice affect outcomes and the ways in which those systems — not projects — 
are managed.  To date, performance has largely been approached from a project-
oriented perspective, or through addressing the latent failures arising from specific 
sources of shock or disruptive events (e.g. natural disaster).  By contrast, the 
delivery of services across the infrastructure system has rarely been examined.  
Yet this is arguably the level relevant to, and the reality of, day-to-day public 
infrastructure management.   
Infrastructure also exists as an identifiable ‘project’ for only a relatively short 
proportion of its lifecycle.  Yet operational matters have received relatively little 
attention and are often overlooked due to a belief that reality reflects theory, and/or 
that any deviation from theory or ‘best practice’ is simply a matter of poor individual 
or organisational performance.  The crux of the problem is an inability to fully 
deliver appropriate and relevant infrastructure outcomes over the long term. 
The research firstly investigated industry perception and perspectives to test and 
define the problem.  Three detailed studies then explored the reasons for this 
problem through different lenses, thereby providing an evidence-base for a range of 
issues shared by the wider infrastructure industry.  Accordingly, the results: 
 provide a range of novel insights that are applicable to industry at several 
levels; 
 highlight a range of complex, interrelated features of the management of 
infrastructure systems, which do not fulfil, or align with strategic intent; and  
 point to a range of implications for long-term outcomes. 
The research has confirmed its hypothesis that: 
The strategic intent and the day-to-day management of infrastructure 
systems are often misaligned, with negative consequences for achieving 
the desired long-term infrastructure system outcomes. 
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In so doing this research has increased our understanding of the ways in which that 
misalignment occurs, and the consequences that result.  It found those 
consequences were material, and frequently not visible within the sub-system 
accountable for the delivery of those outcomes. 
The benefits of public infrastructure to society is a central theme drawn from the 
definition of infrastructure itself.  This research shows that it is not enough to be 
focused on technical outcomes.  Infrastructure needs to move beyond how society 
interacts with an asset, to the outcomes that reflect the needs, beliefs, and choices 
of society as well as its ability to respond to change (aptitude). In short, so that 
society no longer has to work around its infrastructure.  In addition, the research 
has shown:  
1. Individual infrastructure projects automatically, by their nature, become part of, 
are embedded in, and change, a complex infrastructural system (e.g. 
interactions, feedback, emergent properties). 
2. The governance and management of such systems will not be effective if 
focused on outputs at the level of projects, assets, or even subsystems.  
Governance and management needs to address the desired/intended strategic, 
externally-oriented outcomes and aptitude of the whole system.  They also 
need to address the contributions of individual projects and of the day-to-day 
operations to that system. 
3. No matter how well individual projects are designed and delivered, or strategic 
outcomes are initially defined, systems are dynamic.  Accordingly, infrastructure 
administration needs to both accommodate and continually respond to this time 
dimension.   
The research does not purport to offer ‘the solution’; that does not exist for a 
complex adaptive system such as infrastructure.  But the research does offer 
several system-oriented sense-making models at both the detailed and system-
level.  This includes the probing methodology by way of a diagnostic roadmap or 
model.  These models aim to assist practitioners in managing the transition of 
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
200 Reflection and Conclusions CMB150717_E 
projects, assets, and services into a wider infrastructure system, their potential, and 
in (re)orienting the organisation to the dynamic nature of the system and its societal 
imperative.   
Whilst the research contributes to both practical and theoretical knowledge, there is 
still considerable scope for further research.  This includes use of the 
methodological approach, matters of detail arising from the individual detailed 
studies (e.g. in relation to the vesting of assets; detailed studies 2 and 3), and the 
development of system-level themes.  
Public infrastructure exists, not in its own right, but to benefit society.  It also 
endures and changes in a way that is akin to the metaphorical grandfather’s axe.  
As the metaphor goes, the axe has an inherent value as an heirloom (even if the 
axe-head and handle are replaced over time).  For infrastructure, this equates to 
the notion of ‘future value’.  However, in order for our infrastructure to be valued in 
the future, we perhaps need to start thinking of it as ‘our grandchildren’s axe’.  
 
 
  
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
CMB150717_E Reflection and Conclusions 201 
 
 
 
UNLESS…  
 Dr. Seuss 
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APPENDIX I:  NEW ZEALAND CONTEXT 
Land transport context  
Land transport in the New Zealand context is the infrastructure, goods, and 
services facilitating transport on land by any means (Part 1, s5; Land Transport 
Management Act (LTMA), 2003).  National land transport strategies are guided and 
informed by a range of government policy documents, central to which is 
Government Policy Statement on Land Transport Funding (Ministry of Transport, 
2013a; New Zealand Government, 2011a).  Although some integration will occur, 
land transport activities at the national level tend to be addressed by mode (New 
Zealand Government, 2011a, 2011b) and the focus at the present time is largely 
upon those that are road related.  That emphasis is reflected in this research. 
The NZTA is the central entity, as it (Ministry of Transport, 2013b): 
 allocates funding for land transport infrastructure and services through the 
National Land Transport Programme; 
 manages access to the transport system through driver and vehicle licensing, 
vehicle inspections and rules development; 
 provides land transport safety and sustainability information and education; and  
 manages the State highway network, including maintenance, improvements 
and operations activities. 
Local authorities own, maintain, and develop the local road network and perform 
important regulatory functions.  Local government funds land transport 
infrastructure and public transport services alongside central government and is 
responsible for transport planning and land use planning.  Some local authorities 
also own seaports and airports, or share ownership with the Crown or private 
companies. 
Consideration of the roading framework alone would be sufficient for many parts of 
New Zealand, but both Auckland and Wellington also have commuter rail systems 
operated by local government on (mostly) national rail assets.  Auckland, 
Wellington, and Christchurch also have ferry services that form part of the local 
transport system.  Furthermore Auckland has a specific and (at this time) unique 
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local government framework which includes a separate entity accountable for 
transportation management within the region.   
Auckland is New Zealand’s largest city.  Relatively recently established from an 
amalgamation process of one regional and seven local councils (Local Government 
(Auckland Council) Act (LGA(AC)), 2009), the ‘super city’ covers the entire Auckland 
region of approximately 1.4M people (Statistics New Zealand, 2013b).  The 
amalgamation occurred three years prior to the start of this research, so provided 
an insight into recent practice from across the eight ‘legacy’ organisations.167 
Under its enabling legislation, accountability for the Auckland transport system168 
rests with Auckland Transport, a Council Controlled Organisation (s39; LGA(AC), 
2009).  Whilst many of the regional accountabilities rest with Auckland Transport, a 
‘one system’ approach with the State highway network is required (s38AA; LTMA, 
2003).  Auckland Transport also differs from many other local government 
structures, due largely to its establishment as a body corporate and the inclusion of 
a board of directors (s38(2)(a), s43; LGA(AC), 2009).  
Along with Auckland’s scale and complexity, the amalgamation provides a unique 
opportunity to canvass practices selected or adapted from a number of local 
authorities.  It should also reduce the likelihood of defensive or blaming behaviours 
as staff may not have so much ‘ownership’ of past processes and projects.  
Moreover, the organisation is also actively seeking to improve its practice and so 
was open to this research. 
Lastly, New Zealand’s land transport context is also part of, and influences, 
international practice.  This includes close ties with the Australasian practice group 
                                              
167
 New Zealand has 78 local authorities (Department of Internal Affairs, 2011): 11 regional 
councils and 67 territorial authorities (i.e. unitary authorities, city and district councils).    
168
 This includes local roads, public transport infrastructure and services, and excludes State 
highways, rail controlled by KiwiRail, some airports, and aspects of Council controlled off-street 
parking.  For completeness, sea and air ports, and local ferry interfaces are considered as land 
transport nodes. 
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AustRoads, and the New Zealand centre for National Asset Management Support 
(NAMS), which includes an international practice group. 
Wider context 
The operation and management of land transport obviously sits within the wider 
context of other legislation and national strategies.  Key strategic plans are defined 
in Law and so are common to those land transport organisations that fall within the 
jurisdiction of a given piece of legislation (e.g. "Land Transport Management Act," 
2003; "Local Government (Auckland Council) Act," 2009; "Local Government Act," 
2002; "Resource Management Act," 1991).  This establishes a hierarchy of the 
various statutory and planning instruments (e.g. policies, plans, etc.) in which ‘lower 
order’ requirements are required to give effect to ‘higher order’ ones, with 
increasing specificity (e.g. see SC 82/2013 [2014] NZSC 38, 2014).   
Much of the other detail is not immediately germane to this research, or is more 
appropriate to address in the context that it arises, with the following exceptions: 
 Ministry of Works and Development (MoW):  
The country’s need for infrastructure development gave rise to centralised 
project and delivery-led agencies.  These included the MoW, which was 
responsible for the design and construction of much of the significant public 
works and infrastructure until its dissolution in 1988.  Many of the organisations 
responsible for public infrastructure in New Zealand today tend to be strongly 
engineering led, and retain this project delivery focus.  However, there are signs 
that this is starting to change (NZTA, 2014a; Radio New Zealand, 2012). 
 New Zealand Treasury initiatives: 
The Treasury of the New Zealand Government has several initiatives that either 
inform or relate directly to infrastructure.  These include: 
- ‘Working towards higher living standards for New Zealanders’ (New Zealand 
Treasury, 2011). 
- The establishment of the National Infrastructure Unit, which co-ordinated the 
development of the ‘National Infrastructure Plan’ (New Zealand 
Government, 2011b), together with supporting initiatives such as the Better 
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Business Case framework (National Infrastructure Unit, n.d.) and work on 
infrastructure resilience (Fairclough, 2012, 2014). 
Although the National Infrastructure Plan focuses on infrastructure by sector, 
many of the other initiatives encourage a broader, more holistic approach with 
the aim of improving outcomes more generally. 
 Sustainable management of resources:  
The Resource Management Act (RMA), 1991, affects the management and 
operation of infrastructure.  More particularly, new infrastructure is often 
predicated on the basis of it meeting the underlying purpose and principles of 
the Act; the purpose being “to promote the sustainable management of natural 
and physical resources” (s.5(1)).   
 
 
 
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
CMB150717_E Appendix II 241 
APPENDIX II:  SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS AND 
WORKSHOPS 
AII.1 Preliminary research 
AII.1.1 Summary of preliminary interviews 
The following table provides a summary of the interviews conducted as part of the preliminary 
research (Chapter 3 and cross-referenced throughout the document).  To retain interviewee 
confidentiality, this includes the current level of responsibility/role of each interviewee and the 
type of organisation only.  In some cases an individual may hold secondary/other roles 
(e.g. with industry/professional organisations or within governance), and of course an 
individual’s experience may have crossed sectors, organisation type, and/ or country over time 
(for example).  As noted in Section 3.1, it cannot be assumed, therefore, that an individual’s 
response relates to their current role or organisation type because the interviews were 
canvassing experiences within the infrastructure industry generally.  Moreover, some individuals 
were purposefully approached because of the breadth of their experience.  A separate summary 
of interviewee experiences is provided in Section AII.1.2; this has not been linked to role and 
organisation type because, as discussed later, this was found to breach confidentiality. 
Note:  Interviewee numbers are non-sequential as not everyone listed in the underlying 
schedule was able to be interviewed. 
Interview 
date 
Interview 
number 
Interviewee 
location 
(does not 
infer 
nationality) 
Principal interviewee 
role/level of 
responsibility 
Principal interviewee 
organisation type 
Stage 1:  General interviews 
5/12/2013 [PR13] EU Executive
169
 Research org
n
 
6/1/2014 [PR14] NZ Executive Government dep
t170
 
                                              
169
 Includes Board, CEO, Executive management (including non-governance Director roles as 
might exist within a consultancy, for example), Judicial Officer, and Senior Academic 
(Professor). 
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Interview 
date 
Interview 
number 
Interviewee 
location 
(does not 
infer 
nationality) 
Principal interviewee 
role/level of 
responsibility 
Principal interviewee 
organisation type 
8/1/2014 [PR15] NZ Executive Financing org
n
 
10/1/2014 [PR16] NZ Manager
171
 Infrastructure org
n
 
22/1/2014 
and 
25/3/2014 
[PR18] NZ Executive Industry org
n
 
31/3/2014 [PR19] NZ Executive Infrastructure org
n
 
18/3/2014 [PR20] NZ Executive Infrastructure org
n
 
25/3/2014 [PR21] NZ Manager Infrastructure org
n
 
25/3/2014 [PR22] NZ Executive Infrastructure org
n
 
31/3/2014 [PR24] NZ Executive Infrastructure org
n
 
4/4/2014 [PR25] NZ Executive Consulting org
n
 
26/3/2014 [PR26] NZ Team
172
 Infrastructure org
n
 
28/3/2014 [PR27] NZ Executive Infrastructure org
n
 
28/3/2014 [PR28] NZ Executive Consulting org
n
 
3/4/2014 [PR29] NZ Team Government dep
t
 
2/4/2014 [PR30] NZ Executive Infrastructure org
n
 
                                                                                                                                    
170
 Government departments include central government ministries and departments such as 
the Ministry of Transport (see Appendix I), but excludes those infrastructure organisations that 
are State owned enterprises (e.g. KiwiRail) which have been classified within this table as an 
‘infrastructure organisation’.  The examples given within this footnote do not necessarily indicate 
a relationship to the actual interviews. 
171
 Includes team/organisational management, project management. 
172
 Includes team leaders, technical specialists, and senior advisors. 
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Interview 
date 
Interview 
number 
Interviewee 
location 
(does not 
infer 
nationality) 
Principal interviewee 
role/level of 
responsibility 
Principal interviewee 
organisation type 
1/4/2014 [PR31] NZ Team Government dep
t
 
2/4/2014 [PR32] NZ Manager Infrastructure org
n
 
2/4/2014 [PR33] NZ Executive Infrastructure org
n
 
2/4/2014 [PR34] NZ Executive Infrastructure org
n
 
2/4/2014 [PR35] NZ Team Infrastructure org
n
 
3/4/2014 [PR36] NZ Manager Infrastructure org
n
 
1/4/2014 [PR37] NZ Team Industry org
n
 
3/4/2014 [PR38] NZ Team  Infrastructure org
n
 
3/4/2014 [PR39] NZ Manager Government dep
t
 
11/4/2014 [PR40] NZ Retired (Manager) Infrastructure org
n
 
15/4/2014 [PR41] NZ Executive Consulting org
n
 
11/4/2014 [PR42] NZ Executive Infrastructure org
n
 
15/4/2014 [PR43] NZ Executive Contracting org
n
 
11/4/2014 [PR44] NZ Executive Consulting org
n
 
7/5/2014 [PR45] EU Executive Research org
n
 
8/5/2014 [PR46] EU Manager Infrastructure org
n
 
15/5/2014 [PR47] EU Executive Infrastructure org
n
 
11/4/2014 [PR48] NZ Manager Infrastructure org
n
 
23/5/2014 [PR49] EU Manager Consulting org
n
 
2/6/2014 [PR50] EU Executive Consulting org
n
 
7/6/2014 [PR51] EU Executive Consulting org
n
 
7/6/2014 [PR52] EU Team Consulting org
n
 
16/9/2014 [PR70] NZ Executive Government dep
t
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Interview 
date 
Interview 
number 
Interviewee 
location 
(does not 
infer 
nationality) 
Principal interviewee 
role/level of 
responsibility 
Principal interviewee 
organisation type 
Stage 2:  New Zealand transport sector-specific interviews 
21/8/2014 
and 
27/11/2014 
[PR16] NZ Manager Infrastructure org
n
 
21/8/2014 [PR53] NZ Manager Infrastructure org
n
 
2/9/2014 [PR54] NZ Manager Infrastructure org
n
 
16/9/2014 [PR55] NZ Executive Infrastructure org
n
 
17/9/2014 [PR56] NZ Executive Infrastructure org
n
 
16/9/2014 [PR57] NZ Executive Infrastructure org
n
 
2/10/2014 [PR58] NZ Executive Infrastructure org
n
 
16/9/2014 [PR59] NZ Manager Infrastructure org
n
 
2/9/2014 [PR60] NZ Manager Infrastructure org
n
 
21/8/2014 [PR61] NZ Manager Infrastructure org
n
 
18/8/2014 [PR62] NZ Team Infrastructure org
n
 
18/8/2014 [PR63] NZ Manager Infrastructure org
n
 
19/8/2014 [PR64] NZ Manager Infrastructure org
n
 
30/10/2014 [PR65] NZ Manager Infrastructure org
n
 
2/9/2014 [PR66] NZ Manager Infrastructure org
n
 
16/9/2014 [PR67] NZ Team Infrastructure org
n
 
20/8/2014 [PR68] NZ Manager Infrastructure org
n
 
21/8/2014 [PR69] NZ Manager Infrastructure org
n
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AII.1.2 Summary of preliminary interviewee experiences 
Note:  Many interviewees held more than one position at the time of the preliminary research 
interviews and/or were drawing upon previous roles and experiences.  Accordingly, this 
summary cannot be directly linked to the number of interviewees. 
Aspect Interviewee location  
(does not infer nationality) 
NZ EU 
Sector 
Social Infrastructure 
Recreation  
Healthcare/public health  
Education  
Energy 
Generation  
Transmission  
Distribution  
Transport 
State highway  
Local roads  
Rail  
Public transport  
Sea and air ports  
Telecommunications  
Waters 
Water  
Wastewater  
Stormwater  
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Aspect Interviewee location  
(does not infer nationality) 
NZ EU 
Sector (Cont
d.
) 
Wastes  
Defence  
Role 
Central government  
Funding & finance  
Statutory   
Political N/A N/A 
Governance  
Client  
Consultant  
Contractor  
Stakeholders  
Director  
Manager  
Team  
Policy and strategy  
Asset management  
Project delivery  
Operations  
Compliance/audit  
Industry organisation  
Emergency preparedness  
  
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Aspect Interviewee location  
(does not infer nationality) 
NZ EU 
Role (Cont
d.
) 
Aid  
Academia/research  
Discipline 
Engineering  
Sciences  
Planning  
Law  
Other arts  
Finance and business  
Other expertise (e.g. cultural)  
Context (NZ only) 
Ministry of Works (MoW)  
Post MoW (1988+)  
Location 
Auckland  
New Zealand  
Australia  
Pacific Islands  
Greater Asia  
Europe and UK  
Americas  
Africa  
Other/unspecified  
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The summary of interviewee experience has not been linked with the details 
provided within Section AII.1.1 to protect the confidentiality of those interviewed.  
To test this, a summary matrix was provided to two senior industry practitioners in 
New Zealand.  The summary only included interview date and matrix of 
experiences for each interviewee.  No interview number or other identifying 
parameters such as name, organisation, or position were included.  The scrutineers 
were not given feedback on who had been correctly identified.   
Excluding any self-identification, the scrutineers were able to identify: 
 two people correctly (confirming that a breach in confidentiality would likely 
result from a more detailed matrix); and also 
 six people who had been interviewed, but whose name placement didn’t align 
with the underlying spreadsheet (i.e. where individuals have similar experience, 
this would give rise to a perceived confidentiality breach and risk quotes being 
wrongly attributed). 
AII.2 Summary of detailed study 1 interviews and 
workshops 
Date Number Interviewee role/level of 
responsibility 
Interviewee organisation 
Semi-structured interviews 
17/4/2015 [DS1.1] Executive Auckland Transport 
6/8/2015 [DS1.2] Manager Auckland Transport 
1/9/2015 [DS1.3] Director Consultant 
1/9/2015 [DS1.4] Manager Consultant 
18/9/2015 [DS1.5] Programme Director Auckland Transport 
23/9/2015 [DS1.6] Senior Advisor Consultant 
4/11/2015 [DS1.7] Executive (x2) Office of the Auditor General 
Influencing change workshop 
31/8/2016 [DS1.8] Manager (x2) Auckland Transport 
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AII.3 Summary of detailed study 2 interviews and 
workshops 
Date Number Interviewee role/level of 
responsibility 
Interviewee organisation 
Semi-structured interviews 
See AII.2 (AMETI discussions were common to both studies) 
Additional meetings and discussions 
30/3/2015 [DS2.1] Asset Manager Auckland Transport 
19/6/2015 [DS2.2] Asset Manager Auckland Transport 
24/9/2015 [DS2.3] Asset Manager Auckland Transport 
14/12/2015 [DS2.4] Asset Manager Auckland Transport 
12/1/2016 [DS2.5] Asset Manager and Programme 
Director 
Auckland Transport 
13/1/2016 [DS2.6] Finance/Commercial Manager Auckland Transport 
14/3/2016 [DS2.7] Programme Director Auckland Transport 
14/3/2016 [DS2.8] Asset Manager  Auckland Transport 
cOPEX workshop 
18/12/2015 [DS2.8] Asset Manager.   Auckland Transport 
Influencing change workshop 
2/9/2016 [DS2.9] Manager (x2) Auckland Transport 
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AII.4 Summary of detailed study 3 interviews and 
workshops 
Note:  Performance management emerged very early within the preliminary interviews as a key 
issue.
173
  This is unsurprising in the context of New Public Management and infrastructure 
practice, particularly in New Zealand where the majority of the preliminary interviews were 
conducted.  As explained (Section 4.4.1, Appendix III), the detailed studies needed to be ring-
fenced quickly when opportunities arose and resulted in some overlapping of the preliminary 
research with the initial work undertaken for this particular study.  Had the final analysis 
changed the emphasis, then this work would have been set aside; however, this did not 
eventuate and more than compensated for the risk of rework. 
Date Number Role/level of responsibility Organisation 
Preliminary discussion by phone/email regarding the current measure and approach 
Sept 2013 [DS3.1] Manager Auckland Transport 
Sept 2013 [DS3.2] Manager Auckland Transport 
Sept 2013 [DS3.3] Manager Whangarei District Council 
2/10/13 [DS3.4] Manager Dunedin City Council 
Sept 2013 [DS3.5] Manager NZTA (Christchurch) 
Sept 2013 [DS3.6] Manager NZTA (National) 
Date Number Participant description 
Customer workshops 
26/8/2014 [DS3.7] Napier.  12 participants: 
 Freight company (x2) 
 Regional council / walking school bus 
 Emergency services (New Zealand Police, New Zealand Fire 
Service) 
 Residents groups (x3; 2 retirees) 
 Public transport provider (bus) 
                                              
173
 e.g. [PR14-PR16], [PR18-PR21], [PR24-PR39], [PR41-PR51]. 
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Date Number Role/level of responsibility Organisation 
 Blind Foundation 
 Automobile Association (NZTA staff member at request of 
Association) 
 Cycle advocacy group 
28/8/2014 [DS3.8] Christchurch:  10 participants: 
 Living streets / District health board 
 New Zealand Trucking Association 
 SPOKES (cycling advocacy) 
 New Zealand Blind Foundation 
 Age Concern 
 Health Policy Advisors/accessibility and wheelchair user 
advocate 
 Resident groups (x4; interests in local major projects and 
covering a range of modes and urban/rural areas)  
29/8/2014 [DS3.9] Dunedin:  6 participants: 
 New Zealand Police 
 Accessibility and wheelchair user advocate 
 NZTA (x2; as resident customers covering a range of modes) 
 Cycle advocacy group 
Influencing change workshop: NZTA 
9/4/2015 [DS3.10] 7 participants from across the organisation (e.g. asset 
management, journey management, network directions and 
performance, customer services). 
Influencing change workshop: Auckland Transport 
14/8/2015 [DS3.11] 10 participants from across the organisation (e.g. asset 
management, walking and cycling, performance management) 
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APPENDIX III:  RESEARCH MANAGEMENT 
Research and data management tools were established to assist the research 
process.  In addition to physical systems such as filing architecture, backup 
systems and data matrices: 
 Attention was given to ethical matters, including: 
- Completion of a self-declaration style check-list to appraise risks and issues 
that might arise from the research process.   
- Obtaining informed consent174 from each of the interviewees and retaining a 
copy or note of this on file.   
- Obtaining executive-level approval from the two study organisations. 
- Clarifying the voluntary and confidential nature of workshops and surveys. 
- Forwarding compliance and specific safety issues identified within the 
detailed studies. 
 Early consideration was given to the question of data transcription and analysis.  
For process transparency, a set of criteria175 were developed and kept on 
record.   
 Referencing systems were developed for source material (and are as used in 
this document): 
- workshop participant (not individually identified): [WP]; 
- preliminary research interviewee: [PRx];176  
- survey respondent: [SRx]; and  
- Auckland Transport source document [ATx]. 
                                              
174
 Either in writing or verbally (e.g. for phone interviews). 
175
 Based upon a review of Bryman and Bell (2011); Denscombe (2011); Flick (2002); McLellan, 
MacQueen, and Neidig (2003); Nikander (2008); O'Connell and Kowal (1994); Robson (2002). 
176
 Note that the annotation system results in numbers exceeding the given number of 
interviews. 
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The study organisations, themselves, changed over the course of the research.  
This required both an opportunistic approach to the identification of the detailed 
studies (once key issues and themes had been identified through the preliminary 
research), and ongoing adaptation, flexibility and research management.  
Organisational changes included organisational restructuring, and reaction to the 
research itself. 
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APPENDIX IV:  LIFECYCLE INTERFACE FACTORS 
Note:  The removal of words as well as transcribed stuttering, restarts, and other verbal ticks are 
indicated by […]. 
Aspect 
(Lifecycle interface) 
Contributing factors with example comments  
Note: Quotes may contain more than one issue.  Not all quotes 
relating to an aspect or factor are included. 
Strategy–project 
interface 
 
Articulating benefits 
 “What [...] is infrastructure there to serve?  It’s there [...] to deliver 
social and economic development [...] and sustainable outcomes.  
And so if those are the objectives that we are wanting, that’s 
where we should start.” [PR18; on project development]  
 “We are so focused on oversight, sometimes we dabble in 
foresight, but so little do we actually enter the place of insight.  
And the problem about insight is it is really in the generative 
space, so [...] most boards [...] by the time that they see a paper, 
a proposal, a plan, the opportunity for generativity is mainly gone 
[...] So you’re just kind of mainly forced into an oversight, you 
know? [... …] If that’s the only role we play, we land up with the 
poorly thought through, over engineered, expensive pieces of 
infrastructure that fail to truly deliver to our purpose.” [PR58] 
Business case boundaries 
 “It’s actually [...] making sure you [...] build what you actually 
need, not what the accountants think you can get away with.” 
[PR41] 
 Yeah, boy those are hard questions [...] So when businesses 
make infrastructure investments [...] there’s a life put into the 
business case — do they think beyond that?  No.” [PR42] 
Lock-in/momentum/prioritisation 
 “We’re still implementing some projects that’ve been in the system 
for quite some time.  So we’re still [...] building the old system 
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Aspect 
(Lifecycle interface) 
Contributing factors with example comments  
Note: Quotes may contain more than one issue.  Not all quotes 
relating to an aspect or factor are included. 
while we’re trying to invent a new one [... …] So in other words 
we’ve got [sector] projects [that] presumably are seen as past the 
point of no return [...] but [...] I think it’s questionable [...] whether 
they should be priorities in the new environment [... …] we’re 
continuing to build the city [...] in the way in which it’s been 
developed for the last 50 years [...] I’m probably being a little bit 
unfair because I mean there are plenty of signs that things are 
starting to —but you know, it’s a bit like turning [...] an ocean liner 
[...] it’s a very long, slow process to change direction.” [PR60] 
Follow-through/ reconciliation with system-level objectives (feed-
forward)  
 “Clearly there are some [...] classic examples of where things 
have been found wanting —but in retrospect [gives examples…] 
These are all very specific examples but [...] they all illustrate that 
[...] things haven’t [...] all —well things have been thought about 
usually —but they haven’t always been followed through.” [PR50]  
 “The capital development part of the business believes it knows 
what it needs to build, and is reluctant to always be guided by the 
client, which is —oh  [...] it frustrates me because [... …] that’s 
actually a key barrier at the moment to getting the right 
outcomes.” [PR53] 
Project–operational 
interface 
Handover (feed-forward) 
 “I think stories are not obvious with infrastructure at large, and [...] 
there are hidden elements that without some explanation will be 
missed in everyday management [...] Being able to tell a 
comprehensive story in perhaps a structured, but at least simple 
form [...] can provide the understanding that a visual inspection 
won’t [... …]Our design reports have a tendency to have been 
written for the purposes of gaining consent or funding approval 
and are written to the specifications of the consenting body or the 
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Aspect 
(Lifecycle interface) 
Contributing factors with example comments  
Note: Quotes may contain more than one issue.  Not all quotes 
relating to an aspect or factor are included. 
funding body [...] and ...] the [...] basic design intent may be lost 
in the welter of information that is needing to be provided in a 
particular form.” [PR62] 
 “Asset engineers get given a package at the end of the job, and 
it’s usually a [...] whopping great big package and we all say we 
read them and [that] you know every single line and understand 
every nuance of that project but [...] we’re largely given it at the 
end.  So we don’t know all the nuances and everything else and 
the thinking that went behind it [...] So the maintenance [...] 
engineers change, you know […and] someone else comes along 
and goes oh well ‘what a stupid [thing to do], I’m going to [do 
something different]’.” [PR16] 
Transition from asset to system 
 “If [a third party doesn’t] do their associated projects —well that’s 
really naff!  And you know [...] then you think, well that’s only [...] 
happened in the last five years [...] before then, we’d built a 
massive project [...] then you know, they’d just go and create [an 
adverse local effect], well that’s stupid isn’t it? [PR33] 
 “When the new projects are created, they don’t necessarily 
consider the overall [...] lifecycle impacts, or the whole-of-life cost 
[...] I mean for the best reasons, everyone is interested in creating 
something because that’s the exciting thing, isn’t it? But [...] you 
tend to forget about your consequential OPEX or your operational 
requirements, and renewal requirements [...]” [PR63] 
 “… do we cope well with projects coming into… 
No. 
…a wider system? 
No [... …] The interface there is poor [... …] In fact it’s non-
existent around our current projects.” [PR66] 
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Aspect 
(Lifecycle interface) 
Contributing factors with example comments  
Note: Quotes may contain more than one issue.  Not all quotes 
relating to an aspect or factor are included. 
Whole-of-life performance 
 “[We’ve] got to look at the long term consequences —not so much 
in cost terms because all the economists want you to discount 
future costs away and when you get out that far they get to zero 
sort of thing —but more from the point of view of the concept of 
future generations inheriting ‘this thing’ and what are you going to 
do with it!  Whether it can be maintained and serviced or whether 
it has to be removed —whatever.  So there needs to be a 
practicality issue there…some consideration.” [PR14] 
 “It’s not built into [...] the business casing [...] that space [...] I 
think will improve over time, but [...] it definitely is not [...] in there 
and you know you do see some [...] classic [...] issues that come 
up ‘cos there just hasn’t [been] that sort of holistic [...] view” 
[PR15; on interface between strategy, projects, and operations] 
 “A lot of the capital development justification is framed around 
benefits, but a lot of those benefits can only be realised through 
proper maintenance and operations.  And if we [...] can’t fund 
proper maintenance and operations, does that question why we’re 
doing the development in the first place?” [PR16] 
Operational–
strategy interface 
Performance (benefit) monitoring 
 “…do you think those benefits are being captured well…? 
Um, ah, not as well as we could [...] if you can’t measure the 
value, you will never know what the real value is.” [PR20] 
 “I think that whole thing of benefit monitoring [is] an area that we 
really, really should be spending more time and effort on [...] it’s 
so powerful ‘cos you can stand up there when people are thinking 
about investing in new things and saying ‘ooohhh, we don’t think 
[...] that people’re gonna behave that way, you’re never gonna 
get so many people shifting over’ and you can put up this graph 
and say [...] we did it then and look what happened!” [PR57] 
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Aspect 
(Lifecycle interface) 
Contributing factors with example comments  
Note: Quotes may contain more than one issue.  Not all quotes 
relating to an aspect or factor are included. 
 “I mean we try to take a whole-of-life of view of our infrastructure 
[...] you know, what are we building and how’re we building it, 
right through to the decommissioning and making sure that it’s 
safe and doesn’t leave a contingent liability out there [...] but in 
the middle we’ve got the operations and maintenance bit [...]” 
[PR34; on resilient outcomes] 
Follow-through/reconciliation with system-level objectives.  
Feedback to strategy (above) 
 “I guess in my mind I’ve seen them as two separate entities —you 
[...] build something and then you let somebody else come along 
and play and [...] manage it.” [PR24; on strategic planning and 
operations] 
 “We’ve got to be intelligence led, we’ve got to have a capability 
around turning —we…have bucket-loads of data.  We [...] are not 
short of data [...] We [...] can turn it into information.  We can tell 
people.  That’s easy.  But we’re not good at turning it into 
intelligence.” [PR36] 
 “Then the other gap […] is the […] feedback loop [...there’s] a long 
way to go […] that’s probably the least developed, and we…have 
started some conversations with our delivery groups…and we 
want to enhance those processes.” [PR63] 
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APPENDIX V:  AMETI OVERVIEW 
The Auckland-Manukau Eastern Transport Initiative (AMETI) is a major, multimodal 
programme aimed at improving strategic transport links in the east of Auckland 
(Figure AV.1).  It comprises (Auckland Transport, 2013b, p. 48): 
An integrated package of improvements to all transport modes in the 
Panmure area, designed to improve the transport choices so as to 
reduce dependence on private car use and facilitate land use changes 
to improve the area economically, socially and environmentally.   
 
Figure AV.1:  AMETI staging plan  
Source:  Auckland Transport (2015a) 
Note:  AMETI stage 1 (Panmure station and approaches) only has been considered as part of 
this research. 
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The programme is divided into several stages, the first of which, was completed in 
2014.  The main components of Stage 1 (or ‘the project’) include (Ibid.): 
 the reconstruction of two road bridges and one footbridge; 
 construction of a covered box structure (accommodating the rail station and link 
road), plus an additional pedestrian/service vehicle bridge; 
 a local road realignment; 
 construction of a new link road (Te Horeta Road); 
 upgrades to an existing rail station, creation of a new rail/bus interchange, and 
the addition of new bus lanes; 
 improvements to walking and cycling facilities; 
 establishment of public open spaces, park and ride facilities, and environmental 
mitigation works including noise wall construction, improvements to coastal 
outfalls, stream ‘daylighting’, and the rehabilitation of a wetland lagoon 
(integrated with stormwater management). 
At the time this research commenced, AMETI was the largest programme under 
construction for Auckland Transport and one of the largest transportation projects 
of the region.  The overall (uninflated) programme capital expenditure (CAPEX) 
estimate was NZ$1.16B (Auckland Transport, 2014c), and the Stage 1 outturn cost 
was approximately NZ$215M (Auckland Transport, pers. comm., 24 January 2016).  
The Stage 1 OPEX is assessed within study 2 (Chapter 6). 
Whilst other broader methodological matters have been discussed in Chapter 4, the 
choice of the AMETI as a single case within two of the detailed studies was 
deemed appropriate because the project: 
 includes provisions for rail, bus, walking and cycling, freight and over-dimension 
(size/weight) vehicles, plus general traffic.  The scope includes significant 
structures (including a tunnel), public transport facilities as well as transport 
networks, and significant environmental and cultural issues.  It is therefore 
complex enough to enable a range of pan-organisational issues to be 
canvassed (i.e. that might not arise from a straight forward road widening); yet 
 is deemed (by Auckland Transport) to be sufficiently representative of wider 
practice; 
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 is of sufficient magnitude (size and cost) to attract and/or demand proponents of 
best practice within both the study organisation and the wider New Zealand 
transportation sector; and 
 enables extrapolation across multiple programme stages all of which are based 
on that of Stage 1. 
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APPENDIX VI:  DETAILED STUDY 1 ANALYSIS 
This Appendix presents a summary only.  For brevity, once the overarching findings 
from this study emerged, the detailed analysis was reduced to supporting examples 
only. 
AVI.1 Strategic interrelationships 
Auckland Transport’s key strategic documents ideally cascade out of the Auckland 
Plan (Appendix I).  The actual interrelationships between key strategic documents 
were ‘mapped’ so that the connectivity (or otherwise) could be assessed 
(Figure AVI.1).   
How to read ‘subway map’ Figure AVI.1 
As a Council Controlled Organisation, Auckland Transport is required to give effect to the 
Auckland Plan (Section 5.1).  The Plan sets out the vision for the Auckland region and a number 
of objectives (grey shading, Figure AVI.a).  The transport objective (a well connected and 
accessible Auckland) is the primary focus for Auckland Transport, and is supported by four key 
transport-related directives (blue shading, Figure AVI.a) and a number of sub-directives, some 
of which are captured in Figure AVI.a (orange shading). 
 
Figure AVI.a:  Snippet from Figure AVI.1 
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Auckland Transport’s primary strategic document is the Integrated Transport Programme, which 
is supported by a number of secondary plans establishing a hierarchy of strategic documents 
and the visions, objectives, and strategies therein (see Section 5.1 and Appendix I).  These are 
not all visible in Figure AVI.a, but some of the connections between those documents and the 
Auckland Plan are shown (as coloured lines).  These connections are presented as defined 
within the documents themselves.  The Auckland Transport documents and their connections 
are colour coded as follows (not all are visible in Figure AVI.a; see the inset below): 
‘First-order’ Auckland Transport 
strategic documents 
Colour 
Integrated Transport Programme  
‘Second-order’ Auckland 
Transport strategic documents 
Colour 
Asset Management Plan  
Regional Land Transport Plan  
Regional Public Transport Plan  
Parking Strategy  
Disconnects are shown by ‘terminating stations’, or points with no connection (for example the 
Auckland Plan sub-directives circled in pink; Figure AVI.a, preceding page).  Inconsistencies in 
the Auckland Transport strategic documents can also be seen in Figure AVI.a within the area of 
orange shading.  Those inconsistencies arise where second-order plans — in this case 
strategies set out within the Parking Strategy (brown lines) and the Asset Management Plan 
(pale blue lines) — connect to Auckland Plan sub-directives (bright orange nodes within the 
orange shading), but the ‘higher-order’ ITP (dark blue lines) do not (Figure AVI.a). 
Further detail is set out within Section 5.2.  Figure AVI.1 formed a framework for systematically 
analysing strategic connectivity (a summary of which follows below).  The map shows the 
interplay between plans in a way that is more readily discernible than a simple spreadsheet as it 
is able to demonstrate the complexities of these interrelationships visually.  Moreover, it enables 
disconnects to be highlighted which might otherwise have been hidden. 
A grid has been included in Figure AVI.1 and is cross referenced throughout the following 
analysis to further guide the reader.  Figures AVI.3 and AVI.4, which describe the 
interrelationship of performance indicators within the strategic documents, may be read in the 
same way. 
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Intentionally blank 
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AVI.1.1 Auckland Plan–ITP relationship 
This Section describes and discusses the ‘Auckland Transport Map of Strategic 
Plans’ (Figure AVI.1).  Grid references, linking to the figure have been provided to 
assist the reader.  As noted above, only key points are described for brevity. 
The Auckland Plan sets out Auckland Council’s vision and key objectives.177  These 
are supported by key directives and ‘transformational shifts’.  Whilst the Plan 
recognises Auckland Transport will contribute to several objectives, both Council 
and Auckland Transport have identified the most relevant objective for transport as 
“create better connections and accessibility within Auckland, across New Zealand 
and to the world” (Auckland Council, 2012a; Auckland Transport, 2013a).178  This is 
supported by the transformational shift “Move to outstanding public transport within 
one system” (Ibid.).179   
The ITP is the overarching strategic document for Auckland Transport.180  It sets out 
the long-term (30 year) strategies through which Auckland Transport will give effect 
to the requirements of the Auckland Plan.  Its aim (Auckland Transport, 2013a, p. 
6): 
Is to ensure that “Auckland’s transport system is effective, efficient and 
provides for the regions social, economic, environmental and cultural 
wellbeing”.  In order to achieve this aim, six impact statements 
complemented by related levels of service [...] have been distilled from 
the [Auckland Plan].  
In broadening the transport objective, Auckland Transport has provided for other 
high-level linkages to the Auckland Plan.181  However, the ITP itself is unclear as to 
                                              
177
 Figure AVI.1; B2-D2. 
178
 Figure AVI.1; D2. 
179
 Figure AVI.1; C1-C2, D1-D2. 
180
 Figure AVI.1; G2. 
181
 Figure AVI.1; A1-A3, F1-F3. 
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how the Auckland Plan has been “distilled” to create the ITP’s strategic framework.  
For example: 
 Only some of the key directives sitting beneath Auckland Plan priority areas 
have been integrated within the ITP.  But there is no indication why some were 
selected but not others, particularly when many of the omissions explicitly 
reference transport.182  
 Other than establishing a direct link to the Auckland Plan’s transport objective183 
and the clearly stated use of the ‘One System’ directives,184 the ITP largely 
relies on duplicate wording to establish connectivity with the higher-order 
document.   
The ITP has also identified six “impacts” (Figure AVI.2),185 which it expects will 
occur from the Programme’s implementation.  It appears that these are designed to 
guide how high-level strategy is to be interpreted by the organisation as a whole.  
Whilst the establishment of outcomes is laudable, it is potentially unhelpful in this 
context because: 
 five result areas have also been identified under ITP strategy one (‘One System’ 
approach);186 
 three of the four stages of the intervention process187 supporting ITP strategy 
two (transportation programme)188 are also outcome focused, the fourth is 
output focused;  
  
                                              
182
 Figure AVI.1; A1-A3, E1-E3. 
183
 Figure AVI.1; D2. 
184
 Figure AVI.1; D2 and D1-E1. 
185
 See also Figure AVI.1; F3-G3. 
186
 Figure AVI.1; F2. 
187
 Figure AVI.1; H2-H3. 
188
 Figure AVI.1; H2. 
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Figure AVI.2:  ITP outcomes framework 
Source:  Auckland Transport (2013a) 
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 as a general rule, the impacts189 have not been linked to: 
- the Auckland Plan.190  It is understood from Auckland Transport that the six 
impact areas stem from discussions between Auckland Council, Auckland 
Transport, and the NZTA, and are the result of a process to workshop, then 
‘distil’ the Plan; 
- Auckland Transport’s own strategies.191  So do not advance matters much 
beyond generalisations; and 
- second order/subordinate plans.192  These generally map to the impact 
statements rather than the strategies.  This obscures connections and could 
be problematic for feedback processes (including benefit reporting). 
AVI.1.2 Second-order plans 
This Section describes and discusses the ‘Auckland Transport Map of Strategic 
Plans’ (Figure AVI.1). Grid references, linking to the figure have been provided to 
assist the reader.  As noted above, only key points are described for brevity. 
The relationship between the ITP and its subordinate plans193 exhibited similar 
issues to those just discussed.  For example: 
 The management of the transport system as a single system (‘One System’ 
approach) is one of two key ITP strategies.194  Yet with the following exception, 
none of the subordinate plans link directly to this strategy.   
 Whilst the RLTP prioritisation framework195 does reference the ‘One System’,196 
the actual scoring criteria does not support this and covers only a small part of 
the eleven ‘One System’ principles specified by the ITP.  
                                              
189
 Figure AVI.1; F3-G3. 
190
 Figure AVI.1; C2. 
191
 Figure AVI.1; F2-F3, H2-H3. 
192
 Figure AVI.1; Parking Strategy (A5), AMP (C5), RLTP (E5), and RPTP (I5). 
193
 Figure AVI.1; Parking Strategy (A5), AMP (C5), RLTP (E5), and RPTP (I5). 
194
 Figure AVI.1; F2. 
195
 Figure AVI.1; E4-E5. 
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 It was found that the ‘One System’ strategy,197 like the remainder of the 
document, was largely disconnected from the wider strategic framework and it 
was unclear how the document and its strategies were to be given effect.  This 
was underlined by the failure of the Parking Strategy198 and the AMP199 to 
reference the ITP directly at all, and there being only generalised references 
within the RPTP.200   
Within the second-order plans themselves,201 several other issues were identified 
(such as the introduction of new strategic themes).202  Along with a similar lack of 
transparency and strategic connectivity, second-order plans also introduce other 
inconsistencies and conflicts.   For example, the RLTP details a project 
prioritisation framework.203  One of the stated criteria is that “assets are renewed 
and maintained optimally”.204  However, this is then excluded from further 
assessment on the basis that “this is an asset management measure and does not 
relate directly to prioritising new CAPEX projects” (Auckland Transport, 2015c).  
Both the inclusion of the given criteria and then its subsequent exclusion is curious 
because renewals are managed as CAPEX by the organisation (Chapter 6), and 
reportedly have a direct funding pathway.   
It would appear, therefore, that there is a ‘joining of the dots’ somewhere within the 
system, it is just not transparent and accessible.  This runs the risk that parts of the 
organisation will know, but these may not be all that need to know, and may get lost 
                                                                                                                                    
196
 Figure AVI.1; F2. 
197
 Figure AVI.1; F2. 
198
 Figure AVI.1; A5. 
199
 Figure AVI.1; C5. 
200
 Figure AVI.1; I5. 
201
 Figure AVI.1; Parking Strategy (A5), AMP (C5), RLTP (E5), and RPTP (I5). 
202
 Figure AVI.1; Parking Strategy (A5), AMP (B4-D4, B6-D6), RLTP (D6-D7, F6-F7), and RPTP 
(I4-I6). 
203
 Figure AVI.1; E6. 
204
 Figure AVI.1; D6. 
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in time.  It also makes feedback on the outcomes, and even a review of the 
prioritisation framework itself, problematic, and constrains feedback to performance 
measures; the ‘do what you measure’ conundrum (Senge, 2006).  
AVI.1.3 Performance 
This Section describes and discusses the ‘Auckland Transport Map of Performance 
Indicators:  Statement of Intent 2015/16-2018/19’ (Figure AVI.3). Grid references, 
linking to the figure have been provided to assist the reader.  As noted above, only 
key points are described for brevity. 
The overview of both the strategic framework and board documentation highlighted 
the importance and complexity of organisational performance measures.  Measures 
range from strategic indicators through to tactical levels of service, but the 
difference between these is not always immediately apparent (see Figure AVI.3). 
The Auckland Plan205 includes a list of measures through which Council intends to 
review progress against its vision and objectives (Auckland Council, 2012a).  There 
are five core measures which map to the transport objective (see previous section; 
Auckland Council, 2012a).206  A further five transport-related measures stem from 
the ‘Liveability Measures’ and the ‘green Auckland’ objective (Ibid.).207   
The ITP208 includes three separate tables which describe Auckland Transport’s 
performance measures.209  None of the tables fully align with each other and only 
some of the measures map to the Auckland Plan,210 covering only some of the 
transport-related indicators.211  Again, no attention is given to the outcome-oriented 
                                              
205
 Figure AVI.3; B2. 
206
 Figure AVI.3; D1-D2. 
207
 Figure AVI.3; D2 and D1 respectively. 
208
 Figure AVI.3; H2. 
209
 Figure AVI.3; D1-E1, D3-E3. 
210
 Figure AVI.3; B2. 
211
 Figure AVI.3; D1-D2. 
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areas that support the two key strategies within the ITP.212  In particular, it is unclear 
how the metrics support the strategy to manage the region’s transportation as ‘One 
System’.213 
Similarly, none of the second-order plans214 reference the measures within the 
ITP.215  Instead the Parking Strategy,216 AMP,217 RLTP,218 and the RPTP219 all 
reference the SOI.220  But few actually marry with the current SOI (Auckland 
Transport, 2014e),221 and this appears to be an artefact of the SOI being refreshed 
annually.222  The AMP does link its performance measures to parts of the Auckland 
Plan and ITP, and this assists legibility and transparency between these levels.223  
                                              
212
 Figure AVI.3; I1-I2. 
213
 Figure AVI.3; I1. 
214
 Figure AVI.3; AMP (C5), RLTP (D5), RPTP (I5), Parking Strategy (J5). 
215
 Figure AVI.3; H2. 
216
 Figure AVI.3; J5. 
217
 Figure AVI.3; C5. 
218
 Figure AVI.3; D5. 
219
 Figure AVI.3; I5. 
220
 Figure AVI.3; H5. 
221
 Represented by the orange infill within the measures:  see AMP (A3-C3, A7-C7), RLTP (D4-
F4, D6-F6), RPTP (I3-J3, I5-J5), Parking Strategy (J5). 
222
 The current SOI measures (Figure AVI.3; G4-G5, H4-H5) do map to the six ITP impact areas 
(Figure AVI.3; H1-H2), and to some of the other result areas (missing from earlier iterations of 
the SOI).  However, it largely does not map directly to the measures set out within the ITP 
(Figure AVI.3; D1-E1, D3-E3).  Instead, a new tranche of measures is introduced (but not 
explained), which relate to improving customer outcomes (Figure AVI.3; G4 connecting to D2).    
The SOI includes a table which sets out how the latest iteration of strategies will make a 
secondary contribution to wider Auckland Plan objectives.  This is helpful as it establishes an 
explicit link.  However, the change has not been reflected in the measures, nor have the 
‘threads’ been followed through to the ITP or other documents for consistency. 
223
 Provided in a table within the AMP, but not indicated by Figure AVI.3). 
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However, whilst it looks comprehensive, there are both inconsistencies, gaps, and 
disconnects.  Many of the measures also rely on general satisfaction surveys which 
can be problematic (Chapter 7). 
AVI.1.4 Changing strategic direction 
This Section briefly comments on the ‘Auckland Transport Map of Performance 
Indicators:  Statement of Intent 2014-2017’ (Figure AVI.4). Grid references, linking 
to the referenced figures have been provided to assist the reader.  As noted above, 
only key points are described for brevity. 
The refreshing of the SOI224 provided an opportunity to consider the implications a 
change in strategy can have on a complex, strategic framework.  A third ‘strategic 
map’ was therefore prepared (see Figure AVI.4).  Comparison with the map of the 
latest SOI (Figure AVI.3; previous section) shows a change in explicit and inferred 
connections with both the Auckland Plan and the ITP,225 and a change in alignment 
with second-order plans and measures.226   
Even this simplest of comparisons highlights the need to provide for iteration of 
strategic documents and for the ‘threads’ of change to be followed through to their 
logical conclusion within the wider system.  This is almost a necessity for a complex 
system, and continual iteration and adjustment of multiple parts is to be expected 
(Section 1.2).  This need was recognised within the organisation, but at the same 
time, it was observed that there can be a tendency to ‘write another strategy 
document’ to address any perceived shortfalls.  That, of course, simply adds to the 
complexity (and the challenge of aligning and iterating documents), and in enabling 
the system to adapt and evolve at the pace required. 
                                              
224
 Located within H2, for both Figures AVI.3 and AVI.4. 
225
 Located within B2 and H2 respectively, for both Figures AVI.3 and AVI.4. 
226
 For both of Figures AVI.3 and AVI.4; AMP (A3-C3, A7-C7), RLTP (D4-F4, D6-F6), RPTP (I3-
J3, I5-J5), Parking Strategy (J5). 
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AVI.1.5 What is missing 
Aside from any disconnects and omissions already mentioned, many general 
operational areas do not have much of a presence within strategic plans.  This 
appears to include the Auckland Transport Operations Centre and functions such 
as: 
 road corridor access; 
 network maintenance; 
 community transport (including TDM); 
 property; 
 communications; and  
 business technology.   
It is not clear how these parts of the organisation contribute to the delivery of 
organisational outcomes (how they fit, enhance, or could adversely affect these).  
Moreover, this touches on the matter of the clarity of accountabilities and so risks 
acts of both commission and omission (Ackoff, 1971), particularly when 
performance management is also considered. 
It is also not clear why certain strategic directives from the Auckland Plan have 
been emphasised and others omitted.  In particular, directives relating to rural 
areas and the balancing of place and movement are two areas that do not appear 
to be well connected within the various plans.  Connectivity of strategies and the 
coupling with performance measures seems to be a factor in the visibility and 
follow-through (or cascade) of directives throughout the organisation. 
There is also a temporal element missing here.  This relates to the synchronisation 
of the various plans, the ability to review and adjust strategy (including the 
prioritisation framework and criteria), and mechanisms for capturing feedback at 
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this level.227  But the feedback needs to be firstly enabled.  This cannot occur if 
there are disconnects and a lack of clarity in the strategic framework. 
Finally, there is the opportunity to improve both the simplicity and clarity of the 
strategic framework.  Of those spoken to, all observed that the framework was 
complex and that it was hard to understand how it all fitted together.  However, this 
is not singular to Auckland Transport (Chapter 3).   
AVI.2 Benefit visibility 
This Section presents results from the analysis of Auckland Transport board 
documentation.  Particular attention was given to the distinction between benefits 
and features, as well as the prevalence of benefit delivery (and feedback).  The 
sub-sections that follow relate to the coding schedule set out within Section 5.2.  
Each are discussed in turn before turning to the other matters to emerge. 
AVI.2.1 Benefits documentation 
Overall, ‘benefits’ did not occupy much of the board documentation.228  As already 
noted, this might not necessarily be a problem, as there is nothing to suggest that 
any given proportion is appropriate.  But where benefits did receive coverage, this 
was often quite circumspect or repetitious.  For example the ‘alignment with 
strategy’ section of the monthly patronage reports were the same for January–June 
2015 [AT15b; AT15c; AT15d; AT15e; AT15f; AT15g].  Again, whilst repetition is not 
necessarily inappropriate, the point is that these contribute to the overall ‘benefit 
                                              
227
 None of the documents discussed how the measures would be used to feed back into 
processes or to adjust strategy.  This passive collection of data — even when evaluated relative 
to success thresholds — does not in itself result in a change of behaviour, and/or evolution. 
228
 In addition to the manifest content analysis (Section 6.2), NVivo was used to test and cross-
check the dominance of benefits- and outcome-related terms.  Board documents contained 
1,000 frequently used words.  The maximum weighted percentage was 1.31% (transport).  The 
term ‘benefits’ does not appear until number 320 (AMETI occurs at position 318; 0.05% ); 
confirming at the word-level, what was seen through coding, that benefits are not very visible at 
board level. 
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coverage’.  Discussion of benefits accounted for less than 2% of all board 
documentation, and was often brief and generalised: 
Various projects are underway that directly align to the improvement of 
Customer Services. [AT12c] 
Strategic Context:  The EMU and EMU M&SF projects address the SoI 
target regarding "prioritising and optimising investment across transport 
modes". [AT13b] 
In the case of a project within a programme of works, the programme itself was 
often the sole justification for the project without review or reflection.  Not only does 
this lack of detail inhibit benefit management and feedback, but, given the issues at 
the strategic framework level described previously, is a brittle approach.  
Finally, the organisation persists in describing its achievements using features.  
Whilst this has its place, it does not further one’s understanding of what has been 
achieved as “transportation is not an end in itself” (Auckland Transport, 2012a, p. 
8).  However, there were several good examples from community transport [AT13a; 
AT13d], the network optimisation programme [AT15h], the regional cycle 
programme [AT12i], and road corridor maintenance [AT11a].  These examples 
were notable for establishing the: 
 drivers for change; 
 benefits being sought; 
 proposed features and actions; and  
 outcomes that had been achieved (rather than the features delivered).   
What was not apparent from the available documentation is how these individual 
areas/initiatives act upon each other and influence the benefits at the system level. 
Notwithstanding the examples of good practice, the relative lack of benefit visibility 
at the board level is surprising.  There was no sense of benefits being tracked or 
followed through.  Consequently, there is no sense of where outcomes are either 
being delivered well, or being compromised.  Rather, the overall emphasis is on the 
establishment of actions and the delivery of features on time and on budget.  Given 
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the lack of benefit visibility, this project management-oriented approach is redolent 
of the red queen: running frantically without moving forward (Carroll, 1954).   
AVI.2.2 Infrastructure lifecycle/organisational structure 
Strategy 
Analysis of the board documentation shows that the issues identified with the 
strategic framework (previous section) are not new: 
Some submitters were concerned at an apparent lack of alignment 
between the RLTP, the Auckland Plan and the [Long Term Plan…] 
funding allocations [...] do not reflect the transformational shifts and 
targets identified as priorities in the Auckland Plan. [AT12g] 
Overall, the SOI should be a statement which first and foremost aligns 
the Auckland Plan. [AT12h] 
Links between documents need to be explicit so that they are transparent, and 
clearly defined for the organisation as a whole.  Otherwise, meaning could get lost 
in translation or manipulated to suit divisional objectives and drivers (e.g. Johnston 
& Pongatichat, 2008; Perrow, 1961). 
Many strategic documents are dominated by programme/project lists, or actions 
driven out of performance measures as proxies for outcomes, and thence financial 
reporting (e.g. Auckland Transport, 2013a, 2015c).  However, the documents do 
not cohesively work together and nor is there always a clear connection between 
strategic intent and the listed programme of works.  For example, whilst the 2012 
draft SOI set out a programme of action (which anticipated the ITP four step 
intervention process), it gave no basis for its prioritisation of works [AT12h].  For 
someone to understand the justification, they would have needed to await the issue 
of the ITP in 2013 (which advised a prioritisation framework was being developed), 
and later, the inclusion of the framework within the 2015 RLTP (by which time the 
2012 SOI had been superseded).  Issues with linking strategy/benefits and projects 
are also evident: 
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Auckland Transport should show how each item in the Programme of 
Action relates to the relevant Progress and Performance Measure. 
[AT11b] 
Another aspect dominating strategic coverage was statutory- and compliance-
related requirements, which often comprised only a brief summary of legislative 
drivers (and was often the sole strategic justification for a course of action).  
Otherwise, a significant proportion of statutory/compliance coverage was given 
over to consultation summaries and other related documentation.  However, it was 
not clear that the requirement to consult was being sufficiently differentiated from 
the identification of community and customer need.   
Operations 
Operational material dominated board reporting and was itself dominated by the 
monthly reporting of public transport patronage data (see the performance and 
feedback section to follow).  Issues associated with operational strategy and 
individual initiatives have been largely canvassed under strategy and projects 
respectively.  The operational area was also responsible for some of the better 
examples of benefit assessment and reporting at board level (discussed earlier).   
Capital development 
Capital development material largely focused on the delivery of features, their cost, 
and the programme of works.  At face value this is, perhaps, reasonable as project 
benefits/dis-benefits will have been subject to a high level of scrutiny through the 
business case, BCR assessment, and — typically — some form of statutory 
approval process.  However, there is a sense that once approved, the project is 
treated as inherently beneficial. 
Board-level project initiation processes appear to occur within either closed 
sessions or a separate sub-committee, as there was little in the way of related 
documentation available.  Unfortunately, this does not assist in understanding or 
managing the benefits, and nor does it help process transparency, benefit 
evaluation and follow-up.  This approach provides no indication of why these 
projects were needed, and what they are intended to achieve or by when, and what 
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other parts of the organisation or the ‘One System’ they might affect.  Furthermore 
— as discussed below — this ‘inherent goodness’ can misdirect. 
Similarly, the aggregated board-level reporting of the BCR does not enable benefits 
to be managed or subsequently evaluated.  Moreover, the BCR is an investment 
decision-making tool, and does not necessarily provide: 
 For long-term operational requirements, or cover all benefits (which often relied 
upon an assumed frequency/level of service; Chapter 6).   
 Any indication of whether the right benefits are being delivered, and what is 
being compromised (Damart & Roy, 2009). 
This last point is particularly relevant to scope change decisions: simply reporting a 
change in the BCR gives no indication of whether the project will still deliver the 
outcomes that were either intended/required.   
Overall, project initiation and other go/no go decision-making, together with scope 
change, received very little coverage within board documentation.  Any discussion 
that did occur was not specific enough for long-term benefits to be understood, 
managed, or verified.  This raises several significant questions: 
 What is the basis being used to approve or vary projects (i.e. how do they 
connect to strategy/how are they being expected to transform the current 
system)? 
 How are benefits then being articulated to projects? 
 How can projects be held accountable for benefits and outcomes? 
 What is the purpose and benefit of a stage-gate benefit realisation and 
management system in this context? 
 What interventions delivered the expected benefits, what didn’t work, and what 
could be improved next time?  
 If not the board, then who is responsible for closing the system-level strategic 
loop? 
AVI.2.3 Performance and feedback 
The 2012/2015 RLTP (Auckland Transport, 2012a, p. 44) advises project outcomes 
will be evaluated against a yet-to-be-developed ITP framework, which will reflect 
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the applicable statutory instruments and provide a series of key performance 
indicators (KPIs), to “measure changes in transport system performance as a result 
of the investment”.  Crucially, whilst the ITP does include performance monitoring, it 
does not provide: 
 monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for the performance of programmes and 
projects; and 
 any system-level feedback and evaluation mechanisms (other than the 
reporting of data). 
The effects of this could be seen within the way in which performance data was 
presented.  Performance reporting comprises much of the board documentation, 
with monthly updates of regional metrics (such as road fatalities) and public 
transport patronage.  Whilst this is not entirely inappropriate — for complex 
systems should, ultimately, be goal seeking (Ackoff, 1971) — as just noted, there 
are issues with the current approach from a benefits management perspective: 
 Performance targets were initially missing from reported data.  It wasn’t until 
2013 that either targets or forecasts started to appear [e.g. AT13f].  What is not 
clear is whether the actual patronage data, for example, is actively used to 
readjust those same forecasts. 
 Performance reports frequently described reasons why targets may have been 
suppressed for any given month: 
- these descriptions do not appear to extend to ‘lessons learned’, changes in 
organisational processes, or interventions to address these issues.  This 
potentially reduces the use of performance measures as a driver for 
behaviour change and outcomes.  Whilst there was evidence that targets 
had been adjusted over time (e.g. thresholds had been attained), this is not 
a new issue and one the board itself has recognised: 
Patronage is the most important KPI for [public transport] and AT is 
already behind on the SOI KPI target. 
The Chairman noted this is not a new problem and simply restating the 
problem will not solve it [...] More understanding about the root causes 
of this is needed and must be addressed [in a paper].  The paper 
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needs to address not only what will be done but most importantly how 
actions will be undertaken and why it is believed they will work.  He re-
emphasised that AT needs to be a customer led organisation which 
will require a mindset change within the organisation. [AT12j] 
- with a single exception, patronage growing events or interventions such as 
the opening of a piece of major public transport infrastructure, the addition of 
a new ferry service, or the electrification of the rail network, do not appear to 
have been identified.  Consequently, the success or otherwise of these 
initiatives and/or projects cannot be gauged over time.  Yet understanding 
whether they have been delivered may be fundamental: 
Approximately 90% of the benefits arise from increased patronage, 
with most of the balance coming from a reduction in operating costs. 
[AT12b] 
 Responsibility for KPIs, notably public transport patronage, does not appear to 
be shared across the organisation.  In the public transport patronage example, 
there was no mention of how or whether other parts of the business such as 
road corridor maintenance or capital development were either assisting or 
impeding outcomes.  Similarly, whilst Strategy reports regional metrics such 
road fatalities, it is not clear how the various parts of the organisation either 
have responsibility for, or are contributing to the broader organisational 
objectives.  System-level outcomes may therefore be being compromised, 
opportunities missed, or data is simply being collated and reported. 
 The analysis of the board documentation highlighted issues with the way in 
which performance data is being presented and then used to develop benefits.  
The focus was often on whether performance against the target has increased 
or decreased, and so is relatively passive; lessons or changes to organisational 
behaviour do not appear within the board documentation.  For example, what 
can be learned from potential/new customers (i.e. those not targeted by 
satisfaction surveys), or from dis-satisfied customers: 
The customer satisfaction rating for [...] car parks was 72%, an 
increase from the December 2012 rating of 68%. [AT13e] 
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Other than general performance reporting, feedback comprises relatively little of the 
board documentation.  Much of the general feedback relates to plan or network 
consultation (driven by statutory considerations), or financial performance.  
Examples of good practice do exist in parts of the organisation, as discussed 
already, and the ex post assessment of AMETI Stage 1 is discussed below. 
In 2013, a project auditing framework was developed by the organisation [AT13h].  
This included benefit realisation, and was aimed at major projects.  Although the 
framework provided for interim and post-project audits, there were no audit results 
in the available board documentation.  This is at odds with the aim of the framework 
to provide “independent and objective assurance to the Chief Executive, the 
Finance and Risk Committee [...] and the Board that Auckland Transport’s financial 
and operational controls are designed and implemented to manage risks and 
achieve Auckland Transport’s objectives” (Ibid.). 
AVI.2.4 AMETI visibility at board level 
Manifest content analysis (Sections 3.1, 5.2) showed AMETI was often mentioned 
but rarely in any detail.  Once approved, projects gather momentum, and from the 
documentation, benefits are taken as a given.  This can be problematic when the 
objectives or scope changes, and in the absence of feedback processes.  
Treatment of TDM provided an example of inconsistency between board and 
project documentation (also see Chapter 6).  For example, the project stated that 
TDM was integral to the design and the assumed baseline condition.  By contrast 
the RLTP advised TDM was to be investigated, and whilst the community transport 
team noted the completion of some AMETI-related TDM activities, these did not 
align with project commitments.   
The 2014 AMETI Stage 1 update [AT14d] reported that there was:   
 99% satisfaction with the Panmure Station; 
 a 57% increase in passengers since opening; and 
 an increase in bus/train transfers. 
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A further survey of those using the newly opened Panmure station found: 
Almost all respondents are satisfied overall with the newly-upgraded 
stations, 97% at both Panmure and Mt Albert stations [...] Just less than 
a third of customers (32% for Panmure [...]) are very satisfied with the 
station overall [... …] 
The results are now being used by Operations staff to look at 
infrastructure improvements.229 [AT14a] 
This is one of the few examples to show a cross-departmental linkage and 
purposeful feedback.  However, the report did not indicate whether the feedback 
included those delivering the remainder of the AMETI programme (or, for that 
matter, other Auckland Transport projects).  It also points to ‘corrective’ action 
being required on new infrastructure to meet operational need, and hence to 
additional expenditure (but gives no specific details of either).  Again, it is not clear 
whether this has fed back into the wider organisation.  Such expenditure is unlikely 
to be considered OPEX (Chapter 6), but the costs will still need to be ‘absorbed’.  
This will either affect opportunities/levels of service in other areas, or the intended 
levels of service (and therefore the benefits) may not be realised for the project in 
question.   
AVI.2.5 Other matters 
Five secondary matters also emerged from this part of study (discussed in turn 
below). 
Management of dis-benefits 
Rarely, the board documentation would identify system constraints and/or possible 
project dis-benefits.  What was not clear from any of the documents was whether: 
 Such constraints: 
- are requested/identified as a matter of course; 
                                              
229
 The survey report did not detail the improvements/actions. 
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- are required to look beyond the immediate project or programme to the 
wider system and high-level objectives; 
- get communicated to the wider organisation (so, as a minimum, they are 
understood and not a surprise). 
 Appropriate responses or strategies evolved to avoid, address, isolate or 
mitigate the dis-benefits to the wider organisation. 
Customer need 
Strategy development is currently dominated by the hard infrastructure typology, 
and did not appear to step back and ask fundamental questions around customer 
need.  Whilst this is not the same as consultation on a proposed strategy, the 
consultation process does provide insights into how this might affect outcomes: 
 The RLTP includes a project prioritisation process, with a given set of criteria, 
yet changes arising from the consultation process do not appear to be subject 
to evaluation: 
A number of submissions [...] were critical of the focus of transport 
expenditure on the city centre [...] Rural areas in particular perceived 
that they receive little benefit from expensive city centre projects, while 
the programme contains limited funding for rural priorities such as seal 
extensions, the provision of footpaths, and basic maintenance. 
Panel Recommendations: 
 Highlight region-wide benefits from major central city projects… 
 Make specific allocation to rural areas for seal extensions [AT12g] 
Whilst the choice might be appropriate, it cannot be determined why seal 
extensions were chosen from the list of issues, and whether this choice is 
appropriate to all rural communities and current needs (see Chapter 7). 
 Consultation on the second generation of the RLTP [AT15a] included the 
following general feedback: 
It is apparent to the team that many of the people making submissions 
and/or attending Have Your Say Events are significantly misinformed 
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about transport or have good information but still have a particular 
perspective and have expressed their particular view [...] The following 
are examples of some of the things people believe:230 
 Public transport is not subsidised at all [...] 
 Fare evasion is widespread on the train networka 
 The train network is dangerous to personal safety [...] 
 That [Auckland Transport (AT)] has no idea what the community needs 
are around public transport
b
 
 AT is a huge bloated bureaucracy that does nothingc [...] 
Points a–c were used to explore how this might affect the ability of the organisation 
to achieve its strategic objectives: 
a) Fare evasion is widespread on the train network:  Of the 765 coded board 
documents, the words ‘evade’, ‘evading’, and/or ‘evasion’ occurred in 73 
(~10%) documents 181 times.  In 2012, the board requested a “vigorous 
campaign to deal with fare evasion” [AT12a]; the subject was addressed in 
most of the business reports and monthly public transport patronage reports 
for 2014.  This might suggest the organisation is as concerned about the 
issue as its community (belief dimension). 
For completeness, it is noted that a farebox recovery ratio is also currently a 
performance indicator within both the latest SOI and the RPTP (Auckland 
Transport, 2014e, 2015f).  Whilst this indicator is aimed at factors such as 
increased patronage, commercial arrangements, operational efficiency, and 
fare subsidies, it is easy to understand how fare evasion could be viewed as 
being a part of this. 
  
                                              
230
 In Chapter 3, the point was made that precepts (or belief) are one of the dimensions of an 
infrastructure problem.  The others are needs, choices, and aptitudes.  All four emerged from 
this analysis, and is the reason these examples have been included (i.e. it is the latent not the 
manifest content being considered here). 
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b) Auckland Transport has no idea what the community needs are around 
public transport:  It was only in 2013 that there was evidence that work on 
customer need had begun (giving attention to the dimensions of need and 
choice), and has since been an ongoing and emergent process: 
This is the first time AT has undertaken a comprehensive review of 
customer attitudes and behaviour [...] The research will help to develop 
a more detailed profile of people and cycling in Auckland, will guide 
promotions planning and provide useful information into [...] Community 
Transport. [AT13c] 
Similar work in the public transport area commenced at roughly the same 
time with the Customer Experience Programme [AT13; AT13g], and 
development of the new bus networks.  The latter involved both preliminary 
consultation and an active approach to resolving submitter issues [AT12d; 
AT14c]. 
What was not clear from the available documentation was: 
 whether customer need initiatives have since influenced strategy;  
 how this information is now being used — not just by the one 
department with an interest in the given area — but right across 
the organisation;  
 how this is being communicated externally; and 
 how this evidence-base is being managed and refreshed over 
time. 
c) Auckland Transport is a huge bloated bureaucracy that does nothing:  
The board documents/organisational reports generated numerous actions 
and collate ‘lots of data’, but offer relatively little in the way of insight into 
organisational outcomes.  This tendency to deflect, rather than to reflect upon 
the feedback and change (aptitude dimension) is perhaps a missed learning 
and (r)evolutionary opportunity for the organisation. 
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As the organisation has matured, it has placed greater emphasis on customer 
outcomes.  Customer feedback, whilst required of local government in many 
circumstances, offers the organisation a valuable insight into customer need and 
perception, and so offers an opportunity to adjust itself rather than the customer so 
that long-term outcomes might be better achieved. 
Dissemination and follow-through of initiatives 
Several key initiatives were traced through the available reports with the aim of 
tracing organisational implications.  Unfortunately, follow-up reporting rarely 
occurred; the notable exception being the corridor optimisation process discussed 
previously. In the absence of the opportunity to learn, adapt, and inform other parts 
of the organisation, any initiative becomes nothing more than an isolated action if it 
is not followed through. 
It is unclear how the organisation, and its board, keep track of all the initiatives and 
then close the loop so that value can be extracted from these.  In the least, there 
would appear to be merit in a register of initiatives, with reporting timeframes, and a 
requirement to present outcomes.  However, this would only be a superficial 
response, and something more is required that enables the organisation to retain 
knowledge, use feedback, and to learn.  Otherwise, the current approach simply 
reinforces the ‘red queen’-like culture. 
‘Misdirecting’ outcomes 
Some organisational services tend to report ‘practice performance’, rather than 
relate this to organisational outcomes: 
Online campaign evaluation of the central corridors initiative saw a 44% 
prompted recognition; nearly half (44%) consider it innovative, 26% bold 
and 30% friendly. [AT14b] 
Whilst this is useful at one level, it can direct attention away from organisational 
goals.  Even if unintended, the practice may give the impression that progress has 
been made, when this might not be the case.  This makes it difficult to understand 
how outcomes are being changed or benefits effected.   
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Where reporting was outwardly focused, this was more helpful in describing the 
benefits that had been delivered: 
86% thought the campaign/event was likely to encourage people to stay 
sober when driving [...] 63% said the event got them more determined to 
arrange non-drinking driver. [AT12d] 
Inherent benefits 
The documents also show an inclination to treat certain modes and initiatives as 
‘inherently beneficial’: 
 electrification of trains is good for the environment;  
 any safety improvement project is beneficial; and 
 walking and cycling, and anything that increases public transport must be 
beneficial for the transport system and the environment. 
These statements may well hold true, but may not always be the case and 
obscures conflicts with other parts of the system.  This was difficult to pinpoint 
because the assumed position is implicit, and where this arises, the documents 
remain superficial.  This issue becomes apparent where there is no testing of the 
inherent benefit or ‘goodness’ of the proposal beyond budgetary constraints, which 
is often signalled by the cursory assessment of strategic context and 
project/programme drivers (discussed previously).  Where a BCR is given, it is not 
unbundled, and so any wider benefits are not transparent.  The issue is then further 
reinforced through the lack of consideration given to the wider implications of an 
action or initiative.  This can be limiting when there may be a balance between 
movement and place, urban and rural, localised environmental effects and global 
targets.   
State highway revocations 
At the other end of the infrastructure lifecycle (albeit a new asset for Auckland 
Transport) are the State highway revocations [e.g. AT12e; AT12f], where OPEX 
was assessed/reported, but: 
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 Decisions did not appear to be subject to criteria consistent with that used by 
the organisation elsewhere (e.g. project selection and prioritisation).   
 It was not clear whether the amount agreed with the NZTA for remedial work, or 
the estimated OPEX included any provision for integrating the new asset into 
the strategic framework or to otherwise bring the asset in line with Auckland 
Transport levels of service (not just for asset management, but across the 
organisation; Chapter 6). 
Board documentation did not include material relating to the vesting of assets, so is 
an area for further research.  
AVI.3 Project-level benefit management 
The matter of benefit management within the AMETI project was touched upon as 
part of the cOPEX study (Chapter 6).  Four broad themes emerged from a more 
detailed analysis of the benefit-related content of the available project 
documentation.  Each is explored below, except for deferred benefits, which is 
discussed within Chapter 6. 
AVI.3.1 How objectives and benefits are articulated over time 
AMETI has been ‘in the pipeline’ for a significant period, so has been exposed to 
changes in strategic direction, including that arising from regional amalgamation.  
This change is not always easy to trace: some of the documents contained different 
versions of objectives, and it was not clear from the documentation whether (or 
how) the project reacted.  Various design documents, for example, did note altered 
features between design stages, but these were not explicitly linked to strategic 
direction or other drivers. 
Programme and project benefits have been captured in documents used to engage 
the Auckland community.  These create another layer of expressed and, perhaps 
more importantly, expected benefits.  This is reinforced by the Programme Initiation 
Document, which states that one of the project measures is organisational 
reputation (Auckland Transport, 2014c). 
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Existing tools and frameworks such as PRINCE2231 (Turley, 2010) already 
emphasise the need for benefits to be articulated clearly, so this is a recognised 
issue.  However, benefits are not merely a high-level list of objectives.  Moreover, 
when viewed in concert with the earlier analysis (Sections AVI.1-AVI.2), this 
underlines the need for complete integration across the organisation, and for 
changes to instigate a systemic review so that the broader implications can be 
understood.  Arguably, there is not always the time or the resources for this, and 
reality will often dictate the need to compromise.  Either way, the rationale and 
implications of the decision need to be documented to inform future decision-
makers. 
Parsons (1995, p. 47) reminds us that Schön has already drawn attention to this 
gap between institutions and problems:  
Institutions, he argued, have an 'inertial life of their own' and the 
problems of today all too often take place in institutional contexts that 
are fifty years and more out of date.  Second, Schön argued that as 
change is so important a process to understand, the critical question to 
ask was how can we develop systems which best provide for learning 
and adaptation?  There was, he maintained, not an 'information gap': 
there was no shortage of evidence, information and data.  The deficit 
was less to do with information than our capacity for public and private 
learning.  Schön focuses on the issue of learning rather than the idea of 
knowing: on the learning rather than the information or evidence gap 
and the gap between institutions and problems. 
This is where current benefit realisation approaches could misdirect with their 
emphasis on data warehousing (Sammon, Adam, & Carton, 2003). 
In this vein, Auckland Transport also runs the risk of dragging ‘legacy contexts’ into 
the new organisation.  Ultimately, as the context and/or benefits change, the 
organisation needs to be able to follow the ‘threads’ to their logical conclusion: back 
to strategy and out through the project delivery process. 
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 A process-based method for project management. 
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AVI.3.2 How benefits are managed through the design and delivery 
process 
Benefits are intrinsic to the investment and funding process, and accordingly, the 
organisation’s approach was to assign accountability for the management of 
benefits to the finance function of the project.  However, it should not be assumed 
that benefits are expressed in the same way from the perspective of funding and 
organisational strategy: funding reflected NZTA requirements and appeared to be 
largely driven out of the traffic modelling, whereas project objectives were 
espoused in terms of a modal shift and multi-modal outcomes.   
The addition of benefits to the conventional ‘iron triangle’ of project management, is 
now an intrinsic part of project management tools such as PRINCE2 (e.g. Turley, 
2010), and is reinforced by the stage-gate tools such as Gateway (State Services 
Commission, 2010, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e).  Although there was no 
formal benefit realisation process in place for Stage 1 of the AMETI programme, 
the project review process did include the scope and terms of reference to enable 
sufficient focus on outcomes and benefits.  However, this did not transpire, at least 
as documented in the available material.232  
As the project developed, there also did not appear to be any schedule of proposed 
outcomes and benefits, much less an understanding of how these were followed 
through.  This was particularly important for the statutory documents, within which 
the wider strategic drivers and requirements are a key component.  Within the 
design documentation, the main focus appeared to be upon the development and 
delivery of features.  Any discussion on strategic context sometimes came later in a 
document, and often relied on generalised statements to ‘broadly align’ features 
with outcomes.  This lack of documented follow-through became manifestly obvious 
when trying to schedule and then price the cOPEX (Chapter 6). 
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 It is not the place of this research to assess why this might be so. 
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
CMB150717_E Appendix VI 299 
AVI.3.3 How the benefit realisation process aligns with strategic intent 
and assessed benefits 
Although AMETI has an established set of programme objectives, up until recently, 
there was no formal process for benefit management as a purposeful activity within 
the programme.  Furthermore, whilst a benefit management framework did exist 
within the organisation, this was not widely known, less used (see above).  Indeed, 
in Chapter 6 areas are pinpointed where the project’s benefits had either not been 
delivered or were unlikely to be sustained in the absence of budgets and 
organisational exigencies.   
The lack of a formal benefit management process was also noted by an audit of the 
second stage of the project (Controller and Auditor-General, 2015).  Although a 
programme ‘benefits realisation plan’ has now been prepared (Auckland Transport, 
2014a), the plan does not: 
 identify the necessary baseline surveys and data needed to enable an ex post 
assessment of benefits to be completed; 
 provide benchmarks, targets to enable outcomes to be assessed (this detail 
was to be ‘further refined’ and not available within the version of the Plan 
provided); 
 follow up on the specific problems the project was expected to solve (some of 
these are set out within the Benefits Realisation Plan itself); 
 revisit or otherwise utilise the benefits assessed within: 
- the BCR process; 
- statutory documents.  These include benefits that have been expressed at 
multiple levels; from strategic goals through to technical/disciplinary 
outcomes, through to specific mitigation to avoid dis-benefits and negative 
outcomes; 
 consider long-term, system-wide, operational requirements such as whole-of-life 
costs, or levels of service; 
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 establish a framework for the management of dis-benefits (plus any interface 
with risk management processes);233 
 address community feedback and expectation; 
 attempt to reconcile these with the overarching transformations being sought 
from the programme as a whole; 
 state how the assessed benefits will feed back into: 
- subsequent project stages; 
- the operational system and definition of strategy; 
- consequential projects and programmes; 
- organisational processes such as the assessment and calculation of the 
BCR on future projects. 
It would be easy to argue that the open wording of Gateway and benefit 
management processes provide for such matters to be addressed.  This is true.  
However, matters such as salience, perception, the scope of existing processes 
and terms of reference can all influence what actually gets considered at the end of 
the day.   
AVI.4 Influencing change 
Figure AVI.5 shows the output from the ‘influencing change’ workshop 
(Section 5.2).  Whilst very much organisation-specific, the broad themes are useful 
to reflect upon given the shared issues across New Zealand local government 
(Section 5.1) and even those expressed by the wider infrastructure industry 
(Chapter 3).   
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 Also, risk management will not necessarily cover this requirement as the project, in the New 
Zealand context at least, will be required to avoid, remedy, or mitigate significant adverse 
environmental effects. 
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Figure AVI.5:  Practitioner mapping of required change 
Notes:  Node and edge (connection) colouring denotes issue or factor communities.  Text size 
indicates level of influence.  These show the connectivity of issues/actions, establishing a 
hierarchy to assist the organisation prioritise its response. 
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APPENDIX VII:  DETAILED STUDY 2 ANALYSIS 
This Appendix presents a summary only.  For brevity, once the overarching findings 
from this study emerged, the detailed analysis was reduced to supporting examples 
only. 
AVII.1 Wider implications 
As several sources augmented this detailed study with the aim of broadening the 
approach and the study’s relevance (Section 6.2), this Appendix investigates the 
issues within their wider infrastructure context.   
AVII.1.1 General processes 
Information accessibility 
Although AMETI Stage 1 was opened in 2014, it proved difficult to obtain the 
information necessary for this exercise.  In particular: 
 there was no clear bundle of information aimed at operational matters or 
handover.  This had to be compiled, which took time and was incomplete.  
Missing information included, amongst other things, up-to-date as-built plans, 
management plans, and owner’s manuals; and 
 compliance requirements had to be retrieved from a consultant’s archive, and 
did not show a complete document or decision trail. 
Compounding this further is the practice of archiving of project files upon 
completion of the delivery stage and the lack of staff continuity within the 
organisation and its advisers between stages.  Access to information is obviously 
necessary and important to inform future decisions.  This becomes more so in the 
absence of a comprehensive or complete operational schedule and budgets, as 
these must be derived from first principles.  This was the case here (see also 
Auckland Transport, 2015d), but is not a singular experience (Anguillid Consulting 
Engineers and Scientists Ltd, 2008, 2010, 2012).  The advent of information 
systems has not necessarily helped either, as both AMETI and the above-
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referenced ‘legacy studies’ encountered issues with the coding and filing of 
information, document retrieval from data management systems, the completeness 
and accuracy/reliability of the archive, and staff creating separate filing systems as 
a work-around to these problems.  Moreover, at this point, filing structures reflect 
project delivery requirements, which are unlikely to be suitable for the long term.   
These are issues experienced by others: 
It’s just reliant on people remembering that there was something in there 
[...] There is some institutional knowledge that gets lost [PR26] 
So now we have [information technology (IT)] we have the ability to 
have all of this so that it’s organisational dependent, not person 
dependent [...] but we actually document less detail on a better IT 
system.  So the global effect is we pass less knowledge on and we 
cause more problems. [PR37] 
The Controller and Auditor-General (2010, p. 29), too, has also observed this: 
There is no central storage of hard-copy information about Auckland 
Harbour Bridge.  The information was held in various locations by 
several entities.  Historical information was held by the NZTA library, the 
Auckland Harbour Bridge Library, Opus International Consultants 
Limited, and Archives New Zealand. Current documentary information 
on the Bridge is primarily held by the specialist structural engineering 
consultants. 
There is no current requirement to update business case (ex ante) whole-of-life 
cost assessments as a project progresses, or to produce a final assessment of 
cOPEX at project completion.  Consequently, it is very difficult to know with any 
certainty that all project requirements and assets have been captured and 
integrated within operational schedules and processes.  This has flow-on effects 
into asset management, compliance, and risk management (for example).  It also 
affects knowledge transfer, learning, and adaptive capacity (Walshe, Harvey, 
Skelcher, & Jas, 2009), as other parts of the business may not know what they do 
not know, or need to know.  
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Issue salience and summing of the parts 
Three key issues emerged around salience:41 
 Project versus operational:  The available documentation showed a tendency 
to prioritise project management and ‘best for project’ delivery over operational, 
long-term, or system-level requirements or benefits.  This was, perhaps due in 
part to document purpose (e.g. business case, consent application).  
Conventional project objectives (programme, delivery cost, and safety and 
environmental compliance during construction), also conceivably contributed to 
this.   
 Functional focus versus systemic need:  Organisational belief-systems can 
lead to the establishment of assumed accountability boundaries and a belief 
that excluded matters are either dealt with elsewhere within the organisation 
and/or not the responsibility of a given functional area (Chapter 3).  The almost 
complete absence of any operational allowance for significant structures from 
the current schedule suggests this may be a contributing factor.234 
If the underlying question being asked of a local authority relates to an 
understanding of the consequential cost to the organisation and thence to 
ratepayers, then this must surely apply to the organisation as a whole, and 
without boundaries in the first instance.  Of course not everything is able to be 
readily quantified (next point), but even the boundaries which define the CAPEX 
and OPEX, whilst arguably logical, nonetheless have ‘fuzzy edges’ and 
therefore, it cannot be assumed that everything will be automatically included.  
Two examples to arise within this study is the cost of accommodating the 
project works, and the cost of completing project actions after practical 
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 But as will be discussed later, investment assessment processes may have also contributed 
to the omission. 
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completion (e.g. reinternment of kōiwi.235).236  Whilst these tasks might not be 
classified as cOPEX, these do need to be identified so that appropriate 
provision can be made and the boundaries of cOPEX better defined. 
The handling of service costs is another example.  The costs of public transport 
service improvements are managed separately, as these sit within another 
functional area.  However, OPEX is, by definition, the cost to the organisation, 
so there is sense in reporting an all-encompassing OPEX figure before 
assigning accountabilities across the organisation.  This should also improve 
transparency, performance feedback, and reduce the risk of omission or error. 
 Familiar versus less defined:  The ‘estimated cOPEX’ showed a bias towards 
assets conventionally found within the road asset management and 
maintenance (RAMM) database.237  For example, road painting had been 
estimated to the nearest dollar for the individual types of marking (e.g. turning 
arrow, give way symbol, chevron).  By contrast there was very little information 
on environmental mitigation or changes to public transport services.  This is as 
much the ability to estimate costs that are perceived as tangible, as it is the 
comfort or sense of certainty that might be derived from standard systems, 
check lists, or previous schedules.238  As Love, Lopez, Edwards, and Goh 
(2012, p. 102) note, familiarity may “provoke error” which “proliferates through 
an organisation”.  Several interviewees raised related issues: 
I’m not a big fan of the tick box because [...] it moves from a tool to a 
decision-making proxy and [...] I’ve seen the same thing in [RAMM] —
it’s very good if you want information on the pavements but [...] not so 
good if you want to capture the community aspirations and have those 
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 Human remains. 
236
 Auckland Transport has advised that the resolution of the outstanding Stage 1 
archaeological matters (which are not limited to the reinternment of kōiwi) is likely to take some 
time and could cost in the order of NZ$0.5M to resolve. 
237
 Widely used within New Zealand local government. 
238
 The ‘do what you measure’ conundrum (e.g. Senge (2006)). 
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change over time.  It doesn’t even record those so they get lost from the 
system [... …] I mean no one ever said that engineering tools took away 
engineering judgement. [PR29] 
I just see that it would be useful if the accounting system could actually 
assist good management by taking a wider definition on assets [... …] 
How can we have a negative depreciation? [...] How does the 
accounting norm allow for a more greening of the infrastructure 
approach? [PR26] 
Given these points, there is a risk, then, in using existing systems as the sole basis 
for determining cOPEX.  Certainly maintenance and other operational schedules 
should be used to cross check, but this study has shown that requirements are 
greater than the sum of the conventional or technical parts.  Furthermore, 
operational schedules and templates need to be revisited over time, and amended 
to reflect the specifics of any given project as it emerges into the wider system. 
Compliance 
Several compliance-related dimensions (and the environmental, social, and cultural 
matters to which this relates),239 were found, and span the infrastructure lifecycle: 
 integration of compliance-related matters within OPEX estimates; 
 the purpose of project documentation; 
 completion of project delivery requirements; 
 third party interfaces; and 
 consequential operational implications. 
The first of these is discussed below and expands the discussion on omissions 
from the previous Section.  The remaining points have been included in the 
relevant lifecycle sections that follow. 
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 Hereafter ‘environment’ encompassing all such matters —in line with s.2(1) RMA (1991). 
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Few environmental requirements were included within the ‘estimated cOPEX’ 
schedule.240  However, this is not just a matter of whether the estimates are 
accurate and budgets appropriate.  If requirements are not captured within the 
system, and budgets are a good indicator of this, then there is a real risk that 
requirements will not be implemented.  Compliance is more than a performance 
target or measure, it is a legal obligation that has consequences for offences 
(including, but not limited to, financial ones). 
This study highlights several process gaps for Auckland Transport.  Firstly, 
operational personnel are not involved in reviewing or approving long-term 
conditions.  Consequently, conditions were not only a surprise, they prompted a 
discussion as to how/whether these could be met.  For example the operational 
plan for Van Damm’s Lagoon241 states the pond will achieve 34% stormwater 
treatment, whereas project conditions actually require 75% treatment to be 
achieved (ARC, 2003; Auckland Council, n.d.; Opus International Consultants Ltd, 
2015).  Whilst rectifying this shortfall might not be OPEX, it nonetheless remains a 
cost to the organisation, and, if not identified early enough, will emerge as an 
operational issue given enough time.  In the meantime, because requirements have 
not been completed, the land attracts rates until such time the reserve status is 
able to be reinstated.  As this will be ‘absorbed’, the cost and impact of the 
underlying issue are unlikely to be identifiable and ‘known’, curtailing the ability to 
change and to avoid repetition. 
Secondly, the organisation needs the means of handing over, then managing long-
term compliance (it is understood Auckland Transport is currently developing a 
database for this).  However, as has been found on other projects, something more 
than this is required (Anguillid Consulting Engineers and Scientists Ltd, 2008, 
2010).242  For example, only some of the stipulated management plans had been 
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 Setting aside the all-encompassing requirement to maintain the asset in a good condition. 
241
 A complex site that includes a dam, wastewater pipe bridge, and ecological considerations. 
242
 Transferring requirements into a database is one thing, but it is the ability to embed or 
subsume a project into the system that is the key point here (proposition 1).  See also the 
previous point about the limitations of management tools. 
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prepared, it was not known whether these had reached those with ongoing 
accountabilities, or even where within the organisation these had gone.   
Compliance, like cOPEX, affects many parts of the organisation, and project-level 
requirements need to be congruently embedded at the ‘system’ level.  Budgets 
need to be provided — not only for activities such as ongoing monitoring or the 
maintenance of environmental mitigation — but also to allow for the renewal of 
long-term consents and the consequences of adaptive management.  Given the 
specificity of the conditions, it does not necessarily follow that all such costs are 
intangible as is sometimes believed.  Furthermore, omitted actions can be difficult 
to resurrect, not least because this may be seen as introducing ‘additional costs’, 
simply by adding a new budgetary line item rather than making a relatively minor 
incremental change to an existing one.  However, the implications of externalising 
effects upon the environment may not be ‘felt’ within the infrastructure organisation 
unless it is specifically set up to recognise these in the first place.  
AVII.1.2 Project strategy and planning 
Business case and funding 
Auckland Transport completed an assessment of whole-of-life costs as part of the 
Stage 1 Business Case for Construction (Auckland Transport, 2013b).  However, 
that estimate complies with the requirements of the NZTA cost estimation manual 
(NZTA, 2010), which defines ‘whole-of-life’ as the period from project investigation 
and reporting through to the end of construction.   
Auckland Transport subsequently assessed the whole-of-life costs for the complete 
AMETI programme as part of its Programme Initiation Document (Auckland 
Transport, 2014c).243  The document states that assessment was undertaken in 
general accordance with the requirements of the NZTA Economic Evaluation 
Manual (NZTA, 2013a), so is expressed as a net present value over a 40 year 
investment life, and uses the given NZTA discount rate of 6%.  However, the 
purpose of an economic evaluation should not be conflated with that of estimating 
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 Post-dating the start of Stage 1 construction. 
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cOPEX, as different drivers and levels of detail may be required.  Moreover, they 
are asking different ‘questions’.  In particular, the economic evaluation is 
specifically informing an investment decision and return on investment over a given 
period.  This is very distinct from any question of operating expenditure over the 
long term:  
 just because maintenance requirements fall outside of the 40 year assessment 
period at the end of the project/handover milestone does not mean that the 
costs do not exist or that it is valid to apply a static ‘snapshot’ assessment;  
 maintenance requirements often increase over time as assets age; and 
 budgets need to provide a rolling assessment and provision for maintenance 
over time. 
However, any inclusion of maintenance in such an assessment appears  to be an 
improvement on legacy practice (e.g. Maunsell/AECOM, 2007).   
Notwithstanding all of the above, there is a question-mark regarding the level of 
attention subsequently paid to any business case, its assumptions and estimates, 
once a project has been approved, much less whether those assumptions are 
revised and available to operations personnel.  This appears to be an issue on 
AMETI Stage 1, as no further assessment of the whole-of-life costs, beyond that 
just outlined, was included within the available documentation.   
Several of those interviewed as part of the preliminary research also made related 
observations, pointing to this being a wider infrastructure problem: 
I think [organisation] for example, is wading its way through a quagmire 
of latent infrastructure costs that haven’t surfaced yet […and] yesterday 
I met with [name] from the Board of [a second organisation…] they don’t 
have a very good fix on what the burden of costs will be on their 
infrastructure assets.  The week before I was with some of the Board 
members of [a third organisation] — it’s a very familiar story, it’s quite 
amazing! [PR42] 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) made similar observations regarding project CAPEX 
estimates.  Whilst Flyvbjerg et al. focus on the quality and ‘honesty’ of the 
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estimating process, this study is highlighting its complexity.  That complexity 
underlines the often overlooked necessity of identifying all needs and requirements 
as assessed from multiple perspectives. 
A number of central government initiatives have recently been launched to improve 
the preparation of business cases and the effectiveness of public expenditure.  
These include the Gateway Reviews promulgated by the State Services 
Commission (2010, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e), and Treasury’s Better 
Business Cases (e.g. The Treasury, 2015a; The Treasury, 2015b).244  The Better 
Business Case Framework introduces operational expenditure as a risk to be 
assessed at the stage of developing the indicative business case (The Treasury, 
2015a). Curiously, although the whole-of-life project or programme cost establishes 
a threshold above which the Gateway process is required or recommended, 
cOPEX is not specifically mentioned within the framework until Review 4:  
Readiness for Service (i.e. at completion of construction).245   
There appears then, to be significant scope to bolster frameworks to not only 
improve the transparency of the whole-of-life costs used within project-related 
strategic decision-making, but to specifically provide for an operationally focused 
framework.  Such a framework should be aimed at better informing strategic 
decision-making (after all, infrastructure strategy and governance is not limited to 
programme development and project delivery).  The need for organisation- or 
system-level operational documentation is a common theme that arises in many of 
the issues discussed in this Section. 
Project planning and approvals 
Much of the available project-related design documentation had been clearly 
prepared and structured with subsequent statutory processes in mind.  Whilst there 
is obviously a need for this, such documents, like those prepared for the business 
case and investment decision-making process, become the de facto project record.  
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 Both of which are based upon UK frameworks. 
245
 There is earlier mention of managing operational risk, but no specific prompt to detail the 
whole-of-life or operational costs. 
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This does not necessarily result in operational matters being given due 
consideration, and the organisation being alerted to long-term implications or 
requirements.  As was observed during industry interviews: 
We always find that if the planning hasn’t been done well, then the 
designers struggle, and [...] when it’s all commissioned and the [...] 
owner of whatever you’ve created then turns around and says well you 
didn’t take into account how you’re going to maintain this or, this or that. 
[PR27] 
Other than providing for the ‘maintenance and operation’ of the new asset, long-
term requirements were typically generic or focused on maintaining environmental 
mitigation measures.  Whilst it is expected that consent documentation would 
broadly consider the whole-of-life implications, such documents (like the business 
case) are shaped and limited by the specific requirements of those processes.  
What this does highlight, is the need for a project to be specifically assessed and 
documented to inform operations.  After all, a project is predicated on the basis of a 
system need and results in a change to that system, so it would surely be prudent 
to understand the implications of such a change. 
Benefit management 
cOPEX is also intrinsically entwined with the delivery of benefits, and particularly 
those that express themselves at the system level.  Simply put, if intended benefits 
are not delivered, cOPEX might be lower, but is not actually ‘reduced’ per se.  The 
corollary is additional benefits, additional features with no benefits, or benefits that 
do not align with strategic need or intent, can unduly increase cOPEX.   
An example relates to the delivery of travel demand management (TDM), which 
was to have underpinned the design: 
Once the residual traffic demand was estimated having accounted for 
the predicted impacts of [public transport] and TDM, the design of the 
infrastructure improvements commenced. (Opus International 
Consultants Ltd, 2008) 
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The cost of TDM initiatives and additional public transport services were not 
included as part of the estimated cOPEX (or available for inclusion in the amended 
estimate).  Yet these initiatives are a key underlying assumption supporting the 
effectiveness or the physical asset that was finally constructed.   
Auckland Transport is not alone in this, for example: 
Well I put it down [...] to incrementalism [...] no one’s ever gone back to 
date [...] and asked those first principled questions [...] what outcomes 
do we want to achieve from this project?  And does the solution we 
come up with actually deliver those outcomes, and if not, why not, and 
what should we do about it? [PR18] 
[Benefit delivery is] one of those things we’re getting better at […but] if 
you really go and interrogate the system, mnnn, not quite so sure. 
[PR47] 
The matter of benefit realisation and management was the subject of study 1 
(Chapter 5). 
AVII.1.3 Project delivery 
Design and construction procurement considerations 
Ongoing operational requirements either received only cursory consideration within 
the available documentation or, alternatively, left operators guessing by referencing 
long lists of design standards and guidelines (but gave no clue as to which 
particular part of these was to be used).  Such detail would better enable inspection 
and maintenance activities, and enable levels of service to be expressly articulated.  
Without this, the true cOPEX cannot be assessed, nor the implications of cuts to 
operational budgets fully understood.  Issues with the management of product or 
supplier warranties complicated this further (but have not been included for brevity). 
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Yet despite such issues, there is a suggestion that New Zealand does relatively 
well overall “maintaining a functioning transportation system at desired levels of 
service is part of the governmental ethic guiding planning and decisionmaking [sic]” 
(Federal Highways Administration, 2005, p. 17).  However, this does not cast light 
on whether operational levels of service bear any relationship to the design (or 
indeed, the strategic intent).  In populating the cOPEX schedule, Auckland 
Transport identified cases where project levels of service did not align with current 
requirements and organisational standards.   
Whilst the purpose of the study site visit was familiarisation, and not to audit the 
project in any way, it was apparent that there were areas where design choices will 
influence maintenance requirements.  Inevitably, there will be the need to 
compromise and the balancing of competing demands or design requirements in 
any given project.  However, maintenance requirements can obviously be assisted 
by purposeful consideration.  Irrespective of the underlying reasons for eventual 
design decisions, the fact remains that if maintenance is to occur (to deliver the 
envisaged or specified benefits), appropriate budgets need to be identified.  If the 
maintenance requires a scissor platform or rail closure, then this needs to be 
understood and appropriate budgets set aside.  This would then enable feedback to 
strategic and design decision-making. 
Industry interviews also gave rise to numerous examples arising from this part of 
the lifecycle.  All this points to an issue that is distinct from the current literature 
focus on engineering and design error, which predominantly views error as a 
departure from process (e.g. Busby, 2001; Love et al., 2012; Reason, 1995).  In 
this instance, a requirement to consider operational matters may not be explicit and 
even if it is, is not approached from the operator’s perspective (and there may be 
many of these within an infrastructure organisation), let alone that of the user or 
community it serves.  Something more is required than generic considerations of 
durability and robustness: an understanding of the organisational capability and 
capacity to resource the operation of new technologies through to changes to 
contracts, systems, processes, and budgets (for example).   
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Questions also need to be asked (and answered) about how the organisation will 
prepare for the delivery of projects and, more particularly, the significant and 
complex transformational projects that may be multimodal or sensitive due to the 
social, environmental or reputational context.  This is also likely to require different 
economic boundaries from those established for funding assessments, and may 
well drive a change to the time dependent (‘use it or lose it’) budgeting approach 
that currently challenges the ability for an enabling cOPEX budget to establish and 
foreshadow project completion. 
Project completion 
One of the questions raised through this exercise was: what happens to the 
expenditure required to complete project deliverables?  Whilst the simple answer 
was that this is not OPEX and should reside within project budgets, this may not 
always be so clear cut for a number of reasons.  How the organisation manages its 
internal budgets around project closure and handover boundaries is also likely to 
be a factor and may not be defined sufficiently for the transparent management of 
the CAPEX/OPEX transition.  This in turn can affect the clarity of accountabilities 
and raises two questions:   
 what actions or requirements get lost?  And therefore: 
 what costs get hidden as a consequence? 
Examples where this was encountered (i.e. where expenditure is required after 
practical completion and completion of the ‘project phase’ within the organisation) 
included:  
 resolving secondary project consequences; 
 completing mitigation requirements; 
 completion of other compliance requirements such as monitoring; and  
 resolution of ‘defects’ (as defined from an organisational perspective).   
One industry interviewee observing: 
In an ideal world [...] we’d audit it before we were effectively handed 
over the keys.  But often the case is [...] we’re given the keys and then 
we audit it [...] It’s not [...] that we’ve got a whole heap of engineers [...] 
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who want to get their hands dirty, it’s more [...] a case of being taken 
along the journey as it’s being built [...] but also having a team that 
actually does check what [...] we originally asked for [...] and signing that 
off [...] So we’ve still got things that really, on a day-to-day basis for the 
operational side, are a problem […and] as projects wind up [...] 
nobody’s really interested anymore [...] it becomes an issue for [...] us to 
pick up which is not really a great model of success either. [PR53] 
Deferred benefits 
One final matter to arise around project completion is closely intertwined with 
benefit management, and relates to the alignment or reconciliation of statements 
made in project assessments with the finally delivered scope.
 
 This is the matter of 
the deferment of ‘claimed’ benefits.246  The walking and cycling provisions of this 
project are an elegant illustration of this point.   
The Scheme Assessment Report (Opus International Consultants Ltd, 2009) 
identified key transverse corridors, notably the link from Mt Wellington to the 
Panmure Town Centre and the Panmure Basin.  The Final Design Report (B. I. L. 
Opus International Consultants Ltd, Brewer Davidson, PB, 2011) noting: 
Each area of open space is isolated within its own context and there is 
little sense of connectivity between them.  Pedestrian connectivity is 
restricted between the two most prominent areas of open space (Mount 
Wellington Domain and Panmure Basin)... 
The report proceeds to underline the significant enhancement to be delivered by 
the improvement of these connections (Figure AVII.1). 
                                              
246
 This is distinct from agglomeration, being the “spatial concentration of economic activity” 
(New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2013). 
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
CMB150717_E Appendix VII 317 
 
Figure AVII.1:  Panmure Station precinct 
Source:  B. I. L. Opus International Consultants Ltd, Brewer Davidson, PB (2011) 
Figures AVII.2 and AVII.3 show the extent of the pre-project cycling and walking 
networks in the vicinity of the project.  Whilst the cycle lanes delivered by the 
project will eventually contribute to the future cycle network, they currently finish at 
the edges of the project not at a destination.  Similar examples can be found with 
the Pleasant View Road pedestrian and cycleway linkages (the alternative until the 
Panmure Roundabout is removed in Stage 2), and William Harvey Bridge 
connections. 
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Figure AVII.2:  Pre-project cycle network 
Source: Modified from  Auckland Transport (2011) 
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Figure AVII.3:  Pre-project walking network 
Source:  Modified from Auckland City Council (2007)  
The point is, whilst project boundaries are necessary, ‘connectivity’ requires a 
connection to something, least this result in the delivery of disjointed facilities such 
as the ‘around-the-block’ cycle lanes seen in Figure AVII.2.  This was raised by 
study 3 survey respondents (Chapter 7): 
Poorly designed infrastructure that takes you from a safe space into 
conflict with other users.  The Star Trek effect where cyclists are 
expected to beam from one piece of infrastructure to the next when it 
got too hard to make it safe for the whole journey.  No network 
approach. [SR476] 
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There is an argument, then, for the project envelope to be variable by mode to 
enable appropriate outcomes to be achieved.   
Deferred benefits were not recognised within project or organisational processes 
and have been left for the operations team to resolve.  However, operational staff 
consider this to be CAPEX.  Whilst the examples given here are relatively small, 
they relate to key outcomes and would now be difficult to prioritise given their size.  
Furthermore, the benefits have already been ‘claimed’.  However, they would have 
been a very minor addition to the overall project.  This underlines a need to ring-
fence all consequential elements to ensure the outcomes upon which a project was 
predicated are actually delivered. 
AVII.1.4 Operations 
Handover processes 
Whilst an internal project review showed Auckland Transport was aware of this 
matter (Auckland Transport, 2015d), one year after the project was opened, not all 
the operational management plans had been received or finalised.  Many plans, 
such as those for electrical componentry, were generic lists, and did not necessarily 
assist operators in their day-to-day use.   
As operations is accountable for delivering the levels of service and long-term 
outcomes on behalf of its community, it is incongruent that the handover process is 
either absent or so ineffectual that practical completion could be granted without 
the requisite handover requirements being satisfied.  Indeed, this exercise 
reinforces a need to reorient infrastructure organisations away from project delivery 
and around, not just operations, but operational outcomes. 
Similar issues were found in the Albany Lakes legacy project (Blom & Irwin, 2011; 
Blom et al., 2011), and Auckland Transport is clearly not alone.  Although there is a 
paucity of academic material on the project handover and operational transition 
(except in computing/information technology), social media groups such as the 
‘CAPEX to OPEX for Maintenance Reliability Professionals’ group on LinkedIn 
suggest a shared experience across several infrastructure sectors.  Whilst this is 
part of the ‘knowledge transfer’ problem space, and is distinct from the difficulty 
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organisations have in capturing project lessons learned (Busby, 1998; Flyvbjerg, 
Skamris Holm, et al., 2003; Schindler & Eppler, 2003), the inability to learn that 
there is a handover problem — and then to address it — is a compounding and 
confounding factor.   
Whilst improving the project handover process is an obvious need, it is suggested 
that when viewed in the context of the other issues raised, poor handover 
outcomes are more likely a reflection or symptom of the wider systemic issues.  
After all, if cOPEX requirements had been appropriately costed, it should follow that 
there would be appropriate schedules, defined accountabilities, and an audit trail 
that leads to operational signoff for the delivered project.  Improving the handover, 
whilst a key part of any way forward is not, therefore, a complete solution or ‘simple 
fix’.   
Maintenance specifications and requirements 
An overview of an Auckland Transport standard network maintenance contract 
showed that although these are wide ranging, the contracts are largely focused on 
hard assets and need to be varied to incorporate specific features or more complex 
designs.  This is not unusual (Anguillid Consulting Engineers and Scientists Ltd, 
2010; Blom et al., 2011).  Part of the issue is that there is an ongoing need to 
review and, if necessary, adapt standard specifications and documentation on a 
project-by-project basis.  As projects are the means through which the organisation 
is proposing to transform the system, it is only prudent to review supporting 
processes accordingly.  Without this, it is difficult to assess whether: 
 the design and delivery of certain items could or should be standardised (e.g. 
limiting the breadth of architectural finishes or lighting choices); 
 the introduction of a new asset or technology causes a system cascade in asset 
upgrades, or sets a precedent or expectation for the cost of future maintenance 
(cost ‘ratcheting’); 
 efficiencies can be made (or conversely how to avoid replicating poorly 
performing assets or material decisions); 
 the organisation has the capability or capacity to manage the emergent assets, 
systems, or services. 
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Furthermore, if the organisation finds itself managing reactively, it runs the risk of 
incurring additional costs through urgency and the reduced ability to plan and 
optimise. 
Any review needs to be more than a superficial reflection on an evolving list of 
assets or services, as a range of secondary changes may emerge.  In this instance, 
the site contamination and archaeological risks provide two examples where 
secondary consequences are likely (e.g. consents/authorisations, management 
plans, works hold points/delays, additional expenditure).   
Without appropriate comprehensive and integrated frameworks in place there is a 
risk that, again, requirements, knowledge, and performance all dissipate, and 
operational costs might actually increase for the scope that remains.  Preliminary 
research interviewees told of similar experiences: 
[The water treatment plant] would have only have been put in because 
there was a government subsidy at that time, and I suspect they 
perceived themselves [...] that it was more than they needed [...] they 
perceived later on that they wanted to lower the running costs [so] they 
closed down part of the plant! [PR31] 
We understand [...] how [...] the system operates in terms of every 
morning there’s a queue down here etc. [...] What [...] nobody really 
understands is why particular things were done.  And it could be down 
to even the simple detail of why [...] a drainage pipe was put in that 
place and not that place. [PR16] 
The risk is that omissions, acting in concert with a myriad of incremental changes to 
scope, timing, and eventually costs, means that this becomes an insidious problem: 
difficult to quantify, and more so to diagnose.   
AVII.1.5 Organisational interfaces 
Organisational integration 
Silos and decision boundaries affect not only the segregation of project and 
operational teams and their advisers, but organisational structures between the 
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various functional accountabilities and disciplines.  The effects of these factors can 
be seen within the amended cOPEX estimate, whereby a number of the line items 
fell outside of currently defined areas and were deemed a general ‘cost of doing 
business’.  This introduces a lack of transparency, uncertain accountability, and 
appears to be where many of the tasks associated with compliance, social or 
environmental outcomes, mitigation, risk, adaptation and evolution reside.  It is 
clear that both the cost and consequential actions arising from these areas may be 
difficult to define.  But this does not abrogate the responsibility or requirement to 
actually manage and deliver these less tangible components, as these may not be 
as intangible as they are perceived (Section AVII.1.1).  Moreover, given these are 
at the core of what defines infrastructure, this surely counteracts efforts to improve 
long-term performance and outcomes.  Again, from the preliminary interviews: 
Some of the [facilities] that were built [...] there was some [...] public 
amenity type things that weren’t included.  And then new people come 
in and go – well why?  And the engineers go ‘oh well people might use 
it’.  Well isn’t that the point? [PR61] 
I think there’s a number of problems.  One is the client, and 
[organisation] falls into this trap [...] there’s a project team working on 
that, and they’re in their silo.  Over here’s another project and you know, 
same client but different siloed team and they don’t talk to each other.  
They don’t see what the big picture is. [PR28] 
There is also the need to prepare a single cOPEX estimate from a whole of 
system/whole of organisational perspective before assignations to organisational 
structure are made.  It is clear from this exercise that cOPEX is more than the 
summing of the parts, and that there are not only ‘fuzzy’ boundaries between 
functions and stages, but many costs fall outside of existing tools, frameworks, or 
functions. 
Third party interfaces 
AMETI involves functional interfaces with other organisations including Auckland 
Council, KiwiRail, and the NZTA.  In this regard, s.17A(5) of the LGA, 2002, 
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requires that where functions are to be “undertaken by a different entity from that 
responsible for governance” that an appropriate contract or agreement is in place. 
Without contemplating whether the SOI (Auckland Transport, 2012b, 2014d) fulfils 
any legal obligation, it was clear that at the project level, such matters had not yet 
been fully resolved.  For example it is understood that at the time the data was 
collected, agreement had not yet been reached with Auckland Council over the 
ongoing management of Van Damm’s Lagoon.  This raises several issues: 
 Whether Auckland Transport should transfer maintenance functions outside of 
the organisation.  It has been suggested that it is appropriate for Auckland 
Transport to focus on road-related assets.  However, this raises questions 
about what exactly a road asset actually is, and the place of ‘blue-green’ 
infrastructure (e.g. raingardens, swales, treatment ponds), or indeed overland 
flow paths, let alone more complex multipurpose infrastructure that might 
interface with transport.  This is a perhaps an area for further discussion, 
particularly in light of the following two points. 
 Operational costs need to be assessed early to enable the formation of an 
appropriate transfer agreement in the first instance, along with any funding 
provisions.  It is understood that this is one of the details missing from the 
project’s agreement in principle between the two organisations. 
 This relates to the last of the compliance issues, and the separation of 
mitigation from effects.  This is perhaps unique to the Auckland ‘super city’ and 
the establishment of Council Controlled Organisations where inter-
organisational functions might assist efficient operations and/or introduce risk, 
notably: 
- Who is to hold the resource consent:  Part of the organisation thought this 
might be transferred to Auckland Council stormwater (as that department 
would be responsible for maintenance and ongoing operations).  However, 
Auckland Transport has no process through which they report on 
compliance and audit the performance of obligations carried out on its 
behalf.   
- The consent was issued for the discharge of stormwater from the road 
(effect) via the Van Damm’s Lagoon (mitigation).  There is a risk 
(exacerbated if the consent and/or operations were to be transferred to 
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Auckland Council stormwater) that the linkage between the effects and the 
mitigation are severed, and become non-compliant.   
What is clear is that if responsibilities are to be transferred, Auckland Transport 
retains a duty of care to ensure that these are followed through over the long term 
and therefore to evaluate performance, as it would for any contract. 
Programme staging 
As part of this study, Auckland Transport was asked whether: 
 it had undertaken an evaluation of the impacts arising from current plans to 
defer subsequent stages (particularly any impacts upon the benefits and 
outcomes of the first stage of the project); and  
 given the timeframes, maintenance should be resumed or temporary 
improvements made.   
It is understood that no such assessment had been undertaken.   
AMETI has been likened to a series of smaller projects and accordingly, many of its 
benefits are agglomerated or reliant upon the delivery of other works and services.  
This highlights a need for an assessment of the impact on preceding stages (if 
subsequent works are to be significantly delayed or completely abandoned) so that 
the actions required to deliver the benefits of earlier investments can be understood 
and enabled. 
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APPENDIX VIII:  DETAILED STUDY 3 METHODS AND 
ANALYSIS 
This study comprised three stages: 
 customer workshops (and survey piloting); 
 national survey; and 
 an investigation of influence and change. 
To assist readership, this Appendix has been structured differently from the rest of 
the thesis by coupling the method for each stage with its results. 
Note that this Appendix presents only a summary of the results.   
AVIII.1 Customer workshops  
AVIII.1.1 Workshop methods 
Workshop logistics 
Focus group locations were selected to reflect the NZTA’s national organisational 
accountabilities.  Locations were therefore sought in both the North and South 
Islands of New Zealand, and within rural and urban centres as follows: 
 Napier; 
 Christchurch; and 
 Dunedin. 
As Christchurch’s infrastructure was still being redeveloped post-earthquake, there 
was the possibility that the discussion would centre on related issues; however, this 
did not transpire.   
Time was spent considering who the NZTA’s customers were, so that appropriate 
groups could be established.  Given the aims of this stage, user or advocacy 
groups were targeted rather than trying to arrange a sample of random, yet 
representative individuals (so sample/workshop size is not an applicable 
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consideration here).  Whilst this arguably brings an inherent bias in the form of 
mode or user specific positions, this was considered appropriate in this instance for 
the following reasons: 
 the purpose of the process was to elucidate the language specific to, and the 
needs of each mode and user group; 
 the information was to be used to shape a more extensive appraisal of 
individual need in the form of the subsequent questionnaire. 
Any bias was also tempered by the structuring of the focus group sessions, which 
facilitated a shared understanding across mode and user groups by starting with 
the higher-level concepts (discussed below). 
A range of potential customer groups were identified and provided to the NZTA’s 
Journey Managers who then sent out invitations based on local knowledge and 
availability.  The invitations called for customer participants that were ‘interested 
and available’ on a voluntary basis.  Potential customer groups included: 
 car clubs (e.g. Automobile 
Association); 
 advocacy for the elderly (e.g. Grey 
Power/Age Concern); 
 disability advocacy (e.g. Be 
Accessible, Blind Foundation); 
 cycling groups (e.g. SPOKES); 
 universities/schools; 
 those living beside roads and paths;  
 other local interest groups 
(e.g. Marae). 
 freight-related advocacy (e.g. Freight 
Association); 
 bus-related advocacy (e.g. Bus and 
Coach Association); 
 rural sector (e.g. Federated 
Farmers); 
 children’s advocates (e.g. Plunket); 
 emergency Services; 
 motorcyclists; and 
A total of 28 adult customers participated across the country (12 in Napier, 10 in 
Christchurch, and six in Dunedin).  This provided a diverse array of mode and user 
groups (Table AVIII.1). 
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Table AVIII.1: Summary of focus group participation 
 = Mode or user group advocacy representation (does not indicate participant gender); 
 = Mode use or user group from pilot questionnaire 
Customer Group Napier Christchurch* Dunedin 
Freight  
 
 - 
Bus  
 
-  
 
Emergency Services  
 
-  
Taxi - - - 
Car  

 
  
 
Motorcyclist/moped -   
 
Parents (pushchairs, children)  
 
- - 
Disabilities (e.g. mobility, sight-
impaired, wheel chair user) 
 
 
  
 
Elderly (including mobility scooter 
users) 
 
 
 - 
Horse riders - - - 
Cyclists  
 
  
 
Pedestrians (including walking school 
bus) 
 

 
  
 
Skateboarders/push scooters  
 
- - 
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Customer Group Napier Christchurch* Dunedin 
Farm vehicles - - - 
Tourist/first time user - - - 
Residents interest group (customers 
living beside the asset) 
 
 
- - 
Total Customer attendees 12 10 6 
*  Questionnaire not piloted in Christchurch 
An NZTA staff member was sometimes nominated by a user group, or helped to 
make up numbers to represent an under represented customer group, particularly 
in the smaller centres.  This was closely managed.  No more than two NZTA staff 
participated in each of the customer sessions.  In such instances, the staff were 
advised that they were there as a customer, and to avoid technical discussions or 
wearing an ‘NZTA hat’.  Where conversations drifted into such matters, these were 
addressed within the workshop and participants guided back to their role as a 
customer or user. 
The workshops were facilitated by myself, and lasted a minimum of 2.5 hours.  
Additional time was spent at both Napier and Dunedin to pilot the first draft of the 
questionnaire, which was subsequently modified to reflect the issues raised in all 
three focus groups.   
Exploring comfort 
Few studies appear to have asked their customers what comfort means to them.  
So the first part of the focus group session started with the broad concept of 
comfort and explored what this meant to participants, canvassing the language 
used and the breadth of the factors identified.  A series of cascading questions 
followed (Figure AVIII.1), which explored the concept of comfort as it related to 
transport generally and then to a range of land transport-based modes and user 
groups.  
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Figure AVIII.1: Exploring comfort 
This essentially inverted conventional approaches to this topic and was 
subsequently found to be an effective means of enabling engagement, especially 
where modal or user tensions gave rise to competing needs.  The different order of 
the questions, along with discussing the matter of comfort from a range of different 
angles enabled the possibility of triangulation both within each workshop and 
between the focus groups themselves (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The approach 
recognises that the notion of comfort as it relates to road infrastructure may be a 
latent variable, which needs to be explored by obtaining the participants' sense of 
what it is or by exploring other attributes which together make up comfort (Eboli & 
Mazzulla, 2009; Parasuraman, Zeithaml, & Berry, 1985, 1994).  
The first two focus group questions (Figure AVIII.1) were discussed in pairs to 
identify key words or factors.  These were written on cards so that these could 
then be pooled and grouped by all participants into key themes and those themes 
discussed.  The themes were subsequently collated across all three of the focus 
groups by looking for common language and terminologies (termed notions of 
comfort). To cross-check this synthesis, overarching word frequency analysis 
(irrespective of the underlying themes) showed that key words aligned with the 
majority of these ‘notions’.  Limited synonym clustering of less used terms gave full 
alignment. 
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Participants were invited to be more specific when defining comfort in transport and 
by mode.  For example, ‘safety’ was a common, overarching theme, and as the 
focus narrowed, participants were asked to consider what safety factors affected 
comfort at each, more refined, level. 
Prior to advancing to the third question (Figure AVIII.1), participants were asked to 
briefly share their understanding of what comprised the road corridor.  This was to 
prime participants to subsequently focus down on road-related comfort issues and 
also provided a chance to reflect on how the customer understood any differences 
between highway and local road accountabilities. 
The subsequent mode/user discussion again involved small group work.  
Participants were invited to view and add to the factors identified by other groups, 
before using the collective output to identify the most important factors affecting 
comfort for them (irrespective of mode).  
Participants were also asked to comment on a range of technical footpath and road 
pavement defects shown in 160 photographs (Figure AVIII.2).  The photographs 
were largely sourced from a preceding accompanied journey survey, but 
augmented to provide a balance of road- and footpath-related issues. 
 
Figure AVIII.2:  Example photos 
Source:  Anguillid Consulting Engineers and Scientists Ltd (2014) 
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Piloting the questionnaire 
The final task was the piloting of the questionnaire (two workshops only).  This 
involved: 
 recording completion times, and discussing the number of questions/overall 
duration; 
 answering questions and recording areas where clarification or changes were 
required (including changes arising from workshop discussions); 
 seeking specific feedback on what was problematic, terminology, the scope of 
questions, and the range of factors given in the various questions. 
AVIII.1.2 Workshop results 
This section presents the proceedings of the workshop in response to each of the 
four key questions (Q1-4) set out within Figure AVIII.1 and the short aside (S1) to 
explore administrative boundaries. 
Q1 The notion of comfort 
Workshop participants were firstly asked to write key words, and then by grouping 
these, themes describing comfort as a general concept.  Key words or synonyms 
sometimes appeared across themes.  However, whilst noting the similarities, the 
participants made the point that their groupings/themes expressed different aspects 
of comfort as a general concept.   
My subsequent analysis generated eight ‘notions of comfort’ from across the three 
focus groups (left-hand column, Table AVIII.2).  For example, health, positive 
emotions, company, and food were uniformly grouped together by participants 
(synthesised to: ‘I have a sense of wellbeing and community’) and were grouped 
separately from the themes around relaxation and peace (‘I have peace of mind 
and am at ease’).  To cross check this synthesis, overarching word frequency 
analysis (irrespective of the underlying themes) showed that key words aligned with 
the majority of the eight notions.  Limited synonym clustering of less used terms 
gave full alignment.   
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Table AVIII.2:  Notions of comfort 
Notions of Comfort Key Words within Customer Generated Themes  
(selected examples from workshop) 
‘I have freedom and choice’  Choice (free to choose) 
 Freedom 
 Being able to do the things you want to do 
‘Life is hassle free’  Convenience 
 Easy 
‘I feel safe’  Safe 
 Security 
 No fear 
‘I have confidence and certainty’  Familiarity 
 Confident 
 Certainty 
 Ability to respond to the situation 
‘I have a sense of wellbeing and 
community’ 
 Well-fed and watered 
 Inclusive 
 Friends, family 
 Happy, contented 
‘I have a good personal 
environment’ 
 Soft/hard, warm/cold (depending on, say, back) 
 No pain/discomfort 
 Controlled noise/sounds 
 Smells 
‘I have a sense of place’  Visually appealing 
 Surroundings (nice place, view, environment) 
 Awareness 
 Environment in 
‘I have peace of mind and am at 
ease’ 
 Relaxed 
 Stress/anxiety free 
 No pressure 
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Comfort and discomfort also emerged as distinct notions; comfort is “more 
noticeable when it is absent” [WP].  Pain was one example given by workshop 
participants.  Pain can cause discomfort, but its absence does not result in comfort.  
Road smoothness was later identified as another such example: a poor road 
surface may make someone uncomfortable; however, a smooth road does not 
necessarily make a person comfortable.   
The customers themselves observed that comfort was described both emotionally 
and physically, and that it had personal dimension or scale: “Some people don’t 
mind and are comfortable learning [going outside their personal comfort zone] 
whereas others want things under control” [WP].  A range of other influencing 
factors were also identified such as whether a person was relaxed, stressed, safe, 
and physically comfortable or in a good environment, highlighting the 
interconnectedness of the eight comfort factors listed above.  Comfort was 
associated with “luxury and pampering, something special” [WP]; a positive 
attribute, again distinguishing it from discomfort.  Companionship was also 
identified as being particularly important: “Even if you go to an unfamiliar place it 
helps to have someone with you.  Shared experiences are important” [WP]. 
Q2 Comfort in transportation generally 
As requested, the factors (key words) identified for comfort in transportation 
became more detailed and specific than those expressed for comfort in general.  
For example the factors contributing to a customer defined theme around safety 
shifted from the generic ‘safe’, ‘non-threatening environment’, and ‘security’ 
(comfort generally) to ‘condition of vehicle’, ‘appropriate speeds’, and ‘reduced 
roadside hazards’ (comfort in transportation generally).  Of the themes that 
emerged from this exercise, knowledge and information, consistency and control, 
behaviour (road respect, manners and intimidation), safety, surfaces and overall 
design, and timeliness were identified as being particularly important.   
Although there was overlapping of key words across customer-defined themes, 
analysis showed that these broadly aligned with the same eight high-level notions 
of comfort (Table AVIII.2).  This provided a degree of verification by testing the 
emergent notions of comfort at a different scale (Heath & Cowley, 2004).  However, 
the customers did identify an additional theme at this scale which related to cost 
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and value.  Further exploration of this aspect revealed that comfort was important, 
but that this was conditional on the cost to the customer.   
One of the key messages to emerge from this exercise related to the aspects of 
timeliness, consistency and control; and demonstrates the importance of looking 
beneath terms that might be construed differently in a technical context.  
Customers in each of the focus groups made the point that most people at some 
stage in their lives will need to change modes, or become a pedestrian or mobility 
device user; whether as a child in a pram, or through ageing, illness, or accident.  
Consistency in the look and feel of roads and paths, and the ability to have control 
over one’s life were seen as vital to comfort in this context.  Timeliness was flagged 
not because of congestion delays, but because constraints, such as road works, 
might cause someone with a mobility or disability device to be house-bound and 
isolated for days or even weeks.  Timeliness, consistency, and control were 
therefore interwoven with notions of self-expression, freedom, and community 
inclusion, all of which were seen by the customer groups as impacting on the 
comfort of those that were more vulnerable. 
Where engineers are using comfort as a measure and are focusing on ride quality 
and physical comfort within the road carriageway, they may not be surprised that 
less tangible issues such as behaviour and timeliness (in the terms described by 
the customers) may be being omitted.  Penn, in Knight and Ruddock (2008), 
discusses such a point in relation to the role of architects in the built environment 
and building design in particular.  He talks of retailers creating a ‘customer 
experience’ or designers that identify with an ‘innovative environment’.  Notions that 
Penn argues are "indefinable except as judgements of a building in retrospect".  
Whilst a brief or specification cannot define such intangible outcomes, Penn is of 
the view that this is what distinguishes architecture as a profession, and why 
intuition, judgement, and tacit skills learnt within practice are so important.  It is 
argued that engineering is no different.  Indeed, an approach that embeds such 
intangible elements within technical practice is necessary if customer-centric 
strategies, such as those of the NZTA, are to be meaningfully delivered.   
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S1 Organisational/administrative boundaries 
When it comes to the road corridor, customers emphatically noted that they weren’t 
aware of, or particularly interested in the differences in accountability between 
agencies.  Viewed as a single entity comprising roads and footpaths, it was seen as 
a network that helped customers connect with where they wanted to go [WP]: “it is 
not a railway to get things from A to B”, “corridor is a commercial term and not 
about the quality of life”; “network gives you choice”. 
An example was cited of two nearby townships which previously had good 
connectivity.  But with the highway, they were seen as now being quite isolated 
“unless you have a car” (high speed, narrow, no paths, and facilities all located in 
one of the towns; [WP]).  In their view, the towns were further apart now than they 
had been 100 years ago.  A change, they felt, that had occurred dramatically in the 
last few decades: “New Zealand roads have not kept up and also need to consider 
all users more” [WP].  Footpaths too, in their minds, had not evolved to cope with, 
say, mobility scooters or to enable parents to walk side by side with pushchairs 
without impeding other users.  Similarly, road “radii are designed for vehicles [...] 
vehicles turn faster —this can be an issue for [...] people trying to cross at 
intersections” [WP].   
All groups also highlighted the effect on comfort of the different standards between 
highways and local roads, and across local authority or funding boundaries; all of 
the groups identifying the example of road edge and pull-off areas to explain their 
point.  They observed that seal frequently does not extend far beyond fog lines 
(painted edge; see Figure 7.1) and is often accompanied by a large level difference 
even with a sealed shoulder.  They saw this as a funding boundary (pavement 
width) and maintenance or contract boundary (transition between surfaces).   
The issues this raised for customers were numerous and ranged from an inability to 
pull off, reduced manoeuvrability (trucks) and effective lane width (cyclists), risk of 
overturning, risk of tripping, and the risk of getting stuck or breaking mobility 
devices.  Customers commented that they were uncomfortable with the uncertainty 
that these factors caused; highlighting a difference between technical acceptance 
and perceived user comfort.   
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More specifically, whilst high shoulders with a specified level of rutting would be 
defined as ‘ineffective’ from a technical perspective (Transfund New Zealand, 1997; 
see Figure AVIII.3), the very issue identified by the customer focus groups is 
expressly identified within NZTA technical guidance as being ‘adequate’ (Transfund 
New Zealand, 1997; see Figure AVIII.4).  This would suggest not only the need to 
consider a measure for footpaths and road cross-sectional profiles (particularly at 
crossing points and intersections), but also the need to review technical 
specifications, and embedded processes and procedures to align with strategic 
objectives.   
 
Figure AVIII.3:  Examples of ineffective and technically inadequate road shoulders 
Source:  Transfund New Zealand (1997) 
Customers noted that a holistic approach was required; a solution for one mode 
can cause problems for another.  Citing rumble strips which push trucks out from 
the edge, they observed this reduces traffic separation but creates space for 
cyclists (see also G. Johnson, n.d.).  Similarly, exposed aggregate footpaths might 
assist with grip, but break canes used by the sight-impaired. 
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Figure AVIII.4:  Examples of technically adequate road shoulders 
Source:  Transfund New Zealand (1997) 
In customers’ minds then, transportation comfort was not just limited to the 
interaction with the physical asset or means of travel.  Customers instead 
expressed a need for a holistic, system view to be adopted, as comfort on the asset 
itself was a subset of comfort in their wider lives. 
Q3 Transportation mode specific comfort 
Although most participants drove cars, the results of this stage indicate a collective 
customer view across the focus groups that the mode/user groups with the widest 
range of issues are those using mobility devices, followed by cyclists 
(Figure AVIII.5).  The most frequently identified issue across all the modes was 
consideration of or by others, followed by road and path surface issues, and road 
design generally (Figure AVIII.6).  This reinforces the point made earlier that 
customers view comfort holistically across all their mode choices.  They noted that 
designs for vulnerable users would encompass their needs as a car user, but not 
the other way around. 
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Figure AVIII.5:   Dominance of comfort factors for each mode or user group 
Percentage of the Comfort Factors (as listed in Figure AVIII.6) that were identified as relevant to 
each mode) 
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Figure AVIII.6:  Frequency of comfort factors across all modes 
Percentage of the listed Comfort Factors that were identified as relevant to all modes (as listed 
in Figure AVIII.5).  Note:  The comfort factors that were generated have been grouped into core 
themes. 
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Customers were then asked to identify which of all the mode-specific comfort 
statements/factors were most important to their overall comfort irrespective of the 
mode or user group for which they were generated.  The factors the customer 
groups saw as critical to comfort are ranked in Figure AVIII.7.247  This indicates that 
whilst road smoothness is both a frequent and a critical concern, the customers 
were most concerned with a wider range of issues that relate to vulnerable users in 
the first instance.  To address these concerns, pavement smoothness would need 
to be measured in a way that addressed all user needs, and a range of other 
comfort indicators may need to be considered. 
Q4 Pavement specific issues 
Finally, participants were asked to comment on the comfort effects of a range of 
technical footpath and road pavement defects.  Participants were asked to ‘tag’ or 
prioritise these as either intolerable or of high importance, and to briefly note the 
issue of concern and which mode it affected.  Issues and modes were not defined 
so that participants had a free rein, and notably, this did not constrain customers to 
matters of pavement smoothness.  However, participants were asked to focus on 
issues that related to comfort. 
68% of photos were tagged and of these, 65% were tagged by more than one 
focus group, and 28% by all focus groups.  A range of issues were often identified 
in each photo.  Using a presence/absence indicator, more photos contained an 
issue for cyclists and pedestrians than any other mode or user group.  Frequency 
analysis of the total number of identified issues was again dominated by those 
issues specific to cyclists and pedestrians.  This was despite the wide range of 
customer interests represented and the majority of participants using or having 
access to cars.  The key issues are shown in Figures AVIII.8 and AVIII.9 (overleaf).   
                                              
247
 Figure AVIII.7 relates to Figure AVIII.6, but because the underlying detail is important to this 
point, the individual factors have been used (i.e. Figure AVIII.6 is a summary). 
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Figure AVIII.7:  Critical comfort factors (irrespective of mode) 
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Figure AVIII.8:  All identified pavement issues 
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Figure AVIII.9:  Key pavement issues for the top 50 ranking photographs  
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Figure AVIII.8 highlights the importance of potential trip hazards to customers, 
followed closely by the interlinked issues of narrowness/reduced space, and the 
presence of obstacles.  Of note is the pairing of the surface issues with the issue of 
defects causing customers to swerve (whether into oncoming traffic, or in the case 
of cyclists, into the live traffic lane).  These were clearly linked in customer’s minds 
as they noted that it was not so much about smoothness, but where defects were 
located.  The effect of defects in the ride- or wheel-line not only caused discomfort 
from bumping, but also from swerving to avoid the issue and creating another 
comfort issue; that of uncertainty or feeling unsafe from reduced separation caused 
by the need to swerve into the live traffic lane.  Customers indicated that this was 
also linked to the presence and quality of shoulders (extent of pavement/pavement 
level changes) discussed earlier. 
Figure AVIII.9 considers the top 50 ranked photographs in more detail.  Given most 
of the identified issues pertained to cyclists and pedestrians, this analysis indicates 
that whilst relatively fewer issues were identified on paths, these user groups have 
a wide range of road-related issues.   
Piloting the questionnaire 
The piloting of the questionnaire confirmed the length of the survey as being 
suitable.  Minor refinements were made (e.g. to some of the terms used and the 
ranking criteria).  The major addition was the inclusion of ‘potential customers’ and 
questions relating to mode uptake and barriers to modes and user groups. 
AVIII.2 Survey 
AVIII.2.1 Survey methods 
Survey logistics 
The second stage of this study entailed a comprehensive online survey 
(Appendix IX).  The survey is distinctive by being developed in conjunction with 
customer groups; a noted lesson derived from cultural safety practice in New 
Zealand healthcare (Koptie, 2009; Ramsden & Spoonley, 1993).  It therefore 
sought to approach the underlying question from the customer perspective rather 
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than that of a technical paradigm and built upon the customer workshops just 
described.   
Although originally designed to enable people using non-vehicular modes to 
comment on roads, limitations required some modal segregation.  However, 
pedestrians and those using non-vehicular modes are road users, so this is an 
important issue yet one not often addressed in surveys of road use.  The survey 
sought to recognise this incongruence within path-related questions.  It also treated 
cyclists and bus passengers as hybrid categories that may use either roads or 
paths (the latter because getting to a bus stop is integral to their journey).  Road 
and path use are therefore generalised terms used for convenience, and of course 
should not be taken to mean that pedestrians and other path users are not road 
users also.   
The NZTA hosted the survey on its webpage, project websites, and promoted it via 
all its electronic media channels.  Links were also sent to earlier workshop 
participants and various interest groups.  The survey was available for two months, 
and a total of 1,648 responses were volunteered across this period.  A single, 
manual response was entered into the dataset prior to validation and analysis.  
Data was also screened to check for issues using a defined set of criteria (e.g. 
eliminating responses where only basic ethnographic data had been completed); 
this gave a total of 1,619 usable responses.   
This was a lengthy survey (but within the time limits defined within the workshops).  
Whilst the survey is representative, it is nonetheless a snapshot at this current time; 
the potential for change does not negate the findings here, it does underline the 
importance of not relying on high-level satisfaction surveys for extended periods.  
Things change, so there is a need to periodically complete a deep dive to reflect on 
the evolving context and customer need. 
Analysis of data 
Most of the quantitative data was managed through Excel.  Qualitative data 
involved the coding of survey responses, which followed the emergent coding 
practice previously described in Section 3.1, except that instead of NVivo, Excel 
was used to record and graph the outputs. 
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AVIII.2.2 Survey results 
This Section follows the survey structure (Appendix IX) and responds to each of the 
questions in turn: 
 Section 1:  Basic ethnographic data (Section AVIIIX.2.2.1; survey Q1-3).  
Enabled an assessment of representativeness to be made. 
 Section 2:  Replication of current survey conventions (Sections AVIII.2.2.2-
AVIII.2.2.5; survey Q4-11).  Enabled a comparison with current surveys.  Note: 
- this section included two new questions (Q5-6) to investigate barriers to 
mode use uptake; and 
- the terms used in Q11 are derived from current convention.  The point here 
is that the terms are open to interpretation (not least between customers and 
practitioners).  This was discussed within the preceding workshops, which 
confirmed issues with interpretation.  It emerged from separate discussions 
(with practitioners) that such lists were typically generated by practitioners 
(Section 7.1), who selected not only the terms used, but the range of 
matters to choose from. 
 Section 3: Exploration of comfort (Sections AVIII.2.2.6-AVIII.2.2.8; survey 
Q12-20).  These questions augment the exploration of comfort from first 
principles and enable consideration of the findings relative to the current 
performance indicator and stated strategic intent.  The range of factors, and 
the terms used were refined and developed with within the preceding 
customer workshops. 
The final two sections of the analysis (AVIII.2.2.9-AVIII.2.2.10) look at the results in 
terms of how the current performance measure is framed and directed.  This is a 
cross-analysis of two matters arising from the survey (the complexity of comfort and 
the role of comfort in mode augmentation and general satisfaction). 
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AVIII.2.2.1 Survey representativeness 
Although the workshops provided useful insights, these involved only a few 
participants.  The survey was therefore aimed at canvassing a wider customer 
cross-section. 
Bryman (2001) records that social research typically aims for a 95% level of 
confidence (with an associated margin of error of 1.96%).  The survey achieves this 
as a subset of the New Zealand population (4,355,739 (Statistics New Zealand, 
2013a)).   
Basic ethnographic data (age, gender, geographic distribution) were also compared 
with the 2013 New Zealand Census (Ibid.).  Regression analysis across a 
combined list of all three factors gave a relatively good correlation between survey 
and Census (r=0.87).   
Overall, it is considered that the survey is statistically significant and is reasonably 
representative of the wider New Zealand population. 
AVIII.2.2.2 Mode use 
Respondents were asked to indicate the forms of transport they currently use to 
travel on roads or footpaths, and were then asked to state the modes they would 
like to use but do not do so currently (Table AVIII.3).  Potential customers do not 
appear to be approached often in infrastructure satisfaction surveys, and the 
question was included after workshop feedback.  More than one mode was able to 
be selected in each case.   
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Table AVIII.3:  Mode use 
Mode or User Group Current mode 
use 
Additional mode 
use sought 
Road Modes 
Car driver 87% 5% 
Car passenger 60% 2% 
Motorcyclist/scooter 10% 7% 
Light commercial vehicle 5% <1% 
Truck 3% 1% 
Bus driver 1% 1% 
Both Road and Path Modes 
Bus passenger 37% 17% 
Cyclist 43% 19% 
Path Modes 
Pedestrian 84% 3% 
Pedestrian with pram or pushchair 11% 1% 
Wheel chair or mobility scooter 6% 2% 
Skateboard/long-board/push-scooter 3% <1% 
Horse 1% 2% 
Other  1% 3% 
Car travel dominated current mode use, with car drivers and passengers 
accounting for 42% of total mode usage.  However, pedestrians were also 
dominant.  Five of the 13 defined mode or user groups accounted for 89% of the 
total current modal use.   
54% of the survey indicated that they would like to augment their current mode 
(1.4 additional modes sought on average).  A strong preference was expressed for 
cycling or bus patronage, which accounted for 57% of all additional mode usage 
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sought.  However, this is not necessarily latent demand, as respondents noted a 
range of scenarios, including modes that were: 
 used previously but which had been given up; and 
 currently used but which the customer would like to use more than at present. 
AVIII.2.2.3 Barriers to mode augmentation 
Respondents were also given the opportunity to comment on the barriers affecting 
their use of other modes (Table AVIII.4).  Approximately 40% elected to do so, 
giving rise to 1,199 barriers in total across 59 individual issues.  The two most 
sought additional modes (cycling and bus patronage) identified the widest range of 
barrier issues; 71% (42/59 barrier issues) and 64% (38/59 barrier issues) 
respectively (Table AVIII.4).  These two modes, together, accounted for 78% of all 
the barriers (i.e. 935/1,199). 
Table AVIII.4:  Key barrier factors to the uptake of additional modes 
Mode or User 
Group 
Range of 
Individual 
Issues 
Identified  
(n=59) 
Proportion of 
the Total 
Number of 
Barriers 
Identified 
(n=1,199) 
Top Ranked Barrier Issues 
(1= top ranked) 
Road Modes 
Car driver 14% 1% 1. Traffic environment 
1. Cost of service/relative cost 
1. Technology gap 
Car passenger 17% 2% 1. No facilitated provision for 
carpooling 
2. Cost of service/relative cost 
2. Trip duration, time 
Motorcyclist/ 
scooter 
29% 4% 1. Safety 
2. Cost of service/relative cost 
3. Weather 
Light commercial 
vehicle 
0% 0% Not applicable 
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Mode or User 
Group 
Range of 
Individual 
Issues 
Identified  
(n=59) 
Proportion of 
the Total 
Number of 
Barriers 
Identified 
(n=1,199) 
Top Ranked Barrier Issues 
(1= top ranked) 
Truck 0% 0% Not applicable 
Bus driver 3% <1% 1. Scared or frightened 
1. Confidence 
Both Road and Path Modes 
Bus passenger 64% 35% 1. Accessibility of mode 
2. Timetabling of service 
2. Cost of service/relative cost 
Cyclist 71% 43% 1. Safety 
2. No or few separate assets 
3. Shared space issues 
3. Lack of width, narrow spaces 
Path Modes 
Pedestrian 41% 6% 1. No or limited asset 
1. Safety 
1. Poor condition, quality of asset 
Pedestrian with 
pram or 
pushchair 
27% 2% 1. Speed environment 
2. No or limited asset 
2. Safety 
2. Obstructions 
2. Pollution 
Wheel chair or 
mobility scooter 
25% 2% 1. Rough or uneven surfaces 
1. Accessibility of mode 
2. Shared space issues 
2. Interface between paths and road 
Skateboard/long-
board/push-
scooter 
22% 2% 1. Rough or uneven surfaces 
2. Safety 
3. Shared space issues 
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Mode or User 
Group 
Range of 
Individual 
Issues 
Identified  
(n=59) 
Proportion of 
the Total 
Number of 
Barriers 
Identified 
(n=1,199) 
Top Ranked Barrier Issues 
(1= top ranked) 
Horse 12% 1% 1. Safety 
2. Shared space issues 
3. No or few separate assets 
3. Design issues 
3. Accessibility of mode 
3. Trip duration, time 
3. Rule clarity 
Segway 14% 1% 1. Rule clarity 
2. Safety 
2. Rough or uneven surfaces 
2. Trip duration, time 
Other  10% 1% 1. Current technology gap 
2. Accessibility of mode 
2. Pollution 
The main modes concerned with the issue of surface roughness and unevenness 
were path users and in particular, skateboarders/push scooters, followed by 
pedestrians and wheelchair or mobility scooter users.  However, the issue only 
accounted for 2% of the total number of barrier issues raised. 
By contrast, ‘accessibility’, which affected an equally diverse number of modes or 
user groups, was identified more frequently as a barrier.  ‘Accessibility’ was most 
significantly a barrier to the uptake of bus patronage (both generally and for those 
with mobility constraints), and to a lesser extent, for cyclists also.  Whilst 
accessibility itself is often managed in transportation operations through simplified 
metrics such as travel time, feedback from this survey tends to support research 
which highlights the complexity of this factor and in particular the role of usability 
(Geurs & van Wee, 2004; Iwarsson & Ståhl, 2003), for example the ability to 
manoeuvre wheelchairs or prams on/off a bus. 
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Overall, the most frequent barrier issue was identified as safety (15% of all issues) 
and that the group most concerned with this are potential cycling customers.  The 
second most prevalent barrier relates to where there are ‘no or few separate assets 
or ability to access a separate facility’ (7% of the overall issues; or 11% when 
combined with the interlinked issue of shared space). 
AVIII.2.2.4 Levels of satisfaction 
A common strategy in general customer surveys is to assess the degree of 
satisfaction with a given outcome or asset, and then to ask customers to rank or 
provide feedback on a range of given parameters.  Respondents were generally 
satisfied with both roads and paths (Figure AVIII.10).  This is important to recall 
when considering other feedback.  Indeed, responses were sometimes prefaced 
‘generally good, but…’.  Furthermore, whilst satisfaction surveys may enable 
comparison over time, there may be an element of ‘expectation adjustment’.  
Consequently, satisfaction aligns with a given context, defined level of service, and 
other conditioning factors (e.g. vehicle condition, suspension). 
The general satisfaction question also provides a degree of benchmarking with past 
NZTA surveys and the context for subsequent questions on the relevance and 
attributes of comfort.  The NZTA currently surveys 1,000 customers every quarter 
to assess their satisfaction with the State highway network (NZTA, 2015b).  
Comparison with this survey (Figure AVIII.10) shows that whilst the proportions of 
average performance are similar, customers were slightly more satisfied with the 
State highway network than New Zealand’s roads and paths more generally.  This 
might infer that customers are less satisfied with local roads, which could indeed be 
the case (and was suggested by survey feedback).  However, this may not be the 
singular reason and the following observations are made in this regard: 
 The State highway surveys specifically excluded local roads, and could be 
interpreted as also excluding urban sections of the State highway (NZTA, 
2015b).  In smaller rural towns, the highway may have adjacent paths, and 
customers are not necessarily aware of, nor cared for, administrative 
boundaries (workshop feedback, survey responses).   
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Figure AVIII.10:  Overall road and path satisfaction (and comparison with State highway 
satisfaction surveys) 
Source:  Results from past NZTA surveys obtained with permission (NZTA, 2015b).   
Note:  ‘Other modes’ refers to walking and cycling only. 
 The State highway surveys also focus on driver or vehicular experience (e.g. 
“Maintaining the road surface so that it is safe to drive on”; NZTA (2015b)).  
Whilst non-drivers are recorded, wording inclines towards vehicle passengers 
(e.g. “Please select the frequency in which you use (as a passenger or driver) 
State Highways”; Ibid.).  However, the highway survey does ask how well the 
NZTA recognises and responds to the needs of different types of highway users 
such as cyclists and pedestrians.  Responses to that question show a much 
closer alignment with this survey (Figure AVIII.10).  This may suggest a higher 
proportion of non-vehicular customers responding to this survey (perhaps as a 
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consequence of distribution to interest groups), or respondents taking a broad 
approach (e.g. “Roads are built excellent (1) for being a car driver/passenger, 
but are built to very poor (5) for cyclists.”; Ibid.). 
A range of factors may therefore have contributed to the differences in satisfaction, 
and may not be as simple as the inclusion of local road infrastructure.  This is an 
area for further exploration. 
Customers were also given the opportunity to clarify their general satisfaction 
responses in an open-ended question; 59% (roads) and 45% (paths) elected to do 
so.  This gave rise to a large range of issues which provided a richness of detail 
otherwise not apparent at the higher level (summarised in Figure AVIII.11). 
 
Figure AVIII.11:  Summary of issues arising from general satisfaction with roads and 
paths 
Note:  Summarised from 79 individual road and 62 individual path issues.   
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At the summary level, by far the most significant road-related category related to 
provisions for mode diversity, followed by issues around maintenance, surface 
treatments, and customers’ experiences and behavioural factors.  Interestingly, 
traffic conditions such as congestion, which is often a transportation sector focal 
point, ranked fifth.   
Of the 79 individual road-related concerns identified (not plotted but integrated 
within Figure AVIII.11), ‘maintenance responses and strategies’ attracted the 
largest number of comments.  The general tenor of comments expressed a sense 
of frustration at the level of rework occurring on New Zealand roads.  There were 
two dominant aspects to this: 
 the reworking of roads where the customer did not perceive a need for 
maintenance (leaving ‘worse’ areas untouched); and 
 the current strategy of patching.  Customers consider this creates rough edges 
and bumps, does not last, and results in more disruption and a degraded 
outcome overall. 
The next two highest individual issues relate to a perceived lack of provision for 
cyclists and the closely related matter of cycle lane connectivity and quality.  
Comments relating to these highlighted issues with a singular approach given the 
breadth of cycling user groups: commuters, children or families, disabled users 
(e.g. using hand-bikes), and recreational cyclists of various levels (from those just 
wanting to do a bit of exercise, to others who indicated more extensive cycling 
usage).   
With respect to road surfacing (which underlies this study), general road surface 
conditions accounted for 3% of the issues raised.  However, customers were also 
concerned with a range of other factors which could arguably contribute to a 
generic question on road surface conditions.  These include: 
 maintenance strategies and practice (including the quality of repairs and utility 
works); 
 no or inadequate shoulders (extent of road surface or seal); 
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 other surfaces (e.g. loose gravel, metal covers); 
 surface treatments (e.g. slippery cobblestones); 
 bumps around manholes and the edge of repairs; 
 interfaces between areas (path to road, train tracks etc.); 
 corrugations, undulating or generally bumpy surfaces;  
 tar melts, bleeds and flushing (where “new layers of chip seal are rapidly 
embedded into the underlying layer” creating smooth or ‘flush’ surfaces; NZTA 
(2000)); 
 issues in the ride-line or corners; and 
 issues that force users to swerve (into a live lane, or to move off the road). 
Together, these account for another 18% of the total number of issues, and begin 
to highlight the complexity of road surface issues when considered from the 
customer’s perspective.   
Aligning with the feedback for roads, provision for mode diversity (or the range of 
modes and user groups competing for path space, and the relative priority these 
are given when interfacing with the road) was by far the most significant path 
category at the summary level (Figure AVIII.11).  Whilst maintenance was not 
within the top four path categories, ‘customers’ experiences and behavioural 
factors’ and ‘surface treatments’ (both within the top four for roads) placed second 
and third respectively.  Safety was the fourth ranked category (and was closely 
aligned with the crossing and intersection categories, which collectively account for 
17% of the total issues raised).   
Of the individual concerns identified (not plotted, but integrated within 
Figure AVIII.11), the three top issues were as follows: 
 The broken or generally bumpy condition of paths:  
Whilst maintenance and the poor condition of paths did attract a significant 
number of comments, a great many of the issues related to the design of the 
paths themselves.  Bumpy and undulating conditions were noted from the 
design of vehicle accessways, path depressions at crossing points, the 
transitions with the road and traffic islands, for example.  Customers noted that 
this made it difficult for path users; particularly the very young (or those pushing 
prams), those using mobility devices, or the less mobile and elderly.  These 
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issues were often exacerbated by other factors such as overhanging vegetation 
or parked cars, which reduced customer choice, experience, and frequently 
forced customers on to grassed verges or the road.   
 Safety issues: 
The broken and bumpy condition of paths was one of the important factors 
contributing to perceived or actual safety issues through the risk of getting 
stuck, tripping, tipping over, or breaking mobility devices.  Another key issue 
was the lack of paths, or the practice of installing paths only on one side of a 
road as this either forced customers on to the road (where often busy roads or 
inadequate shoulders then became an issue), or forced the customer to cross 
the road.  However, the most commonly identified safety issue related to the 
frequency and design of crossing points and the nature of intersections.  
Customers indicated that they would avoid crossing points they perceived (or 
had experienced) as being dangerous.  Roundabouts were often cited as 
problematic, along with driver behaviour, vehicle dominance, and the design of 
kerb depressions (frequency, location, width, steepness, paving transition etc.).  
Several people noted that they used their car more as a consequence.   
 Narrow or inadequate space: 
Narrow paths were considered to be especially difficult to use if you wished to 
walk side by side, needed to manage small children, or were in a mobility 
device.  Whilst there was an interface with path obstruction issues, often paths 
were identified as inappropriately narrow by design.  
Path surface conditions do not contribute to the measure of road smoothness (the 
focus of the wider study).  However, this highlights the importance of physical and 
behavioural interfaces with paths, and the condition of roads to those who may be 
crossing the road or are otherwise forced to walk on or alongside the road due to 
other factors.   
AVIII.2.2.5 Relative importance of comfort 
The next survey question looked at how customers see the relative importance of a 
range of given high-level factors.  The purpose was to contextualise the importance 
of comfort (as a high-level concept) within a range of typical transportation 
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indicators used by industry.  Whilst listed as separate or discrete concepts, the 
previous workshops indicated that the issues were in fact intertwined.  
Of all the issues, comfort was closest to being neutrally ranked (i.e. 55% of 
customers’ ranked comfort within the top six; 45% in the bottom six), and was 
ranked 7
th
 of the 12 given issues (Figure AVIII.12).  Safety and accessibility were 
seen as the two most important issues; comments again underlined the value of 
looking beyond an assumed or technical interpretation of these terms, and indeed, 
in engaging with the community. 
 
Figure AVIII.12:  Relative importance of issues 
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AVIII.2.2.6 Overall journey comfort 
Figure AVIII.13 presents the results of how customers view their overall journey 
comfort.  Of the 13 mode or user groups, all but one of the seven most comfortable 
mode or user groups are vehicular; car drivers and passengers being the most 
comfortable overall.  The most comfortable of the non-vehicular modes are 
pedestrians (5
th
).  The least comfortable are those customers in wheelchairs or 
users of mobility scooters, closely followed by horse riders.  The remainder of this 
Section explores comfort in more detail. 
 
Figure AVIII.13:  Overall journey comfort 
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AVIII.2.2.7 Road comfort factors 
A range of road-related comfort factors were identified and developed as part of 
earlier customer workshops and piloting of the questionnaire.  Customers were 
asked to identify those affecting their comfort (Table AVIII.5).   
Overall, ‘appropriate speeds’ was most the frequently identified factor affecting road 
mode or user group comfort; appearing within the three most frequently identified 
factors for all road modes or user groups with the exception of cyclists and 
motorcyclists/scooters.  Customers were given the opportunity to clarify their 
answers and this gave rise to a range of (sometimes conflicting) views (e.g. speed 
limits are too high/too low) and issues with a perceived ‘one size fits all’ or formulaic 
approach.  Responses also highlighted a behavioural component, such as bus 
drivers speeding up near bus stops or traffic lights. 
Table AVIII.5:  Comparison of most frequent road comfort factors 
Mode or User 
Group 
Three Most Frequent Road Comfort Factors 
1
st
  2
nd
  3
rd
  
All modes/user 
groups 
Appropriate speeds Road roughness and 
defects 
Other’s behaviour 
Car driver Appropriate speeds Other’s behaviour Traffic conditions 
Car passenger Appropriate speeds Road roughness and 
defects 
Other’s behaviour 
Cyclist Other’s 
behaviour 
Road 
roughness and 
defects
(2nd=)
 
Safety issues 
(2nd=)
 
Road surface 
texture
(2nd=)
 
Motorcyclist/ 
scooter 
Potholes Slippery surfaces Road roughness and 
defects 
Light commercial 
vehicle 
Appropriate speeds Road roughness and 
defects 
Other’s behaviour 
Truck Appropriate speeds Road roughness and 
defects 
Potholes 
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Mode or User 
Group 
Three Most Frequent Road Comfort Factors 
1
st
  2
nd
  3
rd
  
Bus driver Appropriate speeds Traffic conditions Road roughness and 
defects 
Bus passenger Connectivity and 
accessibility 
Appropriate speeds Clear and logical 
information 
‘Road roughness and defects’ was also a frequently identified issue for most 
modes; the exceptions being car drivers and bus passengers.  This is interesting 
given the focus on the drive-line of four-wheeled vehicles inherent within the 
methods for measuring road smoothness.  Comments related to road roughness 
and defects reinforced both its general importance and also the observations from 
the earlier focus groups, such as the importance of road shoulders, surface debris 
and its location, loss of grip/ultra-smooth surfaces, kerb transitions (kerb height and 
pavement interface), and user preference.  Maintenance practices (quality of 
workmanship, responsiveness) were also often identified within this theme. 
Other frequently identified issues included ‘other’s behaviour’, ‘traffic conditions’, 
‘safety’, ‘potholes’, ‘slippery surfaces’, and ‘road surface texture’.  The latter three 
being closely related to the issue of ‘road roughness and defects’.  However, the 
interplay between these issues, and the preferences or needs of different modes is 
an area for potential conflict.  Bus passengers also commonly identified 
‘connectivity and accessibility’ and the need for ‘clear and logical information’ as 
comfort factors.  Again, many of the associated comments noted that road 
conditions were ‘generally good, but…’.  Few new issues were raised; the two more 
frequent ones being enforcement and issues forcing users into the live lane, off the 
road, or onto another mode. 
After identifying the range of factors that affected their comfort on the road, 
customers were then asked to select the three most important, and then to rank 
these (Figure AVIII.14).  This shows a clear segregation of the top issues.  Again, 
‘safety issues’ was most frequently and singularly identified as one of the ‘three 
most important road comfort issues’ for customers.  Less notable were ‘others’ 
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behaviour’, ‘appropriate speeds’, and ‘road roughness and defects’.  However, all 
four were relatively dominant by comparison to the other issues.   
 
Figure AVIII.14:  Frequency distribution of the top three comfort factors: Roads 
AVIII.2.2.8 Path comfort factors 
As for roads, a range of path-related comfort factors were identified and developed 
as part of the previous customer workshops.  Customers were asked to identify 
those affecting their comfort (Table AVIII.6).   
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Table AVIII.6:  Comparison of most frequent path comfort factors 
Mode or User 
Group 
Three Most Frequent Path Comfort Factors 
1
st
  2
nd
  3
rd
  
All 
modes/user 
groups 
Kerbs/transitions with 
the road/between 
surfaces 
Path roughness, 
unevenness, and 
defects 
Path width 
(being 
able to 
travel side 
by 
side)
(3rd=)
 
Other’s 
behaviour 
(3rd=)
 
Bus 
passenger 
Connectivity and 
accessibility 
Clear and logical 
information 
Safety issues 
Cyclist Traffic separation Kerbs/transitions with 
the road/between 
surfaces 
Path width (being able 
to travel side by side) 
Pedestrian Path width (being able 
to travel side by side) 
Path roughness, 
unevenness, and 
defects 
Kerbs/transitions with 
the road/between 
surfaces 
Pedestrian 
with Pram or 
Pushchair 
Kerbs/transitions with 
the road/between 
surfaces 
Path width (being able 
to travel side by side) 
Path roughness, 
unevenness, and 
defects 
Wheel Chair 
or Mobility 
Scooter 
Path roughness, 
unevenness, and 
defects 
Kerbs/transitions with 
the road/between 
surfaces 
 
Path steepness 
Horse Other’s 
behaviour 
Safety 
issues 
Over-
hanging 
vegetation/ 
obstruc-
tions
(2nd=)
 
Traffic 
separation 
(2nd=)
 
Con-
sistency 
and pre-
dictability 
(2nd=)
 
Freedom, 
flexibility 
and 
choice
(2nd=)
 
Skateboard/ 
Long-
board/Push-
scooter 
Path roughness, 
unevenness, and 
defects 
Kerbs/transitions 
with the 
road/between 
surfaces
(2nd=)
 
Other’s 
behaviour
(2nd=)
 
Potholes
(2nd=)
 
Strategic intent and the management of infrastructure systems 
 
 
366 Appendix VIII CMB150717_E 
‘Kerbs/transitions with the road/between surfaces’ was most the frequently 
identified factor affecting path mode or user group comfort.  This issue appeared 
within the three most frequently identified factors for all path modes or user groups 
with the exception of bus passengers and people riding horses.  Customers were 
given the opportunity to clarify their answers or to comment further and many 
elected to do so, for example: 
Even, wide surfaces are important.  Need to consider good access free 
of barriers/obstacles for prams, wheelchairs and other people with 
mobility impairments as a priority issue.  Currently there are a number of 
areas [...] which have issues for these users at present, which would be 
relatively low cost to fix.  For example, the pedestrian crossing in 
[location] does not have a smooth transition from road to kerb [...] and 
just the other day I witnessed a wheelchair user having immense 
difficulty here.  This would be a very easy issue to fix. [SR913] 
‘Path roughness, unevenness, and defects’ was also a frequently identified 
category for many modes; the exceptions being bus passengers, cyclists, and 
those riding horses.  Current NZTA measures of comfort and smoothness do not, of 
course, consider paths.   
Bus passengers identified similar comfort factors for the path segment of their 
journey.  By contrast, cyclists identified a different suite of key issues including 
traffic separation, transitions with the road, and path width.  Modal separation was 
also important to other path users and included intertwined issues such as 
behaviour, relative speeds, awareness and responsiveness (ability to see or hear 
approaching cyclists), and adequate space. 
Other frequently identified issues included ‘other’s behaviour’, ‘path width (being 
able to travel side by side)’, ‘path steepness’, ‘safety’, and ‘potholes’.  Customers 
riding horses also identified ‘overhanging vegetation’, traffic separation’, 
‘consistency and predictability’, and ‘freedom, flexibility and choice’ as key issues.  
Many of these were also issues for other mode or user groups but fell outside the 
three most frequent issues. 
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Additional comments again largely clarified existing issues with few new issues 
identified.  As for roads, issues that forced users off paths and on to the road were 
also raised.  New issues included shared space, and issues at intersections or 
crossings, one respondent observing: 
Lack of pedestrian priority in street design in general is the greatest 
source of 'discomfort'. There is no greater lack of comfort than being 
killed or injured by drivers taking the cue given to them by the physical 
environment that they have total right of way over all more vulnerable 
users. [SR1328] 
After identifying the range of factors that affected their comfort on paths, customers 
were then asked to select the three most important, and then to rank these 
(Figure AVIII.15).  By comparison with road comfort, there is less separation of the 
top issues.  In this instance the category ‘path roughness, unevenness, and 
defects’ was most often identified within the top three path comfort issues and was 
relatively clear of the next most frequent issue.   
 
Figure AVIII.15:  Frequency distribution of the top three comfort factors: Paths 
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AVIII.2.2.9 Complexity of comfort 
Another way of looking at comfort data is directly in relation to its complexity.  This 
can be seen from the diversity of issues, and in particular the number of times 
comfort was captured by a single indicator or factor as is presumed by the current 
measure.  Table AVIII.7 shows the frequency that ‘path roughness, unevenness, 
and defects’ and/or ‘potholes’ was given as the sole comfort factor.  Figures 
AVIII.16–AVIII.17 then look at the distribution across any and all factors.  This 
reinforced the point that wheelchair or mobility scooter users in particular, and to a 
lesser extent cyclists (on the road) and car drivers have the most complex or 
diverse range of comfort issues.  Very few customers identified only a single factor 
affecting their comfort. 
Table AVIII.7:  Occurrence of ‘path roughness, unevenness, and defects’ and/or 
‘potholes’ as the sole comfort factor 
Mode or User Group Percentage 
Occurrence of 
Roughness or 
Potholes as the Sole 
Issue 
Percentage of 
Current Mode Use 
Roads 
Car driver 4% <1% 
Car passenger 6% <1% 
Cyclist 1% <1% 
Motorcyclist/scooter 1% <1% 
Light commercial vehicle 0% 0% 
Truck 0% 0% 
Bus driver 1% 3% 
Bus passenger 4% <1% 
Paths 
Bus passenger <1% 37% 
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Mode or User Group Percentage 
Occurrence of 
Roughness or 
Potholes as the Sole 
Issue 
Percentage of 
Current Mode Use 
Cyclist <1% 43% 
Pedestrian <1% 84% 
Pedestrian with Pram or Pushchair 0% 11% 
Wheel Chair or Mobility Scooter 1% 6% 
Horse 0% 1% 
Skateboard/Long-board/Push-scooter 3% 3% 
 
 
Figure AVIII.16:  Diversity of road comfort factors 
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Figure AVIII.17:  Diversity of path comfort factors 
AVIII.2.2.10 The role of comfort in mode augmentation and general 
satisfaction 
The survey design also enables consideration of the role of comfort in barriers to 
the uptake of other modes, and general satisfaction.  In essence, given comfort 
complexity, most barriers and comments pertaining to general satisfaction relate to 
comfort in some way.  Consequently, whilst ‘comfort’ as a singular term might not 
rank highly in customers’ minds, the individual attributes that contribute to the 
notion of comfort: 
 are closely intertwined and often inseparable as comfort factors; and 
 contribute to a range of other high-level performance areas (e.g. safety). 
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AVIII.3 Investigating influence 
AVIII.3.1 Investigating influence methods 
The final stage of this study involved a two hour workshop with seven managers 
from the highways operations and customer services teams within NZTA National 
Office.  As the workshop generated a ‘local government’ node, a secondary one 
hour workshop was also held with 11 Auckland Transport staff (providing a cross-
section of the organisation; e.g. walking and cycling, asset management, code of 
practice development).   
As with the other similar workshops (Chapters 5-6), participants brainstormed 
matters that would need to be modified within the organisation and wider system to 
respond to this research (Figure AVIII.18).  In this instance, these were written on 
theme cards and connected with either coloured wool or different coloured 
whiteboard markers (to represent the formal/informal nature of the relationships 
between the identified matters). 
 
Figure AVIII.18:  Raw workshop output (Auckland Transport workshop) 
Note:  Red lines/string indicates formal relationships; green lines/string indicates informal 
relationships.  This detail was included in the subsequent Gephi ‘plots’ but not shown in the 
examples to follow (which instead focus on the relative connectivity and thence likely 
organisational leverage points or priorities). 
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Again, the workshop outputs were plotted using Gephi (social network mapping 
tool). The mapping replicates the connections that were drawn by the workshop 
participants, but highlights the relative connectivity of each of the nodes (the nodes 
in this instance being the matters identified within the workshop).  This relative 
connectivity is underpinned by a tool within the programme which calculates the 
‘betweeness centrality’ (or the relative level of connectedness between nodes). 
Because the workshops generated a rich array of matters the two organisations 
considered would need to change, the relative connectivity was considered further 
here.   
AVIII.3.2 Investigating influence results 
Only limited time was available at the first workshop (NZTA).  However, the 
workshop still generated a wide range of matters; mostly relating to cultural/less 
tangible factors such as ‘tradition’ or ‘expectation management’.248  Workshop 
participants observed that any organisational change would need to extend beyond 
their part of the business to areas that would not necessarily have been top of 
mind; challenging the way they both thought of, and approached the issue.   
One of the other factors to be identified by the NZTA was ‘local government’, which 
is hardly surprising given central government reporting requirements, and the wide 
spread use of road smoothness as an indicator within the transportation sector.  
This provided an opportunity to explore and expand the influence networking 
exercise, and to link both the organisations informing the wider research 
programme.  The outputs from both workshops are shown in Figure AVIII.19.   
                                              
248
 And so aligning with the similar workshops undertaken as part of the other detailed studies. 
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Figure AVIII.19:  Influence of the comfort performance indicator 
Notes:  As defined by NZTA and Auckland Transport workshops.  Node and edge (connection) 
colouring denotes issue or factor communities.  Text size indicates the level of influence.  The 
nature of the relationship (formal/informal) was canvassed but is not shown in this instance. 
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Formal and informal relationships were also explored along with the ability to 
influence (or merely inform) change.  This highlighted further layers of complexity 
for those who might seek to effect change and buy-in from across the organisation 
and wider industry.249   
An alignment was also observed with the four ‘problem dimensions’ to emerge from 
the preliminary research (i.e. needs, precepts, choices, and aptitudes; Chapter 3), 
but with the added dimensions of ‘institutions’ and ‘processes’ (Figure AVIII.20).  
This underlined the point that in addition to procedural change, belief-systems and 
mental models (precepts) also need to be addressed.   
 
Figure AVIII.20:  Nature and distribution of influencing problem dimensions 
                                              
249
 A task becoming even more challenging in the absence of organisation-spanning roles.  This 
was also raised during the preliminary research interviews, where some interviewees noted 
these roles were absent, but needed. 
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Rather than just looking at the network as map of clustered relationships or tasks, 
the workshop material was then re-analysed using the tools within Gephi to assess 
the ‘betweeness centrality’ (or influence) of the six problem dimensions.  The aim 
was to explore in more detail whether this different approach gave a different 
insight into system leverage. 
In this instance, and in contrast with the data presented in Figure AVIII.20, outright 
‘needs’ and the related ‘processes’ were the most dominant areas.  However, whilst 
the source type ‘aptitudes’ had the lowest overall influence as a group, it ranked 
proportionally higher on average.  This suggests that whilst the ‘needs’- and 
‘process’-related areas will be important, there will be certain secondary areas that, 
due to their disproportionate influence, will need to be addressed if change is to be 
effective.   
Secondary areas, such as ‘aptitudes’, included the less tangible actions or issues.  
As such, these may not be immediately obvious or could be easily overlooked 
when prioritising actions or a change in direction.  This suggests that there is merit 
in this approach as a tool for assessing or testing what to prioritise or leverage 
when approaching such a complex matter.  That is, provided the need to iterate 
over time is recognised. 
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APPENDIX IX:  DETAILED STUDY 3 QUESTIONNAIRE 
Source: NZTA (2014b) 
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